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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Aging, Motivation, and Memory for Important Information 
 
by 
 
Mary Bryce Hargis 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Alan Dan Castel, Chair 
 
  Across the adult lifespan, we pursue many different goals: we may learn new 
information, try to stay healthy, and build relationships with loved ones. Previous work (e.g., 
socioemotional selectivity theory, Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) suggests that while 
younger adults pursue primarily knowledge-based goals, older adults pursue primarily social and 
emotional goals. Though this shift in priorities is supported by substantial evidence, what 
motivates us to learn in healthy aging may be more complex than a single theory may suggest. 
The current Dissertation investigates how learners remember information with primarily social 
goals (Chapter 2) and primarily knowledge-based goals (Chapters 3 and 4), as well as how 
variables such as age and information importance can affect memory and metacognition. 
 Though age-related deficits for associative information are well-established (e.g., Naveh-
Benjamin, 2000), older adults are often able to prioritize and associate items in memory that are 
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the most important to remember, given their learning goals. Metacognition is a critical 
component of how we monitor and control our learning, and some evidence in this Dissertation 
suggests that we do not have accurate representations of our memory abilities. However, 
overconfidence is not ubiquitous: for example, we are aware that we may not be very good at 
remembering other peoples’ names; also, after a difficult associative memory task, we may 
remedy our overconfidence about our own memory abilities and others’.  
 An overarching theme among these studies is the investigation of how people learn what 
it is they need to know in order to achieve their goals. The current research suggests that, 
especially when given the opportunity to learn from their mistakes, learners young and old can 
successfully pursue a diverse array of learning goals. While substantial previous work focuses on 
a shift from knowledge-based to socioemotional goals in older adulthood, the current studies 
support the notion that a more general value-based mechanism guides learning behavior. These 
previous socio-emotional models are a helpful framework, but the evidence suggests that value 
and importance drive learning and goal pursuit in aging. Determining what information is 
important to remember, what information can be forgotten, and what information will be useful 
in achieving a goal are complex cognitive processes in which many older adults may still be 
quite successful, even in light of deficits in memory.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Across the adult lifespan, our goals often include gaining new knowledge, building 
relationships, and staying healthy. While younger adults may seek to gain knowledge in school 
and at work to excel in their chosen careers, many older adults have different priorities, such as 
improving their social and emotional well-being. Older adults may pursue relationship-building 
activities with close friends and family, while younger adults choose to focus on learning new 
information. However, cognitive aging is a multifaceted process, and goal pursuit is likely more 
complex than a single theory may suggest. For example, many older adults also pursue learning 
for the sake of acquiring knowledge, and many spend time on hobbies such as birdwatching or 
travelling that involve learning new information and exploring new situations. 
 Motivational differences throughout adulthood are thought to be related to individuals’ 
perceptions of their futures: if individuals are aware that their time on earth is limited, that time 
is spent differently than if the future seems expansive. When younger and older adults are given 
the hypothetical option to spend time with another person, younger adults gravitate towards 
spending time with those they do not know well, while older adults choose to spend time with 
those with whom they are already in close relationships. This is not to say that younger adults do 
not care about building social relationships; in fact, younger adults’ choices show a reversed 
pattern (such that they choose to spend time with closer friends and family more than those with 
whom they are not as close) when the fragility of life is primed by events such as the SARS 
epidemic and the September 11th terrorist attacks (Fung & Carstensen, 2006), or by a more 
predictable ending such as graduating from college (Ersner-Hershfield, Mikels, Sullivan, & 
Carstensen, 2008).   
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 In fact, this well-established pattern of socio-emotional goal pursuit may not always hold 
for older adults, either. It is apparent that older adults seek out relationship-building and 
emotion-regulation goals, and this has been extensively examined in the literature. However, 
older adults also seek to learn new things: prior work suggests that many older adults who are 
engaged in formal learning programs joined these programs to gain knowledge for the sake of 
learning (Wolfgang & Dowling, 1981), and very few report that they joined such a program for 
social or emotional reasons. Even those not engaged in formal learning programs seek out 
information in service of their hobbies, interests, or health. These activities may be intertwined 
with socio-emotional goals, such as the older adult who tries to remember important information 
about a medical diagnosis to discuss later with her spouse or friends, but the motivation to 
acquire knowledge is still present, as is the need to prioritize information that is important to 
achieve one’s goal. 
 Older adults often have goals in common with younger adults, but the pursuit of these 
goals may be different, at least partially due to the resources available to pursue such goals. For 
instance, in the context of memory and learning, younger and older adults likely differ on both 
their performance abilities and their functional goals. Some deficits in cognitive processing 
accompany healthy aging, and these deficits may limit the extent to which older adults can 
pursue goals that are categorized (often by researchers) as knowledge-based, such as spending 
time with a new and informative social partner or attending university lectures. However, older 
adults can be as accurate as younger adults at remembering information that is deemed to be 
important or valuable, either by the individuals themselves or by the experimenter. The value of 
to-be-remembered information can significantly affect one’s likelihood of recalling it later, and 
the difference in memory for unimportant and important information is often even more 
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pronounced for older adults than it is for younger adults. As we face environments in which we 
cannot hope to remember everything (during a course lecture, for example, or at the doctor’s 
office), we may select a relevant group of items based on our goals in that situation and exert 
strategies to remember those items to the best of our ability. 
 When a set of items or facts is important to remember, but we recognize the potential to 
forget some or all of information, we may choose to offload the information (e.g., by writing it 
down or saving it to an external device). Different types of information may be associated with 
different levels of likelihood of forgetting: some information considered easy to remember or 
important may have a lower likelihood of being forgotten (and is thus not necessary to offload), 
while other information that is complex or unimportant has a higher likelihood of being forgotten 
(and thus would benefit from offloading). Variables that influence memory and metacognition 
such as value and likelihood of forgetting are important to assess when investigating potential 
age differences in motivation to learn, as the ability of individuals across the adult lifespan to 
recall information and to make judgments about their cognition often depends upon the goals the 
participant is pursuing.  
 This Dissertation begins by exploring how age may affect learning information about 
other people (Chapter 2, Experiments 1 and 2, Study 3). Then, I will examine how younger and 
older adults learn information to communicate with other people (Chapter 2, Experiments 4 and 
5), as well as how learning across a task can be affected by knowledge-based goals that do not 
have a primary social component (Chapters 3 and 4). An overarching theme among these 
chapters is the examination of how people learn what it is they need to learn, often using multiple 
study-test trials to examine learning across a task. Another theme uniting these studies is that 
many require associative memory (i.e., binding multiple, often unrelated, items in memory), the 
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accuracy of which has been shown to decline in healthy aging. Even though older adults may 
struggle with this type of learning, associating items in memory is an important skill that people 
across the lifespan use in daily life, such as when we meet someone new and seek to match their 
name to their face. Overall, this Dissertation supports the notion that determining what 
information is important to remember, what information can be forgotten, and what information 
will be useful in achieving a goal are complex cognitive processes in which many older adults 
may still be quite successful, even in light of deficits in memory. 
Memory for valuable information 
 The cognitive declines that accompany healthy aging are well-documented. Associating 
items in memory (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000), recalling particular events from one’s past (Levine et 
al., 2002; Mitchell, Brown, & Murphy, 1990), and manipulating items in memory (Salthouse, 
Mitchell, Skovronek, & Babcock, 1989) may all be difficult for an older adult. Healthy older 
adults often complain of memory errors such as where they placed their car keys, the name of the 
person they met earlier, or whether they are supposed to take their new medication with food. 
Younger adults may experience very similar errors but often chalk them up to being busy, tired, 
or rushed, while an older adult may assume (sometimes correctly) that these errors are part of 
getting older, or that they indicate concerning changes in cognitive health. 
 Anderson and Schooler (2000) constructed a framework that explains how information 
that is needed in the future is stored and recalled. This construct, termed “need probability,” 
relates the likelihood of future use of a set of information to the likelihood that the information is 
recalled. If this information is high in need probability, it is considered more likely to be 
remembered, regardless of one’s age. Nevertheless, age is an important factor in determining 
what gets remembered and what strategies are used to do so.  In the domain of cognitive aging, 
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we may consider important information to be related to one’s health, one’s interests, and more, 
including whatever the experimenter suggests will likely be on the upcoming memory test.  
 If a reward is associated with the recall of a particular item — such as points being added 
to a participant’s score on that task — that item is likely to be associated with a higher need 
probability, and thus become more important to remember. If there is more information 
presented than one can hope to remember, one can use strategies that vary in effectiveness to 
remember the valuable information. Should I try to amass as much information as possible with 
the limited study time I have, through brute-force memorization? Should I pay attention to the 
items that are easiest for me to learn, then move on to harder items? Should I use my study time 
on the items that are worth the most points, and direct attention away from less-valuable items? 
When the experimenter randomly assigns points to words as the indicator of their value, 
participants seem to engage in the last strategy: recalling the words that increase their score the 
most (e.g., by focusing on a 12-point word over a 2-point word). Of the words recalled in tasks 
like these, many are high-value, indicating a focus on those items at some point during study, 
which many participants report doing after the task is completed.  
 Not all value paradigms are constructed with randomly-paired point values, however, as 
value-directed remembering tasks can be adapted to allow for the use of more naturalistic stimuli 
that may reflect how participants learn valuable information outside of the lab. Middlebrooks, 
McGillivray, Murayama, and Castel (2015) utilized a list of allergens, Friedman, McGillivray, 
Murayama, and Castel (2015) presented participants with medication side effects, and Castel et 
al. (2016) asked participants to remember information about people who owed them various 
amounts of money (see Chapters 2 and 3 of this Dissertation for more examples). Younger and 
older people are able to execute effective strategies to remember the most important information 
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in such tasks. These findings are particularly interesting in the domain of healthy cognitive 
aging, as memory for associative information can often be affected by the age-related memory 
deficits discussed above (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). Age differences are also present in many 
studies, however, when considering overall memory performance: younger adults tend to 
correctly recall more information overall than older adults do. This Dissertation examines how 
and why people remember important information using point value structures, as well as stimuli 
that people are more likely to encounter outside the lab, such as social and medical information.  
Metacognition across the lifespan 
When we study, we often make assessments about how well we have learned something, 
perhaps adjusting our strategies to remember more (or different) information on the next memory 
test. Metamemory includes the selection and use of strategies, perceptions about how memory 
works, and memory self-efficacy (Hertzog, Dixon, & Hultsch, 1990). Hertzog & Hultsch (2000) 
suggest that there are three main components of metacognition: knowledge about cognition and 
cognitive functions, monitoring of the current state of the cognitive system, and beliefs about 
cognition (including one’s own cognition and others’; see Chapter 2, Experiments 3 and 4). 
These judgments can be collected in a variety of contexts, including asking participants for pre-
task predictions of performance, judgments of learning made during the study phase, or post-task 
confidence ratings of test performance (or some combination of the three). Some of the studies 
described below directly ask for participants’ pre-task and post-task metacognitive judgments 
(e.g., Chapter 3, Experiments 3 and 4), but several of the other studies assess metacognition from 
a more indirect perspective. For example, the use of a value-based strategy in Chapter 4 may 
reflect a sophisticated understanding of one’s ability to perform in a memory task, and/or the 
optimal way(s) to pursue one’s goal.   
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Overall, the literature on age-related differences in metacognition is mixed. Deficits can 
occur under certain circumstances in which older adults are disadvantaged, but other tasks that 
tap into preserved abilities suggest that these age-related declines are not universal. Prior work 
illustrates equivalences between younger and older adults in their post-task judgments about their 
memory performance on a recently completed test (Perlmutter, 1978), their ratings of likelihood 
of recalling each item in a study phase (Lovelace & Marsh, 1985), and their comprehension of 
texts, which also requires metacognition (Zabrucky, Moore, & Schultz, 1987).  
There are reasons to believe, however, that metacognition may be detrimentally affected 
by the process of healthy aging. Older adults are often overconfident in their memory 
performance (Brigham & Pressley, 1988). A particular area of interest, and one in which older 
adults tend to be less accurate, is the use of metacognitive strategies: Older adults do not endorse 
certain effective strategies as in fact being effective, while younger adults do notice these 
differences (Brigham & Pressley, 1988). However, the value-directed remembering literature 
(e.g., Castel, 2008) suggests that older adults (and younger adults) may learn effective memory 
prioritization strategies with task experience. On a task in which the goal is to remember high-
value items to maximize one’s score, older adults are often able to execute such strategies if 
given multiple study-test opportunities. While older adults are less accurate in recalling the 
lowest-value items, they often perform as well as younger adults in recalling the highest-value 
items. Though any number of memory strategies could be used during study (e.g., making a story 
out of the list of to-be-learned words, fitting them into a mental image of a scene, or using no 
strategy at all), there is evidence for the use of an overall value-based strategy in the memory 
performance of both younger and older participants.  
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Pursuit of socioemotional and knowledge-based goals 
 A critical component of the aging process is the conception of time, specifically the time 
remaining in one’s life. As we age, the limited nature of our time left on earth becomes more 
salient (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Awareness of a limited amount of time 
remaining may lead older people to pursue certain goals that are different in many ways than 
how younger adults pursue their goals. For example, the experience of social contact becomes 
more about quality than about quantity: that is, an older adult may seek to spend time with a few 
close friends or family members rather than meet and get to know a large group of 
acquaintances, and this pattern can be reversed for a younger adult whose social preferences 
often include those which fulfill knowledge-acquisition goals.  
 Carstensen and colleagues (1999) argue that the perception of endings leads individuals 
across the lifespan to experience an emphasis on feelings, and this leads to the pursuit of goals in 
line with that emotional emphasis. Substantial work supports this argument (Charles & 
Carstensen, 2010; Carstensen & Charles, 1998; Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003; Ersner-
Hershfield et al., 2008; Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990; Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999). 
Further, Carstensen et al. (1999) propose that emotional goals are fundamentally different from 
knowledge-based goals. Emotional goals may include avoiding negative states, pursuing positive 
states, and getting to know someone. Knowledge acquisition goals can include some social 
component (e.g., planning to share a new medical treatment plan with a loved one), but the 
primary aim of these goals is to learn about the world. The differences between knowledge 
acquisition and emotional goal-seeking are fairly nuanced; to include the conception of time as a 
major factor can help distinguish the two. For example, learning how to get along with one’s 
colleagues in one’s early twenties can be considered a future-oriented goal as one seeks to build 
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knowledge and skills in interacting with people of different backgrounds and cultures that will 
surely be helpful in one’s future workplace interactions.  
 When time horizons are broad and expansive, future-oriented goals are the priority. When 
time horizons are limited, the future is necessarily less expansive, so knowledge-based goals are 
no longer prioritized. Emotional and knowledge acquisition goals often compete with each other, 
but this competition becomes less salient as we notice that time is, in a sense, “running out.” 
Carstensen et al. (1997) acknowledge that there are obviously emotional components to some 
knowledge-acquisition tasks and vice versa, but they do argue that older adults primarily focus 
on satisfying their emotional needs while knowledge-based goals become less important (see 
Figure 1.1 for a schematic diagram of goal pursuit across the lifespan according to socio-
emotional selectivity theory).  
  
Figure 1.1. A schematic diagram of how goals change throughout the lifespan. Carstensen, 
Gross, and Fung (1997) suggest that knowledge-based goals become relatively unimportant in 
older adulthood after peaking in adolescence, and that emotion-based goals have the opposite 
trajectory. 
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 Deciding which goals to pursue is not entirely dependent upon chronological age, 
however. It may not tell the whole story to simply state that older adults care about social goals 
and emotion regulation and that younger adults care about gaining knowledge. There are many 
circumstances under which the roles are reversed, and these do not appear to be merely 
superficial exceptions to the general rule. Situations in which older adults seek knowledge are 
important and worth recognizing from a theoretical perspective, even though much of the prior 
work on this topic does reflect older adults’ preference for socioemotional goals. 
 For example, a particular type of knowledge-based goal that younger and older adults 
may often pursue is learning information they are curious about. McGillivray and colleagues 
(2015) investigated how interest affects memory by presenting younger and older adults with 
different trivia items and asking them which of the questions they felt confident in answering 
correctly. When asked to recall the answers to the questions later, there were no age-related 
differences in recall accuracy, which is surprising given the associative nature of the task. 
Memory performance for both age groups after a one-week delay was significantly less accurate 
than performance on the immediate test, as expected. Interestingly, older adults’ recall accuracy 
was strongly predicted by the ratings they gave after learning the answers to the trivia questions, 
while younger adults’ recall was less strongly predicted by this factor. This finding underscores 
the importance of interest in older adults’ long-term learning of information, and why it should 
be considered a strongly motivating factor when older adults seek new information. In this 
Dissertation, I examine younger and older adults’ memory and metamemory for valuable, 
perhaps interesting information that would serve them in pursuing social and/or knowledge-
based goals (see Hargis et al., 2017 for a deeper examination of interest, memory, and aging). 
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  There are notable situations in which older adults seek to learn, and examining those 
cases can help us better understand how motivation and goal pursuit change across the adult 
lifespan — or, perhaps, do not change as much as prevailing theories suggest. In Chapter 2 of 
this Dissertation, different facets of the impact that socio-emotional goals can have on memory 
and learning will be examined in the context of learning information about other people (e.g., 
their names and occupations). Experiments 4 and 5 in the same Chapter examine situations in 
which we also seek to learn for socio-emotional reasons, but rather than information about 
others, these experiments will examine how people learn information they would use with others. 
Chapter 3 explores how younger and older adults learn health-related information when faced 
with knowledge-based goals (e.g., learning about medication interactions or side effects). 
Chapter 4 examines how value can affect learners’ decisions to commit information to memory 
or save it to an external source, and how these decisions may or may not change with task 
experience. The aim of this Dissertation is to assess how healthy aging and information 
importance may affect memory and motivation to learn, with potential applications to social 
(Chapter 2), health (Chapter 3), and educational (Chapter 4) domains. 
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CHAPTER 2: YOUNGER AND OLDER ADULTS’ MEMORY FOR IMPORTANT 
SOCIAL INFORMATION 
Portions of the following introductory comments, Experiments 1 and 2, and portions of the 
conclusion are taken directly from Hargis & Castel (2017) 
 There is often a shift in what goals we choose to pursue across the adult lifespan. 
Younger adults tend to pursue goals that will build their knowledge — many of their waking 
hours are spent learning information that may (or may not) be useful in their later careers. 
Younger adults’ tendency to pursue knowledge has even been found in their choice of social 
partners; when given the choice, they often choose to interact with acquaintances or authors of 
books they have recently read, rather than a close friend of family member (Fredrickson & 
Carstensen, 1990; cf. Fung & Carstensen, 2006). Older adults, however, prefer to interact with 
people with whom they have already established relationships. Goals in daily life can also 
motivate behavior in a lab-based memory task; indeed, some tasks in this Chapter (and, for the 
most part, in this Dissertation) are built to be similar to real-life situations in which we may need 
to learn about others (e.g., meeting people at a party) while also maintaining as much internal 
validity as possible given individual differences in abilities and opinions about what is truly 
important. The current work examines potential age-related differences in motivation within the 
domain of learning and memory.  
 Chapter 2 explores how younger and older people are motivated to remember information 
that contains different social components: information about potential social partners themselves 
(Experiments 1 and 2; Study 3), or information that one may wish to use when communicating 
with a social partner (Experiments 4 and 5). Chapter 2 serves to support the argument that 
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younger and older adults can be strongly motivated by building relationships, and future 
Chapters will expand upon motivation to include knowledge-based goals.  
Experiment 1 
 During everyday social interactions, we often attempt to remember information about 
people we meet. As we age, we may face situations in which we cannot remember all of the 
social information in our environment. Older adults often complain about forgetting names 
(Troyer, Häfliger, Cadieux, & Craik, 2006), and there is evidence that the impairment in face-
name binding is a specific subset of an overall age-related associative deficit among older adults 
(Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, Kilb, & Reedy, 2004; cf. McGillivray & Castel, 2010). On the other 
hand, occupation information may be processed more deeply than names are, leading to better 
memory for individuals’ occupations (Cohen, 1990; Fogler, James, & Crandall, 2010). Older 
adults’ prior successful task performance can promote future accuracy (Geraci & Miller, 2013), 
and older participants tend to become more selective – that is, recalling more high-value items 
than low– with task experience (Castel, 2008). Festini, Hartley, Tauber and Rhodes (2013) found 
that younger adults are sensitive to value when learning face-name pairs, but this has yet to be 
examined in older adults, and with value categories that are more socially relevant. Despite 
widely-documented associative memory deficits (Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008), older adults 
may be able to focus on remembering associated information about people they will encounter in 
the future, and for a subset of important individuals that may be most relevant to remember. 
 In the current study, we use a novel value structure: social information that varies with 
respect to the likelihood of the participants’ future use of it (Anderson & Schooler, 2000). Basing 
value on the likelihood of future use and utilizing several study-test phases may reduce older 
adults’ associative memory deficits. While younger adults may recruit effective encoding 
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strategies to remember a large quantity of information, older adults’ awareness of memory 
capacity limitations may lead to lower memory accuracy for low-value items but relatively high 
recall of important information (Castel, 2008). Older age may lead to seeking emotionally 
meaningful interactions, while goals that focus on acquiring information are perceived as less 
important (Lang & Carstensen, 2002). If older adults’ goals support remembering a person with 
whom they will interact in future (e.g., their new doctor), they may be able to selectively 
remember item and associative information about these important people. 
 In Experiment 1, we examined the impact of importance on younger and older adults’ 
memory for associative social information. Specifically, we were interested in whether recall 
would be affected by the likelihood of hypothetically meeting the studied people in the future 
and whether this would differ between age groups. Participants saw 20 face-name-occupation 
items and were tested via free recall tests (with restudy periods) and a final cued-recall test. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four younger adults (20 females) aged 18 –21 years (M = 19.78, SD = 1.92) 
participated in this experiment. They had an average educational level of 13.91 years (SD = 
1.76), were undergraduates at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and were given 
course credit for their participation. Twenty older adults (10 females) aged 61– 82 years (M = 
69.55, SD = 5.60) had an average educational level of 16.09 years (SD = 1.48), were from Los 
Angeles, were in good health, M = 8.40 (SD = 1.33) on a scale from 1 (poor health) to 10 
(excellent health), and received $10 per hour for their participation. 
Materials and Procedure 
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Participants were told to imagine that they were attending a party where they would meet 
20 new people and that they had 3 s to view and study each person’s face, name, and occupation. 
Participants were told that personally important people included those with whom there would be 
a definite future interaction (information about whom would appear in orange text), while 
broadly important people were those who would be seen again but with whom the participant 
would not interact (blue text); less important people would not be seen or interacted with again 
(black text). Participants were to remember as much information as possible, “keeping in mind 
the likelihood of interacting with that person again.”  
All photographs in this experiment were of middle-aged adults of various ethnic groups 
(10 with neutral expressions, 10 smiling, all photographs in color, half male and half female; 
Minear & Park, 2004), each of which was presented on a computer screen under the individual’s 
name and occupation. The assignment of names to photographs was randomized within each 
gender, and the assignment of people to each occupation was also randomized. The high-value 
and medium-value occupations were always presented with photographs of smiling faces, and 
the low-value occupations were randomly associated with the remaining photographs of smiling 
or neutral faces. This particular value structure was constructed with the notion in mind that it is 
unlikely that a high percentage of people one meets at a party would be highly important to 
remember. Prior value-directed remembering tasks (e.g., Castel, Farb, & Craik, 2007) categorize 
three to four items as “high value” and separate the remaining items into lower value categories. 
Other experiments examining memory for faces have used, for example, six faces per category 
(Mealey, Daood, & Krage, 1996) and two faces per category (Castel et al., 2016). Therefore, 3 
items were assigned to the “personally important” category, 3 items to the “broadly important” 
category, and 14 items to the “less important” category. Common occupations (e.g., sales clerk) 
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were randomly assigned to the people with whom the participants would not interact or see 
again, while the “broadly important” and “personally important” categories included “future 
television star” and “your new doctor,” respectively. Each face-name-occupation triplet was 
studied in randomized order for 3 s. Participants then completed an untimed free recall test in 
which they were to enter information about the people they had just “met” in columns labeled 
“Name” and “Job” on the computer screen. Each participant completed four study-test phases, 
with the same information on each list in newly randomized orders. Participants then completed 
an untimed cued recall test, in which they saw each photograph and were asked to enter the 
person’s name and occupation. Participants then gave their opinions on a 5-point Likert scale 
(from 1 indicating not important to 5 indicating very important) of how important it would be to 
remember a person with each occupation used in the study. This research was approved by the 
UCLA Institutional Review Board ethics committee. 
Results 
Free recall tests  
The results from the free recall tests are presented in Figure 2.1. The accuracy of 
information presented in the less important category was analyzed separately from information 
presented in the other categories, due to differences in the amount of information in the 
categories. To investigate possible age or value differences in free recall of personally and 
broadly important information, a 2(Importance: broad or personal) × 2(Participant age: younger 
or older) ×	4(Test phase) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, revealing no significant 
main effect of age, F(1, 42) = 2.26, p = .14, h2p  =  .05 . There was a significant main effect of 
information importance, F(1,42) = 7.89, p < .01, h2p  =  .16, such that information about 
personally important people (M = 1.67, SD = 1.18) was remembered significantly more 
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accurately than information about broadly important people (M = 1.39, SD = 1.95).  There was a 
significant main effect of test, F(3, 126) = 51.95, p <.001, h2p  =  .55, such that performance on 
Test 2 (M = 1.45, SD = 0.82) was more accurate than on Test 1 (M = 0.51, SD = 0.81), t(43) = 
5.37, p <.001. Performance on Test 3 (M = 1.94, SD = 1.12) was more accurate than on Test 2, 
t(43) = 3.34, p < .01, and performance on Test 4 (M = 2.22, SD  = 1.00) was not significantly 
different from Test 3 t(43) = 1.89, p = .37. No other effects were significant, ps > .29. 
To analyze the recall of less important information, a 2(Participant age: younger or older) ×	4(Test phase) ANOVA was conducted and revealed a significant two-way interaction between 
test and age, F(3, 126) = 10.88, p < .001, h2p  =  .21.  Post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrections 
indicated that younger adults performed more accurately on Test 2 than on Test 1 (M = 3.79, SD 
= 2.98 and M = 1.21, SD = 1.79, respectively), t(23) =  4.08, p < .001, more accurately on Test 3 
(M = 6.63, SD = 3.94) than on Test 2, t(23) = 4.18, p <.001 , and as accurately on Test 4 (M = 
7.58, SD = 4.98) as on Test 3, t(23) = 1.46, p = .16 . Older adults’ performance on Test 2 was 
more accurate than on Test 1 (M = 1.21, SD = 1.79 and M = 0.80, SD = 1.15, respectively), t(19) 
=  2.24, p = .04, and performance on Test 3 (M = 1.80, SD = 1.85) was more accurate than on 
Test 2, t(19) = 2.43, p = .03. There was no difference in older adults’ performance on Tests 3 and 
4 (M = 1.80, SD = 1.85 and M = 1.80, SD = 2.02, respectively), t(19) < 1, p = 1.00. There was a 
significant main effect of age, F(1, 42) =30.35, p < .001, h2p  = .42, such that younger adults 
remembered more information associated with people of less importance than older adults did 
(M = 4.36, SD = 4.36 and M = 1.18, SD = 1.62, respectively).  
Cued recall test 
Recall of names and occupations were scored separately on the cued recall test. A 
2(Importance: broad or personal) × 2(Participant age: younger or older) ×	2(Characteristic: 
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name or occupation) ANOVA revealed a main effect of characteristic on cued recall 
performance, F(1, 42) = 11.64, p < .001, h2p  =  .22,  such that occupations were recalled more 
accurately than names (M = 2.38, SD = 0.88 and M = 2.16, SD = 0.96, respectively, see Figure 
2.1). There was no effect of age, F(1,42) = 2.67, p = .11, h2p  =  .06. There was a significant two-
way interaction between characteristic and age, F(1, 42) = 4.71, p = .04, h2p  = .10. Post hoc t-
tests with Bonferroni corrections revealed that there were no significant differences in younger 
adults’ recall of names and occupations, t(23) = 1.07, p = .30. However, older adults recalled 
occupations significantly more accurately than they recalled names (M = 2.25, SD = 0.75 and M 
= 1.88, SD = 0.90, respectively), t(19) = 3.29, p < .01. No other effects were significant, ps > .12. 
A 2(Participant age: younger or older) ×	2(Characteristic: name or occupation) ANOVA 
was used to analyze cued recall accuracy of less important information, and revealed a two-way 
interaction, F(1, 42) = 16.66 , p = .001, h2p  = .28. Post-hoc t-tests revealed no significant 
differences in younger adults’ recall of names and occupations, t(23) = 0.53, p = .60, while older 
adults recalled occupations significantly more accurately than they recalled names (M = 6.05, SD 
= 3.93 and M = 3.30, SD = 2.88, respectively), t(19) = 5.60, p < .001. There was a significant 
main effect of age, F(1, 42) = 19.54, p < .001, such that younger adults outperformed older 
adults (M = 9.85, SD = 3.76 and M = 4.48, SD = 3.87, respectively).  
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Figure 2.1. The proportion of personally important, broadly important, and less important 
information correctly recalled by younger adults and older adults in the four free recall tests (top 
panel) and final cued recall test (bottom panel) in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate standard 
error of the mean. 
 
Importance ratings 
After the cued recall test, participants gave their own opinions (on scales from 1 = not 
important to 5 = very important) for the importance of remembering a person with each 
occupation. A 2(Age: younger or older) x 3(Importance: personal, broad, or less important) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on participants’ importance ratings revealed a significant main 
effect of importance F(2, 84) = 49.68, p < .001, h2p  = .54, such that information in the 
“personally important” category was rated as subjectively more important than information in the 
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“broadly important” category (M = 4.20, SD = 0.78, and M = 3.44, SD = 1.02, respectively, t(43) 
= 5.11, p < .001), and that information in the personally important category was rated as more 
important than information in the “less important” category (M = 2.66, SD = 0.61, t(43) = 9.97, p 
< .001), and information in the broadly important category was rated as more important than 
information in the less important category, t(43) = 4.86, p < .001. A significant two-way 
interaction between age and importance was also revealed, F(2, 84) = 5.59, p < .01, h2p  =.12. 
Younger adults rated people with the occupations included in the less important categories as 
less important than the broadly important items (M = 2.39, SD = 0.54 and M = 3.63, SD = 1.04, 
respectively), t(23) = 5.73,  p < .001, those in the personally important category as more 
important than the broadly important category (M = 4.24, SD = 0.74), t(23) = 2.91, p < .01, and 
the less important category, t(23) = 8.17, p < .001. Older adults did not rate those in the broadly 
important and less important categories differently, t(19) = 1.44, p = .17, but they did rate 
personally important items as more important than broadly important items (M = 4.15, SD = 0.85 
and M = 3.22, SD = 0.98, respectively), t(19) = 3.93, p < .001, and less important items (M = 
2.98, SD = 0.53), t(19) = 5.77, p <.001. There was no effect of age on the ratings given by 
participants, F < 1, p = .87.  
Discussion 
Younger and older participants performed equally well in recalling important 
information, suggesting that a value-sensitive mechanism may reduce associative memory 
deficits in older adults. Other processes such as social pruning, in which social networks 
decrease in size as we age but meaningful connections remain and are often strengthened, could 
also influence memory for social information among older adults (Charles & Carstensen, 2010). 
The increase in accuracy throughout the experiment reflects a beneficial effect of repeated testing 
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(and/or of restudying) on memory for associative social information for both younger and older 
adults (Geraci & Miller, 2013; Meyer & Logan, 2013). Finally, both age groups’ ratings of 
importance were similar to the experimenter-designated categories. 
Older adults’ memory deficits may be attributed to general slowing of encoding 
operations (Salthouse, 1996). When younger adults have insufficient time to encode associative 
information, their performance is expected to be less accurate, though value-directed 
remembering strategies may still be implemented (cf., Middlebrooks, Murayama, & Castel, 
2016). It may be that when younger adults have reduced time to encode information, their 
encoding experience and later recall performance is similar to that of older adults, an issue we 
examine in Experiment 2.   
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, younger adults recalled low-value information more accurately than 
older adults did, but age differences were not present in the recall of high-value information. In 
Experiment 2, we sought to increase the difficulty of the encoding phase by allowing younger 
participants less study time, a situation that may perhaps mimic the general slowing that older 
adults experience in several cognitive domains (Salthouse, 1996). Younger adults’ memory for 
face-name associations is impaired under divided attention (Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2004), but a 
shorter encoding time may direct younger participants to focus on important information (cf., 
Middlebrooks et al., 2016). We hypothesized that younger adults would engage in selective 
memory strategies, which would lead to fewer low-value items recalled (possibly at a level more 
comparable to older adults with 3s study time), while recall of high value items would be equal 
to that of older adults with 3s encoding time. 
Method 
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Participants 
Twenty-four younger adults (22 females) aged 18-24 (M = 20.00, SD = 1.41) with an 
educational level of 13.16 years (SD = 1.24) were undergraduates at UCLA and were recruited as 
in Experiment 1. Twenty older adults (11 females) aged 59-88 (M = 77.24, SD = 7.39) with an 
educational level of 17.20 years (SD = 1.85) were recruited as in Experiment 1 and were in good 
self-reported health (M = 8.00, SD = 1.25). None of the participants had participated in 
Experiment 1.  
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except that younger adults 
were given 1s to study each item during the four study cycles. Older adults studied each item for 
3s. The research was approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board ethics committee.   
Results 
Free recall tests  
The results are presented in Figure 2.2. A 2(Importance: broad or personal) × 2(Age: 
younger or older) ×	4(Test number) ANOVA was conducted to assess performance on the free 
recall tests. There was no significant main effect of age, F(1, 42) = 2.62, p = .11, h2p  =  .06. 
There was a main effect of importance, F(1, 42)= 7.18, p = .01, h2p  = .15, such that personally 
important information in the was remembered more accurately than broadly important 
information, (M = 1.67, SD = 1.18 and M = 1.39, SD = 1.19, respectively). There was a 
significant main effect of test, F(3, 126) = 38.87, p < .001, h2p  = .48, such that performance was 
more accurate on Test 2 (M = 1.45, SD = 1.06) than on Test 1 (M = 0.51, SD = 0.82), t(43) = 
6.37, p < .001, and on Test 3 (M = 1.94, SD = 1.12) than on Test 2, t(43) 3.34, p < .01, but there 
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was no difference between Tests 3 and 4 (M = 2.22, SD = 0.99), t(43) = 1.89, p = .37. No other 
effects were significant, ps > .61. 
 Free recall of information associated with less important people was analyzed using a 
2(Age group) ×	4(Test number) ANOVA, revealing, critically, no main effect of age, F(1, 42) = 
1.39, p = .25, h2p  =  .03, such that older and younger adults were equally accurate in recalling 
low-value information. There was also a marginally significant two-way interaction, F(3, 126) = 
2.33, p  = .07, h2p  = .05. Post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrections indicated that younger 
adults’ performance increased at each test. Performance on Test 2 (M = 1.25, SD = 1.51) was 
more accurate than on Test 1 (M = 0.25, SD = 0.74), t(23) = 4.44, p < .001. Performance on Test 
3 (M = 2.41, SD = 3.32) was more accurate than on Test 2, t(23) = 2.75, p = .01, and 
performance on Test 4 (M = 3.46, SD = 4.00) was more accurate than on Test 3, t(23) = 2.83, p = 
.01. Older adults’ performance on Test 2 (M = 0.95, SD = 1.54) was more accurate than on Test 
1 (M =0.25, SD = 0.55), t(19) = 2.41, p = .03 and performance on Tests 2 was more accurate 
than on Test 3 (M = 1.55, SD = 1.82), t(19) = 2.45, p = .02, but there was no difference in older 
adults’ performance on Tests 3 and 4, (M = 1.85, SD = 2.62), t(19) = 0.75, p = .46.  
Cued recall test 
For the final cued recall test, a 2(Importance: broad or personal) × 2(Age: young or old) ×	2(Characteristic: name or occupation) ANOVA was conducted and revealed a three-way 
interaction, F(1, 42) = 4.75, p = .04, h2p  = .10 (see Figure 2.2). There was no significant main 
effect of age, F < 1, p = .76. Among older adults, there was a main effect of characteristic, 
F(1,19) = 8.24, p = .01, h2p = .30, such that names were recalled less accurately than occupations 
(M = 1.35, SD = 1.53 and M = 1.90, SD = 1.46, respectively), but there was no main effect of 
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importance, F < 1, p = .68. Among younger adults, there was no significant two-way interaction, 
and there were no significant main effects of importance or characteristic, all ps > .21. 
For cued recall of items in the “less important” category, a 2(Age: young or old) × 
2(Characteristic: name or occupation) ANOVA revealed no main effect of age, F < 1, p = .55. 
There was a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 42) = 7.62, p = .01, h2p  = .15, and a significant 
main effect of characteristic, F(1, 42) = 6.04, p = .02, h2p  = .13, such that occupations were 
remembered more accurately than names (M = 4.98, SD = 4.25 and M = 3.96, SD = 3.84, 
respectively). Post-hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrections revealed no differences among 
younger adults, p = .80, while older adults recalled occupations more accurately than names (M 
= 5.20, SD = 3.99 and M = 3.05, SD = 3.49, respectively), t(19) = 3.15, p < .01. 
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Figure 2.2. The proportion of personally important, broadly important, and less important 
information correctly recalled by younger adults and older adults in the four free recall test (top 
panel) and final cued recall test (bottom panel) in Experiment 2. Error bars indicate standard 
error of the mean. 
 
Importance ratings 
As in Experiment 1, after the final cued-recall test, participants were asked to give their 
own opinions on a 1-5 Likert scale (1 - not important to 5 - very important) of how important it 
would be to remember each “type of person” (e.g., sales clerk) presented in the experiment.  
A 2(Age: younger or older) x 3(Importance: personal, broad, or less important) ANOVA 
conducted on participants’ importance ratings did not reveal a significant two-way interaction 
between age and importance, F < 1, p = .75, but there was a significant main effect of 
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importance F(2, 84) = 38.25, p < .001, h2p  = .48, such that information in the “personally 
important” category was rated as more important than information in the “broadly important” 
category, t(43) = 4.73, p < .001 (M = 3.93, SD = 0.81 and M = 3.25, SD = 0.89, respectively), 
that information in the personally important category was rated as more important than the “less 
important” category t(43) = 8.73, p < .001 (M = 2.65, SD = 0.67), and that information in the 
broadly important category was rated as more important than the less important category, t(43) = 
4.00, p < .001. There was also a main effect of age, F(1,42) = 4.43, p = .04, h2p  = .10, such that 
younger adults tended to rate information as more important overall than older adults (M = 3.44, 
SD = 0.85 and M = 3.09, SD = 1.02, respectively).  
 
Discussion 
Given very limited study time, younger adults still remember important information (cf., 
Middlebrooks et al., 2016), much like older adults. Unlike older adults, on the final cued recall 
test, younger participants remembered information about personally and broadly important 
people equally, perhaps due to lack of time during study to distinguish among personal, broad, 
and less important information.  
For proper comparison, we collected an additional sample of n = 20 younger adults, also 
undergraduate students at UCLA, who had 3s to encode each item. Younger adults in 
Experiment 2 were significantly less accurate than the comparison group in the free recall of 
personally and broadly important information, F(1, 42) = 7.34, p < .01, h2p  = .15, M = 1.21 (SD 
= 1.14) and M = 1.76 (SD = 1.14) respectively. There was no significant difference in the free 
recall of less important information, F(1, 42) = 1.54, p = .22, h2p  = .04. On the cued recall test, 
younger adults in Experiment 2 were significantly less accurate in recalling personally and 
broadly important information, F(1, 42) = 35.20, p < .001, h2p  = .46, M = 1.70 (SD = 0.67) and 
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M = 2.70 (SD = 0.39) respectively, a pattern which was also present in cued recall of less 
important information, F(1, 42) = 9.39, p < .01, h2p  = .18, M = 8.38 (SD =3.58) and M = 4.81 
(SD = 4.06) respectively. Participants’ importance ratings were similar to the categories 
established by the experimenter, and younger adults rated items as slightly more important than 
older adults did. 
General Discussion  
This study examined how younger and older adults remember important social 
information. Older adults often complain about remembering proper names (Troyer et al., 2006), 
perhaps related to deficits in associative memory (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). We investigated 
whether this deficit is reduced for important social information. As expected, performance 
improved with repeated study and testing (Geraci & Miller, 2013). Both groups remembered 
high-value information, but younger adults remembered more low-value information than older 
adults when given 3s to study each item. Older adults, and to some extent younger adults, 
remembered occupations more accurately than names (Cohen, 1990). Participants’ opinions of 
importance generally mapped on to the experimenter-designated categories. Taken together, 
these experiments provide novel insight regarding memory for associative social information. 
Younger adults were able to remember social information, even when it was not important. In 
contrast, older adults were able to more selectively remember important information – here, 
demonstrated not by point value (e.g., Castel, Benjamin, Craik, & Watkins, 2002), but by the 
likelihood of a potential future use in a social interaction.  
Selective remembering may have been encouraged in the present task, but the knowledge 
that the test will include all of the faces should influence participants to attend to most of the 
information (if not all of it). Presenting more items may lead to more selective remembering (see 
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also Castel et al., 2016; Mealey et al., 1996), though the small number of important items in this 
study were chosen to reflect that only a small number of people we meet at a party will be highly 
important to remember later. The relatively small sample sizes in this study, though similar to 
previous work, could be increased in future research. Given n = 44 for each experiment and an 
effect size f between moderate and high (.35), our post hoc power to detect differences in the free 
recall of personally and broadly important information was .86, which is sufficient (Cohen, 
1992). A Bayesian analysis of the null effects yielded a small Bayes Factor (the collapsed data 
from all participants with 3s to study were 2.14 times more likely to fit the null model than the 
alternative), so future research is needed to determine the boundary conditions of when older 
adults remember important social information.  
 Some faces presented in the current study were smiling, others were not. Paired-samples 
t-tests were conducted to examine whether expression affected free recall of less important 
information. The only participants significantly affected by the facial expression of the stimuli 
were the older adults in Experiment 2, who recalled information about 17.08% of the smiling 
faces in the less-important category (SD = 24.10) and 6.13% of the neutral faces in that category 
(SD = 8.48), t(19) = 2.36,  p = .03. This may be related to older adults in Experiment 2 being 
significantly older than those in Experiment 1, t(38) = 3.96, p < .001, as effects of positive 
emotion on memory strengthen into older age (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). 
 Overall, the present study examined how people of all ages remember important 
information (Castel, Murayama, Friedman, McGillivray, & Link, 2013), and how the future need 
to use information is related to its memorability (Anderson & Schooler, 2000). These findings 
also relate to conditions in which older adults remember source information (May, Rahhal, 
Berry, & Leighton, 2005; Rahhal, May, & Hasher, 2002) and impressions formed about others 
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(Cassidy & Gutchess, 2012). Age equivalences in this study may be explained by the benefits of 
testing across multiple lists, the consideration of future social interaction, and the use of value-
directed memory strategies. These processes may also include socioemotional factors and/or 
cognitive strategies that could be influenced by information importance and memory deficits that 
accompany cognitive aging. 
Study 3 
  Many of us complain about the difficulty of learning proper names of new people we 
meet, and we struggle to recall the names of people we have met before. Prior work suggests that 
remembering a person’s name is more difficult than remembering other types of biographical 
information about that person, such as their occupation or their hobby (Cohen & Burke, 1993; 
Cohen & Faulkner, 1986; McWeeny, Young, Hay, & Ellis, 1987). In fact, forgetting names is the 
most common memory complaint among adults over 65 (Fogler, James, & Crandall, 2010; 
Rendell, Castel, & Craik, 2005; Troyer, Häfliger, Cadieux, & Craik, 2006), and older adults 
struggle in particular with learning new name information (James, Fogler, & Tauber, 2008; 
McWeeny et al., 1987). This deficit may be related to a more general associative deficit in 
memory that increases with age (Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, Kilb, & Reedy, 2004; cf. McGillivray 
& Castel, 2010; Hargis & Castel, 2017), as older adults often struggle to bind items in memory 
that are not related, such as name-face pairs (Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2004) and face-spatial 
location pairs (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2005). It may be that binding name information is 
particularly difficult because a person’s face and name have a fairly arbitrary relationship 
(Cohen, 1990; Fogler et al., 2010). 
  Our awareness of our propensity to forget people’s names may be different from our 
awareness about forgetting other types of information: names are difficult to learn (at least in 
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part) due to their arbitrariness (Cohen, 1990; Fogler et al., 2010), but we often feel like we 
should learn them to communicate effectively and avoid embarrassing mistakes later. If we 
encounter someone we’ve met before and are unable to recall their name, we may feel 
particularly embarrassed; indeed, forgetting a new colleague’s name may be associated with 
more social stigma than forgetting, for example, where we placed our car keys. We may chalk 
the latter up to being busy or not paying attention, whereas the former may be associated with a 
sort of on-the-spot spotlight effect, in which we overestimate how much our behavior is noticed 
by others (Gilovich, Kruger, & Medvec, 2002; Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000; Gilovich & 
Savitsky, 1999). 
  Feeling that we are in the spotlight can occur when we anchor on our experiences and fail 
to adjust our feelings to account for others’ (Gilovich et al., 2000; see also Epley, Keysar, Van 
Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). We know we should remember the name of a person we are likely to 
meet again (see Experiments 1 and 2, this Chapter), so when we forget our colleague’s name, we 
may feel especially embarrassed. Our colleague, however, may not even notice that we have 
failed to recall their name, especially if our struggle was an internal one: we anchor on our 
embarrassment and fail to adjust to account for our colleague’s feelings. We may feel hesitant to 
ask our colleague to remind us of their name for fear of offending them, but they may not think 
twice about it. This experience can create a (perhaps inaccurate) feeling that our mistake is 
obvious to others – that is, that our memory mistake is in the spotlight. Thus, forgetting a name 
may loom large in the mind of the learner, but we are all prone to forgetting names.  
  When trying to remember another’s name, participants are particularly susceptible to 
experiencing the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) phenomenon (Cohen & Burke, 1993); many of us have 
experienced the certainty that we know a person’s name, only to fail to bring it to mind. In 
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addition to a potential spotlight effect, the awareness of a TOT state may also influence our 
perceptions of our ability to remember name information (i.e., our metamemory). TOT 
experiences are particularly prevalent in aging: older adults report experiencing TOT states more 
often than younger and middle-aged adults do (Heine, Ober, & Shenaut, 1999; James, 2006; 
Maylor, 1990). The spotlight effect and awareness of TOT experiences may work together to 
produce an accurate perception of our memory for others’ names by making forgetting 
experiences more salient.  
  Not all perceptions about ourselves are accurate, however. The better-than-average effect 
(BTA; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Goethals, Messick, & Allison, 1991; Taylor & 
Brown, 1988; Williams & Gilovich, 2008) occurs when people perceive themselves as 
performing better than the average person in a given domain. For example, one study found that 
90% of drivers in Sweden rated themselves as above average in driving ability (Svenson, 1981). 
However, by definition, not everyone can truly be better than average: some of us must be 
average or below average (e.g., Klar & Giladi, 1997). In the current study, it is possible that due 
to the salience of the embarrassment of forgetting someone’s name, participants are less likely to 
demonstrate the BTA effect for remembering names than for other items. In fact, some may view 
forgetting names as their own personal deficit (e.g., “I’m so bad with names!”). 
  In other studies of the BTA effect, participants rate themselves highly on socially-
desirable traits such as leadership ability (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). They also tend to rate 
themselves and people close to them (e.g., their family and friends) as higher on socially 
desirable traits, but these high ratings did not extend to “people in general” (Pedregon, Farley, 
Davis, Wood, & Clark, 2012; p. 215). That is, the better-than-average effect was present for 
ratings of oneself and one’s family and friends, but not among ratings of the broader population. 
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In the current study, we adapt Pedregon and colleagues’ paradigm to ask younger and older 
adults to directly assess their own abilities compared to the general population of others their 
age.  
  While much of the previous work investigating BTA has focused on younger adult 
populations, Zell and Alicke (2011) used a sample of participants across the adult lifespan. They 
asked participants ranging in age from 18 to 85 years about their emotional stability, athleticism, 
honesty, and other traits, and found that while participants across the adult lifespan did exhibit 
the BTA effect in many domains, older adults did not rate themselves as better than average in 
areas such as athleticism, skill at using technology, and physical attractiveness – domains in 
which older adults, the authors argue, “clearly decline” (p. 1178). In fact, in those abilities and 
skills, older adults rated themselves worse than average. In the current study, older adults are 
aware of their propensity to forget names and report is as a common complaint about their 
memory, but remembering names can also be difficult for younger people as names are highly 
confusable and arbitrary (Fogler, James, & Crandall, 2010; Rendell, Castel, & Craik, 2005; 
Troyer, Häfliger, Cadieux, & Craik, 2006).  
  People are often overconfident in their memory abilities (Carroll, Nelson, & Kirwan, 
1997; Koriat & Bjork, 2005). Some work suggests that older adults are more overconfident in 
their judgments of their own memory abilities than younger adults are (Bruce, Coyne, & 
Botwinick, 1982; Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990), while other work suggests younger and 
older adults’ judgments are equally as accurate both in terms of what will later be remembered, 
and how much may have been forgotten (Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997; Halamish, 
McGillivray, & Castel, 2011). People across the lifespan believe that their own memory abilities 
decline with age, and so do others’ memory abilities (Hertzog, 2002; Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). 
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Older adults’ memory complaints have been linked to self-efficacy rather than to actual memory 
ability (Ponds & Jolles, 1996), but work by Bieman-Copland and Ryan (1998) suggests that in 
general, people across the lifespan perceive forgetting in old age as caused by lack of ability (see 
also Ryan & See, 1993). In the current study, instead of asking participants to compare their 
memory abilities to the average person’s, participants compared themselves to others in their 
particular age group. Asking older adults to compare themselves to other older adults accounts 
for participants’ general awareness that memory does decline with age, while still allowing for a 
comparison between one’s own abilities and others’.  
  Exhibiting a BTA effect for memory could have consequences. Previous work supports 
the notion that seeing oneself as better than average can influence behavior: people who believe 
they are better than average in a given domain are less likely to listen to others’ advice, for 
example (see Gino & Moore, 2007).  In contrast, if one views their memory as being worse than 
average, that person may utilize effortful strategies when learning. Interestingly, people often 
exhibit a better-than-average effect when they perceive the task at hand as easy, but a worse-
than-average effect when the task is difficult (Brenner, 2003; Kruger, 1999; Larrick, Burson, & 
Soll, 2007). In social interactions, the perception that one is worse than average in remembering 
names or that learning names is particularly difficult could motivate the use of effortful strategies 
when meeting new people, perhaps to avoid the embarrassment of asking a stranger to repeat his 
name yet another time. In this case, thinking that one is not better than average could be 
beneficial. 
  In the current study, we examine how younger and older adults may (or may not) exhibit 
the better-than-average effect in their ratings of socially-desirable traits (e.g., honesty), specific 
memory abilities (e.g., remembering scientific terms), and how well they remember other 
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people’s names. Much of the prior work on the BTA effect has been conducted with younger 
adult samples (e.g., Dunning et al., 1989; Pedregon et al., 2012; Williams & Gilovich, 2008; cf. 
Zell & Alicke, 2011), but we seek to determine whether the likelihood of seeing oneself as 
better-than-average on these dimensions differs with age. When assessing their social abilities, 
we expect that both age groups’ responses will indicate a better-than-average effect. We also 
expect, however, that younger and older adults will not see themselves as better than average in 
their ability to remember names. Name-related memory failures may easily come to mind due to 
spotlight and TOT experiences, thus leading to the perception that remembering names is 
particularly difficult, and we predict that participants will rate their abilities accordingly. 
Method 
Participants 
  Participants were 86 younger adults aged 19-25 (M = 23.23, SD = 1.65) and 71 older 
adults aged 60-84 (M = 65.41, SD = 4.93) who were recruited to participate via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Power analyses showed that with these sample sizes for younger and older 
adults, we could detect an effect of moderate size (d = .40) or greater in more than 90% of cases 
using a two-tailed, one-sample t-test (as determining whether participants rate themselves as 
better-than-average requires comparing their rating to the midpoint of the scale).  Participants 
were paid $2 for their participation. 
Materials and Procedure 
  Participants completed a survey that assessed their perception of their own abilities. They 
were asked about their overall memory ability, their ability to remember proper names, and their 
ability to remember scientific terms (e.g., photosynthesis), historical figures (e.g., Napoleon), 
and locations. The survey also included items assessing participants’ perceptions of their 
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honesty, leadership ability, ability to get along with others, and capacity for hard work (see 
Appendix for all BTA survey items). Each item was constructed so participants would compare 
themselves to others their age (e.g., “How would you say your memory for names compares to 
other people your age?”) using 9-point Likert scales, labelled “much worse than others my age” 
on the extreme left of the scale, “the same as others my age” on the middle of the scale, and 
“much better than others my age” on the extreme right of the scale. 
  To assess the social impact of forgetting another’s name, participants were then asked to 
imagine that they were talking with someone they did not know well, and that they could not 
remember that person’s name after being told. They were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 9 
how they think that person would feel about them, from “s/he would recognize that we all forget 
names quite often” to “s/he would be unimpressed and wonder why I couldn’t manage this basic 
social task.” After making that rating, participants were then presented with the reverse situation: 
they were asked to imagine that they were speaking with someone they didn’t know well who 
forgot their name after being told, and asked to rate their thoughts on a similar scale (e.g., “I’d be 
unimpressed and wonder why the person couldn’t manage this basic social task”). Finally, 
participants estimated how many peoples’ proper names they know, on a scale from 1 to 1000. 
Results  
  To determine whether the better-than-average effect exists in memory for proper names, 
we compared participants’ responses to the true average of the scale. Because the scale ranges 
from 1 to 9, placing oneself at the average on any given item would be reflected in a score of 5. 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that on many of the items related to personality traits and memory 
abilities, participants rated themselves as above average.  
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Figure 2.3. Participants’ ratings in Study 3 of their own ability to get along with others, their 
capacity for hard work, their honesty, and their leadership ability. All ratings were compared 
with other people their age on a scale from 1 (much worse than others my age) to 9 (much better 
than others my age). The horizonal line represents participants’ ratings of themselves as average 
compared to others their age. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 2.4. Participants’ ratings in Study 3 of their ability to remember historical figures, 
locations, people’s names, and scientific terms; also, their ratings of their overall memory ability. 
All ratings were compared with other people their age on a scale from 1 (much worse than others 
my age) to 9 (much better than others my age). The horizontal line represents participants’ 
ratings of themselves as average compared to others their age. Error bars represent standard error 
of the mean. 
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assessing their memory for people’s names, M = 5.04, SD = 1.80, t(70) = 0.20, p = .84. All other 
tests revealed better-than-average effects among older adults’ ratings. Older participants rated 
themselves as above average in their capacity for hard work, M = 5.91, SD = 1.72, t(70) = 4.24, p 
< .001, their leadership ability, M = 5.51, SD = 1.99, t(70) = 2.15, p = .04, their ability to get 
along with others, M = 6.37, SD = 1.43, t(70) = 8.07, p < .001, and their honesty, M = 6.63, SD = 
1.51, t(70) = 9.09, p < .001. Older participants also rated themselves as above average when 
assessing their memory for locations, M = 5.92, SD = 1.54, t(70) = 5.02, p < .001, their memory 
for scientific terms, M = 5.69, SD = 1.74, t(70) = 3.45, p < .001, their memory for historical 
figures, M = 5.51, SD = 1.58, t(70) = 2.71, p = .01, and their overall memory ability, M = 5.79, 
SD = 1.45, t(70) = 4.57, p = .001.  
  There were three items on which younger adult participants’ ratings did not illustrate the 
better-than-average effect, and they were all in the memory domain. Participants’ ratings were no 
different than average when rating their memory for historical figures, M = 5.13, SD = 2.10, t(85) 
= 0.56, p = .57,  their memory for locations, M = 5.34, SD = 1.88, t(85) = 1.67, p = .10, and, like 
older adults, their memory for other people’s names, M = 5.15, SD = 1.85, t(85) = 0.76, p = .45. 
On all other items, younger participants rated themselves as significantly above average: their 
capacity for hard work, M = 6.73, SD = 1.76, t(85) = 9.14, p < .001, their leadership ability, M = 
5.87, SD = 1.75, t(85) = 4.63, p < .001, their ability to get along with others, M = 6.47, SD = 
1.66, t(85) = 8.20, p < .001, and their honesty, M = 6.84, SD = 1.53, t(85) = 11.17, p < .001, were 
all rated as above average. Younger adults rated their memory for scientific terms as above 
average, M = 5.57, SD = 1.81, t(85) = 2.92, p = .01, and their overall memory abilities as above 
average, M = 5.67, SD = 1.85, t(85) = 3.37, p = .001.  
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  Because the pattern of better-than-average effects differed among younger and older 
adults in the cognitive domain, we conducted a 2 (Age group) x 5 (Memory item: locations, 
historical information, scientific terms, people’s names, and memory overall) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). This test revealed no main effect of age, F(1, 155) = 1.43, p = .23, h2  = .01, 
and no two-way interaction between age group and memory item, F(4, 620) = 1.16, p = .33, h2  = 
.01. There was, however, a main effect of memory item, F(4, 620) = 4.60, p = .001, h2  = .03, 
which reflects that there were differences overall among participants’ ratings of the memory 
items.  
  We explored this main effect of memory item by conducting a series of paired-samples t-
tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. The only significant difference to 
survive the correction was between participants’ ratings of their overall memory abilities and 
their ratings of their ability to remember people’s names, t(156) = 3.92, p < .001, such that 
people rated their overall memory abilities (M = 5.73, SD = 1.68) significantly higher than their 
ability to remember names (M = 6.10, SD = 1.82), t(156) = 3.92, p < .001.  
  We then conducted a series of Spearman correlations among participants’ responses to 
the survey items. Many memory processes decline across the older adult lifespan (e.g., McCabe, 
Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010; see also Craik & Salthouse, 2008), but because 
participants were asked to compare their performance to other participants their own age, we did 
not necessarily expect that older adults’ ratings of their memory accuracy would correlate 
negatively with age. Correlations are reported below in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. We also calculated 
the extent to which each participant’s rating of their ability to remember others’ names deviated 
from the average (i.e., a negative score indicates a lower-than-average rating, and a positive 
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score indicates a higher-than-average rating). This deviation score did not correlate with age 
among younger adults, rs = .036, p  = .74, or older adults, rs = -.039, p = .75.  
  When asked to rate how they felt when another person forgot their name and when they 
forgot another’s name, both younger and older adult participants rated the first scenario 
significantly more negatively than the second. We conducted a 2 (Age group: younger or older) x 
2 (Person forgetting: self or other) mixed ANOVA, which revealed neither a significant two-way 
interaction, F(1, 155) = 2.19, p = .14, h2 = .01, nor a main effect of age, F(1, 155) = 0.45, p = 
.50, h2  <  .01. There was, however, a significant main effect of the person forgetting, F(1, 155) 
= 79.33, p < .001, h2 = .34, such that participants gave significantly more positive (i.e., lower) 
ratings when asked about another person forgetting their name (M = 3.32, SD = 2.07) than when 
they were asked about their own failure to recall another person’s name (M = 4.83, SD = 2.19).  
  We also sought to assess whether forgetting names may be associated with an unpleasant 
emotional reaction (e.g., embarrassment) that is not present when another forgets their name, and 
whether this feeling is associated with greater awareness of the difficulty of remembering names. 
We first created a difference score by subtracting ratings of how participants feel when someone 
forgets their name from how participants feel when they forget another’s name. Higher ratings 
on the original scale are associated with feeling worse, so a higher difference score in this case 
would indicate participants feeling worse when they forget another’s name than when someone 
forgets their name. We conducted a Spearman correlation between this difference score and 
younger participants’ ratings of their ability to remember people’s names, which did not reveal a 
significant correlation, rs = -.14, p = .22. However, among older adults, there was a significant 
negative correlation between the difference score and participants’ rating of their ability to 
remember people’s names, rs =  -.41, p < .001. Finally, younger and older adults estimated that 
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they knew approximately 379.50 (SD = 227.35) and 436.15 (SD = 247.77) names respectively; 
this difference was not statistically significant, t(155) = 1.49, p = .14. 
Discussion 
  The current study illustrated the better-than-average (BTA) effect in several of younger 
and older adults’ ratings of their social and memory abilities. Participants in both age groups, 
however, rated themselves as no different from average in remembering others’ names, 
supporting the argument that at least older participants are more aware of their propensity to 
forget names than other information. Even though older adults experience name recall failure 
more often than younger adults do (James, Fogler, & Tauber, 2008; McWeeny et al., 1987), they 
are aware that this experience may be “par for the course” relative to their age group. While prior 
work has found older adults to not rate themselves as above average in areas in which they face 
clear deficits (e.g., athleticism; Zell & Alicke, 2011), the current work establishes a domain in 
which neither younger nor older adults see themselves as above average.  
  Younger adults rated themselves as no different from average on their ability to 
remember historical figures and location information, while older adults rated themselves as 
above average compared to others their age. These findings support prior work indicating age-
related differences in knowing how one’s memory works (e.g., Bruce, Coyne, & Botwinick, 
1982; Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990); though both age groups in the current study rated 
themselves as above average on many domains, older adults did so on more items than younger 
adults. The current study illustrates potential boundary conditions for the BTA effect: perhaps 
when the memory error is particularly salient with highly-available examples and easily-
imaginable consequences (e.g., embarrassment or a low exam score), participants are more 
accurate in their ratings of themselves compared to others than when the memory error is less 
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salient. Among younger adults, instances of forgetting information in their history courses may 
be easy to recall, and these errors may be made even more salient by feedback in the form of 
exam scores (this does not explain, however, why younger adults rate their memory for scientific 
terms as above average). Among older adults, perhaps examples of forgetting history or science 
information are less salient than examples of forgetting names, and their ratings follow this 
pattern. 
  Across the lifespan, we may see our propensity to forget names as an embarrassing 
personal deficit, but when others forget our name, we see it as normal: participants in the current 
study rated their forgetting another’s name as worse than if another person forgot their name. 
Further, there was a significant negative correlation between older adults’ ratings of the relative 
unpleasantness of forgetting another’s name (compared to another person forgetting their name) 
and their ratings of their own ability to remember names. Forgetting a name can be an 
embarrassing and salient experience, and older adults may be especially attuned to this error (in 
fact, forgetting names is a common memory complaint by older adults, Troyer et al., 2006). 
Older participants who rated their ability to remember names more poorly were more likely to 
feel worse when they forget another’s name than when another person forgets theirs. This was 
not the case for younger adults, however. Perhaps older adults’ concern about their forgetting 
experiences led them to be more aware of their struggle to remember names, while younger 
adults may not be especially concerned with forgetting names as they also see themselves as 
average in remembering historical figures and location information.  
  We also examined potential relationships among participants’ age, their ratings of their 
memory for names, and their other memory abilities. The correlations in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 
indicate that among both younger and older adults, age did not correlate with any of the 
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participants’ ratings. Younger adults’ ratings of their ability to remember names were positively 
correlated only with the ability to get along with others, suggesting that people who see 
themselves as more socially apt may see themselves as better at remembering names (perhaps 
trying to remember someone’s name is a good way to get along with that person). Among older 
adults, in contrast, memory for people’s names was positively correlated with all items except 
age and honesty, indicating that the social and cognitive constructs examined here may be part of 
a more global self-assessment of cognitive health. 
  Younger adults estimated that they knew approximately 379.50 names of other people, 
and older adults estimated that they knew approximately 436.15 names. Although this difference 
was not statistically significant (p = .14), the pattern of responses is interesting, especially when 
considering the scale on which participants reported. That the scale provided was from 0 to 1000 
names suggests the potential for participants’ anchoring between 30-50% of the scale (Scheck, 
Meeter, & Nelson, 2004; see also Hertzog, Saylor, Fleece, & Dixon, 1994), perhaps taking the 
anchor as a hint about how to respond (Epley, 2004). Future studies can assess under what 
conditions our awareness of our memory for names can be affected by the scale on which we 
report.  
  Prior work suggests that the BTA effect can be attenuated when the items participants are 
rating are seen as unambiguous (Dunning et al., 1989). It may be that rating one’s honesty or 
overall memory is a fairly ambiguous and broad task, while rating one’s ability to remember 
names is, in comparison, unambiguous and specific (and perhaps examples of remembering 
scientific terms and historical information are clearer to younger adults than to older adults). 
Also, remembering names can be challenging (especially for older people; Fogler et al., 2010; 
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Rendell et al., 2005; Troyer et al., 2006), and participants are less likely to rate themselves as 
above average on a difficult task than on an easy one (Kruger, 1999). 
  In addition, participants’ tendency to see themselves as better than average is stronger 
when they rate attributes seen as relatively important (e.g., being honest) than relatively 
unimportant (e.g., being outgoing; Brown, 2012). Participants in the current study do show the 
BTA effect for desirable traits like honesty but not for remembering names. However, this 
pattern cannot be fully explained by participants’ belief that remembering names is unimportant 
– we do meet new people and encounter acquaintances throughout the lifespan, so remembering 
names remains a desirable skill (though substantial evidence suggests that spending time with 
loved ones becomes more important than meeting new people in older age; Fredrickson & 
Carstensen, 1990). In fact, some prior work suggests equivalence in younger and older adults’ 
memory for names that are deemed important to remember later; older adults may have some 
ability to compensate during a difficult associative memory task by focusing on the social 
information that is most important to them (Hargis & Castel, 2017). Other work suggests that 
individuals see themselves as above-average in abilities that are common but not in abilities that 
are uncommon (Moore, 2007), but this account may not explain the current findings, as 
remembering names is a common activity. 
  In sum, the current study suggests that younger and older adults are susceptible to 
believing themselves to be above average on several dimensions in social and cognitive domains. 
There is, however, an exception to the pattern: younger adults see themselves as average in 
remembering historical and location information, and participants of both age groups see 
themselves as no different from average in their ability to remember other people’s names. The 
subjective experience of forgetting someone’s name may have social implications different from 
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forgetting other types of information, and the internal (and sometimes embarrassing) struggle to 
remember someone’s name may have created a particularly salient memory trace that 
participants recalled while rating their own abilities. While older adults experience “feelings of 
forgetting” that can often represent actual forgetting (Halamish et al., 2011), the present research 
shows that both younger and older adults are aware that forgetting names, while frustrating, can 
be an experience that is not specific to themselves alone. Perhaps if we perceive our memory 
errors to occur while others are paying attention (creating a spotlight effect, Gilovich et al., 2002; 
Gilovich et al., 2000; Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999), we create a more accurate representation of 
our memory’s fallibility and are less likely to be overconfident in our abilities. 
Experiment 4 
 The ability to remember pairs of unrelated information is helpful when learning a 
person’s name, where we placed our car keys, or a new word in a foreign language. Extensive 
work has documented this type of learning using a paired-associate learning (PAL) paradigm in 
which a cue word and a target word are presented together during study, and at test, only the cue 
word is presented and participants are asked to recall the target word. Several variables have 
been shown to influence this relationship, such as the concreteness of the cue and target words 
(Paivio, 1965), the imageability of the cue and target words (Papagno, Valentine, & Baddeley, 
1991), and the degree to which the cue and the target are semantically related (Arenberg & 
Robertson-Tchabo, 1977). The number of opportunities for participants to learn the pairs is also 
worth considering (Peterson, Saltzman, Hillner, &Land, 1962); Theide (1999) underscores the 
importance of more than one study-test trial when examining how participants learn pairs of 
associated information.   
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 PAL can be influenced by our motivation to learn the items (e.g., in this chapter, 
Experiments 1 and 2, and in Chapter 3, Experiments 1 and 2), but sometimes pairs can be 
difficult to learn due to characteristics of the pairs themselves (e.g., concreteness; Paivio, 1965) 
and/or characteristics of the participants (e.g., older age; Rast & Zimprich, 2009; Service & 
Craik, 1993). Indeed, older adults often struggle to remember untreated word pairs (Arenberg & 
Robertson-Tchabo, 1977; Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Service & Craik, 1993); but when unrelated 
associative information is valuable in some way, older adults can remember than important 
information as well as younger adults, even if they face deficits in remembering less-important 
associated items (e.g., Hargis & Castel, 2017; Hargis & Castel, 2018; see also Treat & Reese, 
1976 for similarities in younger and older adults’ PAL). Thus, there are several factors 
influencing PAL, and some pairs can be more important to learn than others given our goals. The 
current study assesses how differences in motivation may interact with age-related differences in 
ability to learn foreign language pairs.  
 One’s motivation to learn information, of course, depends on how one intends to use that 
information. For example, a younger adult and an older adult may both seek to learn Spanish 
vocabulary words: on its face, their desired outcome seems identical (Hargis, Siegel, & Castel, 
2019). However, the younger adult may seek to learn this information with the goal of 
performing well on a test in Spanish class, while an older adult’s motivation may be to help his 
new neighbors from Guatemala feel more welcome by greeting them in Spanish. That is, the 
particular goal of learning Spanish is the same, but motivation differs based on the individual’s 
perspective. Socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen et al., 1999) predicts that older adults 
pursue fewer goals related to acquiring knowledge, instead preferring goals that facilitate the 
growth of social bonds. Learning foreign language vocabulary can be important for people all 
  
 
47 
 
ages when they travel abroad; it can be considered a goal with both social and knowledge-based 
components that is shared by younger and older adults. We aim to better understand how 
knowledge is acquired in service of a goal that has a notable social component. To that end, the 
current study was designed to determine how learning of important foreign vocabulary words 
may differ between younger and older adults.  
 Travelling to a foreign country in which most locals do not speak one’s own language 
can motivate individuals across the lifespan to learn new vocabulary. In this instance, it may be 
important for one to know words for basic social interactions (e.g., “hello,” “thank you”), or 
perhaps words that could be needed if difficulty arises (e.g., “doctor,” “embassy”). While the 
translations for these words may often be featured in guidebooks, introductory foreign language 
courses, or popular language learning mobile applications (e.g., Duolingo), it may also be 
convenient to memorize a few important words before arriving. The current task examined how 
younger and older adults learn foreign language words and their English translations.  
 In addition to being realistic given the backstory of a foreign trip and fitting the needs of 
the communication component of this task (i.e., it was designed such that participants would 
need to consider their ability to communicate with others on their trip), foreign language nouns 
paired with English words reduce the likelihood that a participant could use a sophisticated 
mnemonic strategy during study (Zerr et al., 2018). For example, it is challenging to imagine a 
picture or story representing that the Swahili word for “nurse” is “muuguzi,” but an image could 
be more easily created for the English pair “dog : spoon.” If there is no inherent structure or 
strategy that lends itself to studying the word pairs, it may be that the participant’s own 
perception of how important each item is to remember is a stronger guide of their attention 
during study (in addition, perhaps, to factors such as word length or fluency), which is enhanced 
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by the more explicit, experimenter-designated value component incorporated into current study 
(especially in Experiment 5). Further, Swahili is not as commonly encountered among most 
American participants as, for example, Spanish or French are, which reduces the likelihood of 
prior knowledge impacting participants’ performance (see Nelson & Dunlosky, 1994 for a full 
discussion of the benefits of using Swahili-English pairs in a PAL task).  
 Older adults often struggle to bind associated items in memory (Arenberg & Robertson-
Tchabo, 1977; Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Service & Craik, 1993). The current task may require 
particular engagement of associative strategies with which older adults struggle, due perhaps to 
the lack of obvious strategies to use during encoding and the unfamiliarity of the Swahili pairs. 
Therefore, an overall associative deficit is predicted for older adults’ memory performance, such 
that they perform less accurately overall than younger adults do. Perhaps more interesting is the 
possible connection between perceived importance of learning a word and its later recall. If there 
is a relationship between the two, such that a higher importance rating of an item is related to 
higher likelihood of recalling that item, this provides support for the role of personal perceptions 
of importance guiding memory for difficult-to-learn items. However, if there is no relationship 
between importance and recall, it may be that all words are considered equally important 
(meaning, essentially, that no words are more valuable than others), or that importance does not 
affect learning in this type of task.  
 In the current study, participants were asked to imagine that they were visiting Kenya, 
where many of the local people speak Swahili. Rather than being told by the experimenter which 
words were important to remember (as has been the case in many value-directed remembering 
studies using relatively naturalistic materials, e.g., learning important allergens in Middlebrooks 
et al., 2015 and learning important social information in Experiments 1 and 2 in this Chapter), 
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participants rated how important it would be for them to know the Swahili translation of each 
English word. After these ratings, participants studied pairs of words (e.g., “fever : homa”) and 
completed a cued-recall memory test, which was repeated for a total of two study-test cycles. 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-six younger adults aged 18-22 years (Mage = 19.88, SDage = 1.24; 25 female) who 
were undergraduates at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) were recruited for this 
study, and were given course credit for their participation. Twenty-six older adults aged 61-89 
years (Mage = 74.61, SDage = 7.03; 12 female, one did not report) were recruited from the Los 
Angeles area, and received $10 per hour for their participation. Most older adults had received a 
college (42.31%) or a graduate school (38.46%) education. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were asked to imagine that they would soon take a trip to Kenya, a country in 
which many people speak Swahili. They were told that before they leave on their trip, it would 
be helpful to know some Swahili words. Participants were then given the opportunity to rate the 
words that they would later study on a scale of how important it would be to remember the 
Swahili translation of the word on their trip, from 1 (not at all important to know for the trip) to 7 
(very important to know for the trip). Participants did not see the Swahili translation at this time; 
they only rated the importance of knowing the Swahili translation of each English word.  
 The stimuli were in four different (experimenter-designated) categories, with six words 
per category. The categories were basic conversational words (e.g., “hello”), words that would be 
helpful in travelling (e.g., “money”), food words (e.g., “meat”), and health-related words (e.g., 
“fever”). These categories were not made explicit to the participants, but participants may have 
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perceived the category structure as the words were chosen to be similar within-category but not 
similar between-categories. The words ranged in length from one to six syllables, and were 
chosen because they were words that one would likely see in a guidebook or a basic Swahili-
English translation book; commonly used words were excluded from the stimuli set if they were 
cognates between English and Swahili (e.g., “hotel : hoteli,” while potentially important to learn 
for a trip, was not included). The words chosen were, by design, common in the English lexicon; 
the average log frequency of the English words was 10.30 (SD = 1.64). The English words were 
an average of 6.00 letters in length (SD = 2.59). (See Table 2.3 for the full set of Swahili-English 
pairs in Experiments 4 and 5.) 
 Once participants rated all of the words, they studied each English word paired with its 
Swahili translation. Participants were told before they studied that they would later be presented 
with the Swahili word and asked to recall the English word. The test was constructed in this way 
to mirror communicating with someone who speaks a new language in a different country: often 
the speaker may use a word in a foreign language in conversation, and difficulty may arise when 
one attempts to retrieve the English language translation of that word. This type of retrieval 
could also be necessary when reading city maps or restaurant menus. 
 Participants studied each of the 24 pairs (e.g., “fever : homa”) for 5s, presented one at a 
time in randomized order. Participants were then presented with each Swahili word (in 
randomized order) and asked to recall the English translation of that word to the best of their 
ability. There was no explicit feedback during the test phase. After the test, participants were 
presented with each pair again (in newly-randomized order), again for 5s each, before moving on 
to another cued-recall test with the same cues as the initial list, presented in randomized order. 
Results 
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 The goal of the current study was to determine whether participants’ ratings of 
importance of learning foreign language vocabulary words are related to their recall of the 
English translations of those words. Responses were scored such that slight misspellings were 
counted as correct (e.g., “embassey” and “embassy” were both accepted, as were both 
“vegetable” and “vegetables”). To examine differences between younger and older adults’ cued 
recall accuracy across the task and across different categories, a 2(age group: younger vs older) x 
2(test: 1 vs 2) x 4(category: basic communication, food words, health words, travel words) 
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. The test revealed a main effect of age, F(1, 
50) = 34.59, p < .001, h2  = .41, such that younger adults recalled more items on average than 
older adults did across the task (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6). There was also a main effect of 
category, F(3, 150) = 4.50, p = .01, h2  = 0.08, which post-hoc t-tests suggest was driven 
primarily by the health-related words being recalled less accurately than the travel-related words, 
t(25) = 4.00, p < .001; all other ps > 0.02 (failed to reach significance after Bonferroni correction 
for multiple comparisons).  
 There was main effect of test, F(1, 50) = 249.72, p < .001, h2   = .75, such that 
performance was more accurate on Test 2 than on Test 1; however, younger adults’ performance 
improved to a larger extent than older adults’ did: there was a significant interaction between test 
and age group, F(1, 50) = 35.33, p < .001, h2  = .10. Follow-up t-tests illustrated that both groups 
did improve between Tests 1 and 2, (t(25) = 14.53, p < .001 for younger adults, and t(25) = 7.22, 
p < .001 for older adults), but the magnitude of the difference is not equivalent for both age 
groups: younger adults improved to a greater extent (from M = 33.49, SD = 15.70 on Test 1 to M 
= 68.75, SD = 21.99 on Test 2) than did older adults (from M = 16.51, SD = 10.31 on Test 1 to M 
= 32.85, SD = 19.30 on Test 2). 
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Figure 2.5. Younger adults’ cued recall performance by category across two tests (in Experiment 
4). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 2.6. Older adults’ cued recall performance by category across two tests (in Experiment 4). 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
A 2 (age group) x 4 (category: basic, travel, food, health) mixed-factorial ANOVA was 
conducted on initial importance ratings to determine whether certain categories of words were 
rated as more important to learn than others. This test revealed no main effect of age, F(1, 50) = 
0.17, p = .69, h2  = .01, no main effect of category, F(3, 150) = 1.52, p = .21, h2 = .03, and no 
interaction between age and category, F(3, 150) = 0.87, p = .46, h2 = .02. There were no 
significant differences between the categories in their importance ratings, and there were no 
significant differences between how young and old rated the words in these categories: all words 
were rated as relatively important (see Figure 2.7).  
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Figure 2.7. Younger and older adults’ ratings (in Experiment 4) of how important it would be to 
learn the Swahili translation of each English word, separated by category. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
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the to-be-learned pair. For older adults, there was only a significant correlation between 
importance ratings and accuracy for the words in the basic communication category, Spearman’s 
rho = -.51, p < .01, such that words given higher importance ratings were actually less likely to 
be recalled by older adults. All other correlations were non-significant, ps > .30. Among younger 
adults, the same correlations were conducted, revealing a significant positive relationship 
between importance ratings and accuracy for food-related words (e.g., “fruit”), rs = 0.48, p = .01. 
All other relationships were not significant, ps > .17. 
Discussion 
 As expected, younger adults were more accurate than older adults in learning the English 
translations of Swahili words. Both groups were able to learn with task experience and 
performed more accurately on the second test, once they had been given a re-study opportunity. 
Younger adults’ performance increased more between Tests 1 and 2 than older adults’, 
suggesting that younger adults benefited more from the repeated study-test opportunity than 
older adults did. There was a difference in recall performance across the different categories of 
words, such that words associated with travel (e.g., “embassy,” “identification”) were recalled 
more accurately than those associated with health (e.g., “doctor,” “nurse”). This particular 
difference was not predicted, as we anticipated that both age groups (particularly older adults) 
would rate the health-related words as highly important to remember and then recall them more 
accurately than other types of words. In fact, most categories of words were rated as fairly 
important to remember and ratings did not differ between age groups.  
 These results suggest that both age groups perceived the set of words to be equally 
important to remember for their trip, but younger adults were significantly more successful in 
remembering those words than were older adults. Age-related differences in associative memory 
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are found in many domains, including memory for word-non-word pairs (Naveh-Benjamin, 
2000), a finding that is highly similar to the current study as the Swahili words were totally 
unfamiliar to the participants, essentially acting as non-words.  
 It is worth noting, however, that the participants’ subjective ratings of importance did not 
correlate with their recall of the different categories, except for the negative correlation among 
older adults’ ratings of the basic communication words and recall, and a positive relationship 
between younger adults’ importance ratings of food-related words and their recall of those 
words. It could be possible that for older adults, basic words were considered only somewhat 
important during the importance-rating stage of the task, but those ended up being relatively easy 
to learn, thus leading to the negative correlation. This pattern, however, is not fully supported by 
older adults’ recall accuracy scores, as basic communication words were not remembered more 
accurately than words in the other categories (indicating that they were not easier to learn than 
the other types of words). This relationship is also not completely explained by the length of the 
words: the target words in the basic category were an average of 5.33 letters long (SD = 2.07), 
but so were the words in the food-related category (M = 5.33 letters, SD = 2.34). (The health-
related words were an average of 6.00 letters long, SD = 2.00, and the travel-related words were 
an average of 7.33 letters long, SD = 3.72.) A potential explanation for this negative correlation 
could also be that participants’ ratings were not sensitive to the possibility of within-category 
interference: it may seem important to know “yes” and “no,” for example, but those English 
words have a strong enough semantic relationship that studying both may create the possibility 
for confusability and interference in memory. Experiment 5 more directly assesses differences in 
importance and their potential influence on recall. 
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 As reported above, the average frequency of the English words was 10.30 (SD = 1.64). 
There was a marginal difference in word frequency among the categories: a one-way ANOVA 
revealed a marginal main effect of log HAL frequency, F(3, 20) = 2.82, p = .07, and post-hoc 
tests revealed that the only significant difference (after alpha correction) was that the basic words 
were marginally more frequent in the lexicon than health-related words, t(23) = 2.69, p = .06. 
These differences do not fully explain the reported differences in memory and the correlations 
between importance ratings and recall. 
 Importance ratings suggest that each category presented in the current study was fairly 
important to learn. Because all words are considered relatively important, there is not a 
possibility to execute a value-based study strategy; selectivity for high-value words can only be 
present if there are low-value words to avoid (or, at least, to de-prioritize; Castel et al., 2002). It 
is also likely that when travelling, we do encounter words that we are likely to need for our basic 
needs and preferences, making them relatively more important to learn than other words that 
might be equally as common in the lexicon but less important for travel specifically. To examine 
whether a higher-contrast value-based structure influences learning of foreign language words 
among younger and older adults, we conducted Experiment 5. 
Experiment 5 
  In Experiment 4, participants studied a set of words that could all be considered valuable 
to learn for a trip. Even the words that were rated lowest on the importance scale, such as food-
related words, were still perceived as relatively important to learn (see Figure 2.7). To create a 
paradigm in which value-based strategies can be executed, some items must be higher-value and 
others lower-value (e.g., Castel et al., 2002). To allow participants to execute a value-based 
strategy, Experiment 5 utilized a subset of words from Experiment 5, as well as a new set of 
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words that are similarly frequent in English to those in Experiment 4, but were expected to be 
less important to learn for a foreign trip (e.g., “arm” and “pen”). With a more obvious value-
based structure in place, we expected that younger and older participants would learn the 
translations for high-importance items (e.g., “doctor”) more accurately than the words that are 
less important; age group differences in memory for the high-importance items were expected to 
decrease while younger adults were expected to recall the lower-importance items significantly 
more accurately than older adults did.  
 Results from Experiment 4 suggest that younger adults substantially outperform older 
adults in this word-learning task, and that younger adults improve more than older adults with an 
additional learning opportunity. Given a more explicit value structure, older adults’ performance 
is still expected to be less accurate than younger adults, but older adults may be able to execute a 
value-based strategy for the more important words and thus decrease the gap between younger 
and older adults’ recall of the high-value items (creating an age by value interaction, such that 
the difference between younger and older adults’ performance will be smaller for higher-value 
categories of words than for lower-value categories of words). Older adults may also be able to 
utilize task experience to improve their memory for high-value information with an additional 
study-test opportunity, as value-directed remembering strategies often develop with task 
experience. Younger adults are expected to improve in their recall of the information with task 
experience (both lower- and higher-value), consistent with performance in Experiment 4.  
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-six younger adults aged 18-26 years (Mage = 20.31, SDage = 1.95; 21 female) who 
were undergraduates at UCLA were given course credit for their participation. Twenty-six older 
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adults aged 62-85 years (Mage = 75.54, SDage = 7.92; 13 female) were recruited from the Los 
Angeles area, and received $10 per hour for their participation. Most older adults had received a 
college (30.77%) or a graduate school (50%) education. None had participated in Experiment 4. 
Materials and Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to Experiment 4. The materials were modified slightly. 
Participants studied words from two of the categories from Experiment 4 (e.g., food words and 
travel words). These words are considered relatively high-importance items to learn for the trip, 
based on the high ratings given by participants in Experiment 4. To create a set of 24 to-be-
learned items to match the number of items in Experiment 4, participants also studied two 
additional categories of six words considered to be of lower importance to learn for a trip: 
common objects (e.g., “desk”) and body parts (e.g., “arm”). The categories were chosen to 
include words that are highly common in English and are also words that would likely be learned 
in an introductory foreign language course. The HAL frequency of the object and body part 
categories were high, similarly to the categories of words in Experiment 4 (M = 9.78, SD = 0.71 
and M = 10.48, SD = 0.69, respectively; both within one standard deviation of the HAL 
frequency of the English words used in Experiment 4). 
 As in Experiment 4, participants read the description about their trip to Kenya before 
rating the importance of knowing the Swahili translations of 24 English words. After rating the 
words, participants studied each English-Swahili pair in random order for 5s each. At test, 
participants were presented with the Swahili word asked to recall the English translation. This 
process repeated for List 2, which contained the same words as List 1. 
Results 
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 Figures 2.8 and 2.9 suggest that participants improved substantially between Tests 1 and 
2, and that there are differences in recall between the “less important to learn” categories of body 
parts and common objects and the “more important to learn” categories of food-related words, 
basic communication words, health-related words, and travel-related words.  
 
  
Figure 2.8. Younger adults’ cued recall performance by category across two tests (in Experiment 
5). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 2.9. Older adults’ cued recall performance by category across two tests (in Experiment 5). 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 To examine differences between younger and older adults’ cued recall accuracy across the 
task and across different categories, we conducted a 2(age group: younger vs older) x 2(test: 1 vs 
2) x 2(category: important to learn, unimportant to learn) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
The category variable was analyzed with two levels (rather than six) to ensure that there were an 
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categories, but the subset they did study were averaged to create one score per participant per list 
to compare with the score they received per list for the “unimportant” items. This test revealed 
no three-way interaction, F(1, 50) = 0.95, p = .34, h2 = .02, no two-way interaction between list 
and category, F(1, 50) = 1.17, p = .28, h2 = .02, and no two-way interaction between category 
and age group, F(1, 50) = 2.07, p = .16, h2 = .02. There was, however, a significant two-way 
interaction between list and age group, F(1, 50) = 40.27, p <.001, h2 = .15, in addition to a main 
effect of list, F(1, 50) = 172.37, p < .001, h2 = .66 and a main effect of age, F(1, 50) = 40.42, p < 
.001, h2 = .45. To decompose the two-way interaction between list and age group, we conducted 
post-hoc t-tests to compare younger and older adults’ performance on each list. On List 1, 
younger adults (M = 32.31, SD = 20.36) outperformed older adults (M = 11.39, SD = 9.87), t(50) 
= 4.69, p < .001; on List 2, younger adults (M = 62.50, SD = 24.24) outperformed older adults 
(M = 21.94, SD = 15.42) to a greater extent, t(50) = 7.20, p < .001.  
 There was also a significant main effect of category, F(1, 50) = 38.68, p < .001, h2 = .43 
such that overall, participants remembered the items in the categories that were “important” to 
learn for a foreign trip (i.e., food, health, travel, and basic communication words; M = 37.32, SD 
= 27.55) more accurately than they did the words that were “unimportant” to learn for a foreign 
trip (i.e., body parts and common objects; M = 26.69, SD = 27.56). 
 Initial importance ratings were also compared among categories and between age groups, 
to determine if the categories of words chosen by the experimenters to be important to learn were 
actually rated as such (see Figure 2.10). A 2 (age group) x 4 (category: important to learn, 
unimportant to learn) mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted on these responses to assess any 
differences in importance ratings. This test revealed no two-way interaction between category 
and age group, F(1, 50) = 1.31, p = . 26, h2 = .03, no main effect of age, F(1,50) = 0.02, p = .88, 
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h2 < .001, and, somewhat surprisingly, no main effect of category, F(1, 50) = 0.10, p = .75, h2 <  
.01.  
 
 
  
Figure 2.10. Younger and older adults’ ratings (in Experiment 5) of how important it would be to 
learn the Swahili translation of each English word, separated by category. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
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  Importance ratings were correlated with accuracy scores to determine whether the ratings 
of the words differed by category for either age group. As in Experiment 4, participants had not 
yet seen the Swahili translation when they made their importance ratings, so they were not likely 
to know how difficult it would be to learn the Swahili translation for each English word. 
Correlations among younger adults’ accuracy scores and importance ratings for the unimportant 
words were not statistically significant, Spearman’s rho = .01, p = .96, neither were they for the 
important words, rs = -.20, p = .33. Similarly for older adults, there were not statistically 
significant correlations between accuracy scores and importance ratings for the unimportant 
words, rs = -.10, p = .64, nor for the important words, rs = -.15, p = .46.  
Discussion 
 In Experiment 5, we sought to create a more distinct value structure (i.e., a larger contrast 
between foreign language words that a traveler would seek to learn for a trip versus words that 
they would not seek to learn), while ensuring that the lower-value items were frequently-used 
words that a student who is new to the language may learn. Participants learned two categories of 
words that were thought to be important to learn on a trip, based on ratings in Experiment 4 (e.g., 
basic communication words such as “please” and the travel-related words such as “money”), and 
two categories of words that are common and concrete but are less likely to be needed on a 
foreign trip (e.g., body parts such as “arm” and common objects such as “pen”). Of course 
people may still need to use the items in the less important category on their trip (such as when 
visiting a doctor for a broken arm or requesting to borrow a writing utensil), so we also asked 
participants for their own ratings of the importance of learning the Swahili translations of the 
English words before they began the learning phase of the task.  
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 Though their pre-task ratings did not differ between the important and important 
categories, and those ratings did not correlate with their recall performance, participants’ 
memory performance was affected by the category of the words, such words that were 
considered less important to learn (by the experimenter) were recalled less accurately than those 
in the more-important-to-learn category. That is, memory performance was sensitive to value, but 
participants’ ratings were not. This difference between participants’ ratings and their actual 
memory performance is an interesting one. It may be that before the participants begin the study 
phase, they see each word as fairly important to learn, as each one is a common word that may 
be used in some situations. However, when participants are faced with the difficult task of 
learning 24 words in a foreign language, it is not as easy to learn each word, and they recognize 
that they must apply a strategy.  
 To assess a potential explanation that recall was driven by the length of the target or cue 
word, we conducted correlations between recall performance and length of the target and cue 
words for each age group. Younger adults’ recall performance was not correlated with the length 
of either the Swahili (cue) word or the English (target) word (Swahili words rpb = -.03, p = .49, 
for English words rpb = .04, p = .29). Older adults’ recall performance was not correlated with the 
length of the Swahili word (rpb = .03, p =.27), but there was a (weak) statistically significant 
correlation between the length of the English word and the accuracy with which older adults 
recalled that word (rpb = 0.07, p = .01). 
 Participants may have directed their attention to the words that were actually most 
important to know for their trip, leading to more accurate memory for those items. Older adults’ 
recall performance was overall less accurate than younger adults’, especially on the second test, 
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suggesting that older adults did not benefit as much as younger adults did from the opportunity to 
complete another study-test cycle. 
General Discussion 
 Taken together, Experiments 4 and 5 suggest that participants see many words as equally 
important to remember when their task is simply to rate their importance. That is, when the 
stakes or difficulty of the task are low or unknown (they do not need to apply memory strategies 
to do well on a test, for example; Hargis & Castel, 2017), all words were considered fairly 
important, as they might be helpful to know on a trip. However, when participants completed the 
memory task in Experiment 5 (which had a more distinct value structure than Experiment 4), 
participants learned that they could not remember everything, even if it seemed important during 
the rating portion of the task. Perhaps this awareness of limited memory capacity led participants 
to devote attention and resources to the more important words (e.g., Castel et al., 2002), which 
then led to more accurate recall of those words that were in the “more important” category (e.g., 
“doctor”) compared to the “less important” category (e.g., “desk”). 
 To further investigate potential memory differences among the categories for different 
age groups, an additional group of 26 younger adults rated the stimuli on the wordlikeness of 
each Swahili word (ranging from “not like a word at all” to “very like a word”, adapted from 
Nelson & Dunlosky, 1994), and how difficult it would be to learn the English translation of the 
word (ranging from “not difficult to learn at all” to “very difficult to learn”). The average ratings 
for each word are presented in Table 2.3.  
 In Figures 2.11 and 2.12, it appears that the words in the food-related category are rated 
differently than the words in the other categories, both in wordlikeness and in difficulty to learn. 
We conducted a one-way ANOVA to assess whether there were differences in ratings of 
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wordlikeness across categories, which revealed a main effect of category, F(5, 105) = 12.61, p < 
.001, h2 = .38. We conducted a series of t-tests to determine where differences among categories 
lie. Six comparisons were significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Food-related words (M = 4.61, SD = 1.02) were rated as more like words than basic 
communication words (M = 4.12, SD = 0.91), t(21) = 4.95, p < .001, more like words than travel-
related words (M = 3.52, SD = 0.89), t(21) = 7.50, p < .001, more like words than health-related 
words (M = 3.84, SD = 0.84), t(21) = 4.22, p < .001, more like words than object words (M = 
4.00, SD = 1.07), t(21) = 5.70, p < .001, and more like words than body part words (M = 3.83, 
SD = 0.94), t(21) = 6.47, p < .001. Basic communication words were also rated as more like 
words than travel-related words, t(21) = 5.64, p < .001, all other ps > .003. 
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Figure 2.11. New participants’ ratings of how much each Swahili item in Experiment 5 was like 
a word, separated by category. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
 We also conducted a one-way ANOVA to assess whether there were differences of ratings 
of difficulty to learn across categories, which also revealed a main effect of category, F(5, 105) = 
14.75, p < .001, h2  = .41, see Figure 2.12. Five comparisons were significant after Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons. Food-related words (M = 3.43, SD = 0.88) were rated as 
easier to learn than basic communication words (M = 4.02, SD = 0.83), t(21) = 4.73, p < .001, 
easier to learn than travel-related words (M = 4.41, SD = 0.88), t(21) = 7.37, p < .001, easier to 
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learn than object words (M = 4.30, SD = 0.79), t(21) = 6.72, p < .001, and easier to learn than 
body part words (M = 4.07, SD = 0.87), t(21) = 5.12, p < .001. (The only category that did not 
significantly differ from food-related words was health-related words (M = 3.93, SD = 0.72), 
t(21) = 3.05, p = .01, the significance of which did not survive alpha correction). Health-related 
words were also rated as easier to learn than travel-related words, t(21) = 3.47, p = .002; all other 
ps > .003.  
   
Figure 2.12. New participants’ ratings of how difficult it would be to learn the translation for 
each Swahili word in Experiment 5, separated by category. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean. 
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 To determine whether the length of the Swahili words differed by category, we conducted 
a one-way ANOVA, which revealed no main effect of category, F(5, 30) = 1.20, p = .33, h2  = 
.17 (though, numerically, there do seem to be differences when comparing the lengths of the food 
[M = 5.50, SD = 1.22] and body part [M = 5.67, SD = 0.62] words with, for example, the lengths 
of the object [M = 7.33, SD = 1.51] and travel-related [M = 7.20, SD = 2.61] words). Future 
research may examine what is special about food-related words – that is, what causes them to be 
rated as more like words and less difficult to learn than other categories; regardless, the cued 
recall performance for food-related words was not different than other categories in the current 
experiments (see Figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.8 and 2.9).   
 In sum, the current studies provide further evidence that younger and older participants 
may not truly appreciate how we are motivated to learn until they are in a learning environment. 
That is, people may think it would be helpful to remember everything they plan to study, only to 
find, during study and/or test, that their memory capacity is limited and they need to prioritize. 
Previous work on PAL suggests that the concreteness of cue-target pairs (Paivio, 1965), the 
imageability of the pairs (Papagno et al., 1991), and the semantic relatedness of the pairs 
(Arenberg & Robertson-Tchabo, 1977) can affect learning; in the current study, we argue that 
subjective importance can affect learning as well (even if participants’ initial perceptions of what 
is important do not follow expected patterns).  
 The current work is in line with previous studies suggesting that older adults perform less 
accurately than younger adults do on associative memory tasks (Arenberg & Robertson-Tchabo, 
1977; Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Rast & Zimprich, 2009; Service & Craik, 1993; cf. Hargis & 
Castel, 2017; Hargis & Castel, 2018; Treat & Reese, 1976). Though the goal to learn words for 
an upcoming trip was at least partially social in nature (Carstensen et al., 1999), older adults’ 
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performance was less accurate than younger adults’ performance when learning these items. This 
pattern of performance was not unexpected, given that the current studies used a difficult 
associative memory task. Future work could investigate how introducing effective study 
strategies (e.g., Treat & Reese, 1976) could potentially improve older adults’ performance on a 
Swahili PAL task, as well as how the advent of new language-learning technologies (e.g., 
Duolingo, Memrise, and other smartphone applications) may allow participants to easily 
prioritize (and, perhaps, offload) which words are most important to know when communicating 
with others in a foreign country.  
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Chapter 2 Conclusions 
  Substantial prior work suggests a general shift in priorities with aging. While younger 
adults aim to gain new knowledge that will benefit them in future careers, older adults’ main 
goal is to build and maintain relationships with close friends and family. There are interesting 
areas, however, in which these goals may overlap, such as remembering information about 
people who one has just met, and are likely (or not likely) to meet again. In Experiments 1 and 2, 
participants in both age groups learned information about people with whom they would interact 
in the future with relatively high accuracy, but age-related deficits occurred in recall of 
information about people with whom the participant would not interact in the future. These 
findings relate to work that illustrates an awareness among older adults that their future is finite: 
since time and resources are limited, perhaps it is not important to remember information one 
definitely will not use in the future. Study 3 examined participants’ judgments about their own 
ability to remember names. The better-than-average effect has been demonstrated in multiple 
domains of cognitive and social psychology, but Study 3 suggests that participants across the 
adult lifespan may not commit that bias in their perception of their ability to remember names.   
  Building upon findings from Experiments 1 and 2, Experiments 4 and 5 were constructed 
to create a different type of overlap between knowledge-based and socio-emotional goals. The 
former two Experiments focused on how age and importance affect participants’ learning of 
information about others, and the latter two Experiments focused on how age and importance 
affect participants learning of information they could use with others. The backstory told to 
participants in Experiments 4 and 5 was meant to activate the potential for both social and 
knowledge-based goals; visiting a foreign country where one does not know the language will 
almost certainly involve social interaction (e.g., while navigating the streets or enjoying the local 
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cuisine), but there may also be a strong motivation to learn new information (e.g., about local 
history or art). Utilizing this combination of both social and knowledge-based motivations, 
Experiments 4 and 5 suggest that while older adults are overall less accurate in learning Swahili-
English word pairs than younger adults are, both groups do prioritize information that would be 
more important for their trip once the value structure is made more obvious (even if their pre-
task ratings do not reflect a sensitivity to the words’ relative importance). While overall 
differences in goal pursuit among younger and older adults are well established, motivation and 
priorities often overlap between younger and older adults, and the dichotomy between 
knowledge-based and socio-emotional goals is not always absolute. Chapter 2 focused primarily 
on how we learn in service of social goals and in service of goals that have both social and 
knowledge-based components. Chapter 3 will investigate how importance and age affect learning 
goals that are primarily knowledge-based.   
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Table 2.1 
 
Spearman Correlations: Younger Adults in Study 3 
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Table 2.2 
 
Spearman Correlations: Older Adults in Study 3 
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Table 2.3 
Words presented to participants in Experiments 4 and 5, including their semantic category, as 
well as other participants’ ratings of each Swahili word’s wordlikeness and difficulty to learn. 
 
Swahili (cue) English (target) Category Wordlikeness Rating Difficulty Rating 
asante thank you basic 5.64 3.00 
chakula food food 5.23 3.23 
chumba room travel 5.41 2.82 
dawa medicine health 5.14 2.82 
dawati desk object 5.00 3.50 
dharura emergency health 2.95 4.86 
dririsha window object 3.14 4.91 
fedha money travel 4.45 3.73 
hapana no basic 5.73 2.77 
homa fever health 6.23 2.05 
hujambo hello basic 4.05 4.09 
jicho eye body 4.68 3.64 
kalamu pen object 4.86 3.14 
kichwa head body 4.32 3.64 
kikombe cup object 4.77 3.68 
kinywa mouth body 3.71 4.59 
kitambulisho identification travel 3.32 5.55 
kwaheri goodbye basic 3.27 4.36 
maji water food 5.14 2.86 
matunda fruit food 5.27 3.32 
mboga vegetables food 2.73 4.68 
mgahawa restaurant travel 2.36 4.95 
mganga doctor health 2.86 4.36 
mkono arm body 3.27 4.18 
muuguzi nurse health 2.68 4.86 
mwenyekiti chair object 2.00 6.05 
ndege plane travel 2.09 5.18 
ndio yes basic 2.59 4.77 
nyama meat food 4.23 3.50 
nyewle hair body 1.95 5.27 
pombe beer food 5.09 3.00 
shingo neck body 5.18 3.09 
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suruali pants object 4.23 4.55 
tafadhali please basic 3.41 5.14 
ubalozi embassy travel 3.48 4.23 
wagonjwa sick health 3.10 4.64 
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CHAPTER 3: YOUNGER AND OLDER ADULTS’ MEMORY FOR IMPORTANT 
HEALTH-RELATED INFOMRATION 
Portions of the following introductory comments, description of Experiments 1 and 2, and 
conclusion are taken directly from Hargis & Castel (2018) 
 While socio-emotional goal pursuit is a notable shift that occurs in many contexts, it is 
not all-encompassing for older adults. Many older adults seek to learn into and after retirement – 
if not in service of their careers, perhaps in relation to their hobbies of birdwatching, crafting, or 
travelling, or even for the sake of learning itself (Wolfgang & Dowling, 1981). The assumption 
that younger adults pursue only knowledge and older adults pursue only social connection is an 
overly vague one, which Carstensen et al. (1999) acknowledge. Just because older adults are not 
learning in a formal education setting (though many are, see Bye, Pushkar, & Conway, 2007), 
does not mean they cease to acquire knowledge. Similarly, younger adults may strive to acquire 
knowledge that can benefit them in the future, but also to build and maintain close relationships.  
 There are notable instances in which older adults are motivated by both social and 
informational purposes. For example, if one is learning about a new diagnosis from a physician, 
the patient can be motivated to remember the information for at least two purposes: to adhere to 
the physician’s recommendations, of course, and also to share that information with a friend or 
loved one who is concerned about the patient or who can assist the patient in adhering to the 
instructions. Some of the information gathered in this context may be more important to 
remember (e.g., what foods to avoid while taking a newly-prescribed medication) and other 
information may be less important to remember (e.g., what color the doctor’s eyes were), and 
participants are often sensitive to differences in relative importance, even in a lab setting (e.g., 
Castel et al., 2002). Individuals across the lifespan are often highly motivated to remember 
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information about their own health or diagnoses, but this information is not inherently social in 
nature (though there are certainly components that involve social interaction, see Beisecker & 
Beisecker, 1990; Maynard & Heritage, 2005; Ryan, Hummert, & Boich, 1995). 
 Chapter 3 is devoted to exploring how older adults are motivated to learn health-related 
information that is not explicitly social. Experiments 3 and 4 do have components of social 
communication, but the focus is expanded to include learning information for the purpose of 
increasing one’s own knowledge about a given topic. These instances are not intended to be 
merely exceptions to the general rule of primarily social motivation in aging, but notable 
learning opportunities that may reflect experiences in individuals’ daily lives. Therefore, the 
following Chapter will examine how younger and older adults acquire knowledge about 
relatively practical information of varying importance in contexts requiring participants to bind 
information together in memory and, under certain circumstances, face interference and 
confusability between items.  
Experiment 1 
 When individuals try to adhere to a medication regimen, important information can be 
overlooked, often due to interference and limited memory capacity. More than half of older 
adults take five or more medications and/or supplements on a regular basis (Qato et al., 2008), 
while many younger adults take medications for both medical and non-medical reasons (e.g., as a 
stimulant, White, Becker-Blease, & Grace-Bishop, 2006), and often without considering how 
other medications, foods, or drinks may interact with those substances. Thus, remembering 
information about which substances are safe or dangerous to consume together could have 
important implications for overall health. Remembering medical information often requires 
making an association between two or more items; for example, what medication(s) should not 
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be taken concurrently with another medication. The associative deficit hypothesis suggests that 
the association of items in memory is detrimentally affected in older age (Naveh-Benjamin, 
2000). This deficit is pervasive and present in various memory recall tasks, including 
remembering word-nonword pairs (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000), pairs of pictures (Naveh-Benjamin, 
Hussain, Guez, & Bar-On, 2003), and name-face pairs (Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, Kilb, & Reedy, 
2004; though this can be affected by the value of the information and reduced with repeated 
testing, see Hargis & Castel, 2017). 
 However, there are instances in which age-related differences in memory are not present, 
including tasks examining value-directed remembering, or the strategic focus on important items 
in light of memory capacity limitations (Castel, 2008). Previous studies examining how value 
affects memory have utilized words paired with random point values (e.g., Castel, Benjamin, 
Craik, & Watkins, 2002; Castel, Murayama, Friedman, McGillivray, & Link, 2013). These 
studies provide evidence that while older adults’ overall memory performance is less accurate 
than younger adults’, older adults are still able to remember what is valuable, especially with 
task experience. However, value does not always eliminate age-related recall differences in 
associated information, as an age-related memory deficit has been shown for recall of high-value 
word pairs (Ariel, Price, & Hertzog, 2015). Younger and older adults recognized that high value 
pairs are important (as shown by their preference to study high-value over low-value items), but 
older adults did not recall the pairs as accurately as younger adults did. The interplay between 
aging, memory selectivity, and associative memory is examined in the current study using an 
associative recognition paradigm and novel medication stimuli. 
 A value-based mechanism such as health risk could provide a structure in which older 
adults can overcome associative memory deficits, at least for the most important information. 
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Middlebrooks, McGillivray, Murayama, and Castel (2015) presented younger and older 
participants with a list of allergens (e.g., peanut) that varied in severity. Younger participants 
recalled more allergens initially, but age differences in recall of the most severe items were no 
longer apparent after participants gained some experience with the task. Similarly, older adults 
have been shown to accurately remember important medication side effects if the effects are 
framed in terms of detecting dangerous outcomes (Friedman, McGillivray, Murayama, & Castel, 
2015). Participants studied and rated the unpleasantness of a group of side effects (each of which 
had been previously classified as mild, moderate, or severe), and were then asked to recall as 
many side effects as they could in a free recall paradigm. There were no differences in younger 
and older adults’ recall of these items, but the groups were affected by the level of severity 
differently, such that older adults remembered more severe side effects (e.g., stroke) than mild 
side effects (e.g., itching). While these studies (Friedman et al., 2015; Middlebrooks et al., 2016) 
suggest that older adults can prioritize valuable medical information for item recall, this has not 
been investigated with the added task demands of associating multiple items in memory.  
 The use of prior knowledge through schematic support can also benefit older adults in 
memory tasks (e.g., Castel, 2005); however, this benefit is not present in all domains (Morrow, 
Menard, Stine-Morrow, Teller, & Bryant, 2001). Older adults’ memory for medication side 
effects, for example, is thought to benefit from schematic support (Friedman et al., 2015), as 
many older adults have experienced taking medications throughout their lives (Qato et al., 2008). 
Additionally, being able to refer a to-be-remembered item to oneself benefits older adults’ recall 
(Gutchess, Kensinger, Yoon, & Schacter, 2007), which may occur in healthcare situations if one 
intentionally connects information found online or provided by a physician to one’s own life or 
experiences. While personal connections to the information and schematic support may lead to 
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older adults’ improved memory accuracy in some situations (see Umanath & Marsh, 2014), 
memory for medication information that is familiar but not factually correct could in fact impair 
memory if it contradicts older adults’ schemas and beliefs (e.g., Rice & Okun, 1994), suggesting 
that schematic support is not universally beneficial.  
 When given multiple study-test trials, participants often learn from their prior task 
experience and performance improves as the task goes on. This “testing effect” is well-
established among younger adult participants (e.g., Allen, Mahler, & Estes, 1969; Carrier & 
Pashler, 1992). However, the literature examining older adults’ memory for associative 
information across several study-test trials is mixed. For example, Overman and Becker (2009) 
found that re-studying face-word pairs did not improve older adults’ recall of those pairs, while 
findings by Kilb and Naveh-Benjamin (2011) suggest that older adults can benefit from repeated 
studying (as can younger adults) when given pairs of pictures to remember. There is also 
evidence that older adults benefit differently from prior task success than do younger adults 
(Geraci & Miller, 2013; Geraci, Hughes, Miller, & De Forrest, 2016). The current study utilizes 
multiple study-test cycles to assess how associative memory performance changes with task 
experience, both when binding items (Experiment 1) and when binding under conditions that 
may create memory interference (Experiment 2). 
 Due to their associative nature, medication interactions may be difficult for older adults 
to remember. This could have serious implications for health if one forgets that grapefruit, for 
example, should not be eaten while taking medication for high cholesterol. The current study 
examines how younger and older adults remember associative medication information of varying 
levels of severity across several study-test trials. If older adults engage in selective strategies 
during encoding, they are likely to remember the high-value (important) items as accurately as 
  
 
83 
 
younger adults, especially with task experience, but their overall performance may be less 
accurate due to deficits in associating information in memory.   
 Experiment 1 was conducted to examine how younger and older adults’ associative 
recognition of medication interactions are influenced by the importance (in terms of health 
outcomes) of those associated items. Younger and older participants viewed a series of 
interactions that were assigned to one of three outcomes (severe, mild, or no interaction) and 
were tested via associative recognition for a total of three study-test cycles. 
Method 
Participants 
 Younger adults (n = 26) were undergraduate students at University of California, Los 
Angeles and were recruited through the Psychology Department subject pool (Mage = 20.81, SD = 
1.94), 18 were female and 1 did not report gender.  Older adults (n = 26) were recruited from the 
Los Angeles community (Mage = 68.72, SD = 5.50), 15 were female. Most older adults had 
obtained undergraduate (42%) or graduate (42%) degrees. This research was approved by the 
UCLA Institutional Review Board. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were asked to imagine that their doctor was describing a series of 
interactions between medications. They began by reading a short explanation of what medication 
interactions are, and that they can result in health outcomes that vary in severity. Three levels of 
severity were outlined to the participant: no interaction (no effect on health), mild interaction 
(slight health effects), and severe interaction (life-threatening health effects). Participants were 
then presented with 15 unique pairs of stimuli (five in each severity category) in randomized 
order. There were three pairs of each of the following combinations: real medication - real 
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medication, fictitious medication - fictitious medication, real medication - fictitious medication, 
real medication - consumable substance (e.g., bananas, licorice), and fictitious medication - 
consumable substance. The average length of the medications was 7.90 letters (SD = 1.45), while 
the average length of the food words was 9.00 letters (SD = 2.68).  
 Each medication was displayed on a computer screen as the label on an orange prescription 
bottle, and each substance was displayed as a photograph with the name of the item under (see 
Figure 4.1a and 4.1b for example study and test trials). The fictitious medications were chosen to 
resemble actual medications without being highly familiar to the participants (e.g., Dypraxa, 
Clavosec), thus reducing the possibility of using schematic support to recall the fictitious items. 
If there was a mild or severe outcome that would occur when consuming the two substances, it 
was presented with an example, e.g., “Severe (stroke)”. Participants were given 7s to study each 
pair, with the instruction that they were to remember as much as they could about each 
interaction. The items in each pair were randomly assigned to each other, as were the outcomes 
to each pair, and these were held constant throughout the study-test trials for each participant. At 
test, participants were presented with each pair of medications and asked to choose the severity 
of the outcome that would occur if they were to be taken together. Participants were given the 
answer choices “severe,” “mild,” or “no interaction” and asked to choose one. This study-test 
procedure was completed for two additional cycles with the same information on each in newly 
randomized orders.  
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Figure 3.1. Three example study and test trials from Experiment 1. Participants were given 7s to 
study each of 15 pairs and were later tested on the outcome.  
 
Results 
 The memory accuracy of both age groups across the task is presented in Figure 3.2. To 
determine whether age and severity affected recognition accuracy of medication interactions, a 
2(Age group: younger or older) X 3(Severity: no interaction, mild interaction, severe interaction) 
X 3(Test) mixed-factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. There was no main 
effect of age on recall, F < 1, p = .80, h2 < .01. There was a significant main effect of severity, 
F(2,100) = 7.23,  p < .01, h2 = .12.  Follow up t-tests using Bonferroni corrections indicated that 
recognition accuracy of severe interactions (M = 0.78, SD = 0.16) was more accurate than 
recognition accuracy of mild interactions (M = 0.69, SD = 0.15), t(51) = 3.76, p < .001 , and no 
interactions (M = 0.69, SD = 0.17), t(51) = 3.87, p < .001, but there was no difference between 
recognition accuracy of no interactions and mild interactions, t(51) = .21, p = 1.00.  A marginally 
significant two-way interaction between age and severity was also revealed, F(2, 100) = 3.09, p 
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= .05, h2 = .05. Though this interaction was not significant at an alpha-level of .05, we conducted 
follow-up tests to further examine potentially interesting patterns. These ANOVAs revealed that 
younger adults’ recognition accuracy was not significantly affected by severity, F(2,50) = 2.02, p 
= .14, h2 = .08. Older adults’ recognition accuracy, however, was affected by severity, F(2,50) = 
6.88, p < .01, h2 = .22, such that interactions associated with the lowest level of severity (M = 
0.69, SD = 0.20) were remembered less accurately than those associated with the highest level of 
severity (M = 0.80 , SD = 0.14), t(25) = 3.42, p < .01. Interactions associated with a moderate 
level of severity (M = 0.66, SD = 0.15) were also remembered less accurately than those with the 
highest level of severity, t(25) = 4.61, p < .001. There was no difference in recognition accuracy 
of mild interaction and no interaction pairs, t(25) = 0.81, p = 1.00.  
 
  
Figure 3.2. Performance on a series of three cued-recall tests in Experiment 1 by younger adults 
and older adults. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 There was a main effect of test, F(2,100) = 72.03, p < .001, h2 = .59, such that overall 
performance on Test 2 (M = 0.75, SD = 0.15) was more accurate than Test 1 (M = 0.58, SD = 
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0.17), t(51) = 4.77, p < .001, and performance on Test 3 (M = 0.83, SD = 0.13) was more 
accurate than on Test 2, t(51) = 2.93, p = .01. No other effects were significant, p > .45. 
Additional tests were conducted to determine whether the presence of a food or drink item in an 
interaction led to more accurate recall of that interaction. A 2(Age group) X 2(Consumable 
substances or only medications) revealed that items containing food or drink (M = 0.87, SD = 
0.10) were recognized more accurately than those that contained only medications, (M = 0.62, 
SD = 0.16), F(50) = 161.24, p < .001, h2 = .76. This did not interact with age, F(1,50) = 1.63, p = 
.21, h2 < .01. Finally, the associative recognition of real medications and fictitious medications 
was compared. A 2(Age group) X 2(real or fictitious) ANOVA revealed no differences in 
recognition, F(1, 50) = 1.49, p = .23, h2 = .23; this also did not interact with age, F(1, 50) = 1.49, 
p = .23, h2 = .03. 
 Both age groups recognized the “severe” outcome with relatively high accuracy. We 
sought to determine whether there was a bias in either age group’s responses toward choosing 
“severe” more often than other options, perhaps as a guess if they were unsure of the outcome. 
Throughout the task, a total of 15 “severe” pairs were shown. Therefore, we compared the total 
number of times a participant chose “severe” in all three tests to 15. Neither age group deviated 
significantly from this number: younger adults chose “severe” an average of 14.69 times (SD = 
1.78), and older adults chose “severe” an average of 15.35 times (SD = 2.71). There were no 
differences between the amount of “severe” responses given by younger and older adults, t(50) = 
1.03, p = .31. 
Discussion 
 Given a series of medication interactions that varied in the severity of their outcomes on 
health, only older adults’ recognition accuracy was affected by that severity. Younger adults, 
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who are often more accurate than older adults in remembering associative information overall 
(e.g., Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Naveh-Benjamin, et al., 2003), were not sensitive to information 
importance (i.e., the severity of the health outcome). This is perhaps because performance was 
already quite accurate, so the use of a value-based selectivity strategy was not necessary. Older 
adults, however, remembered severe health outcomes more accurately than the outcomes that 
were not deemed life-threatening, but there was no evidence of a bias towards “severe” in their 
responses. Older and younger adults remembered high-value associations with equivalent 
accuracy (cf. Ariel et al., 2015), and there were no age-related differences in overall 
performance, in contrast with previous literature showing an age-related associative deficit in 
memory (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). 
 Pairs of items that included a food or drink item (e.g., grapefruit) in addition to a 
medication were remembered more accurately, possibly due to the distinctiveness of these items 
(Hunt & Worthen, 2006) as compared to medication-medication pairs. Fictitious but realistic 
medications were remembered as accurately as real medications. Perhaps participants did not 
recognize the real medications and therefore did not remember them any differently than 
fictitious medications. On the other hand, even if they did recognize real medications, perhaps 
participants did not have the time, inclination, or familiarity to use schematic support or prior 
experience to remember real items more accurately than items they would never have 
encountered before. 
 Overall, participants in Experiment 1 performed well on the task. It is possible that 
participants could have performed well by only remembering that one medication was associated 
with a certain outcome (e.g., knowing that the drug Namenda is associated with a mild 
interaction) and the pair of medication items did not therefore need to be encoded concurrently 
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with its outcome to answer correctly on the final test. Also, it is not always the case that one 
medication interacts with only one other substance; in fact, one medication can interact in 
varying ways with a set of other medications. These types of associations in which one item is 
associated with several other items can cause more interference in memory, a process known as 
the fan effect (Anderson, 1974; Anderson & Reder, 1999). The fan effect paradigm has been 
used to examine how younger and older adults remember a series of items associated to another 
particular item (Gerard, Zacks, Hasher, & Radvansky, 1991). The larger the “fan,” or the more 
items that are associated with that item, the more difficult the task usually is, especially for older 
adults. If one item is associated with several others, older adults are often less accurate than 
younger adults in remembering those items. 
Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 1, younger and older adults recognized the severity associated with a pair 
of medications with equivalent accuracy. Experiment 2 was conducted to examine the role of 
interference in memory for medication information among younger and older adults. Participants 
viewed a set of medication interactions in which each medication interacted with five other 
medications. Memory was assessed with multiple study-test trials. If the connections between 
medications interfere with each other in memory, older adults are expected to be differentially 
affected by this. While they still may engage in value-directed remembering, the level of 
interference caused by binding one item to five other items (in addition to the task requirements 
of associating multiple items) may lead to age-related differences in overall performance. 
Method 
Participants 
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 Younger adults (n = 26) were undergraduate students at University of California, Los 
Angeles and were recruited through the Psychology Department subject pool, Mage = 20.19, SD = 
1.06, 15 were female. Older adults (n = 26) were recruited from the Los Angeles community, 
Mage = 68.42, SD = 6.91, 15 were female. Most older adults had obtained undergraduate (50%) or 
graduate (34%) degrees. This research was approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Instructions given to participants were identical to Experiment 1. Unlike in Experiment 1, 
participants in Experiment 2 were presented with only six unique medications (no food or 
drinks), which each appeared in five different interactions for a total of 15 items. For example, 
Dypraxa : Cordarone could lead to a mild interaction, Dypraxa : Doloxan to a severe interaction, 
and Cordarone: Doloxan to no interaction. The assignment of severity to each interaction was 
randomized for each participant. As in Experiment 1, the medications were presented on a 
computer screen as orange prescription bottles with only the name of the medication on the label. 
Participants were given 7s to study each pair, and were asked to choose the severity of the 
interaction that would occur given the choices “severe,” “mild,” or “no interaction” at test. This 
study-test procedure was completed for two additional cycles with the same information on each 
study and test in newly randomized order. 
Results 
 The memory accuracy of both age groups across the task is presented in Figure 3.3.  To 
determine whether age and severity affected associative recognition of medication interactions, a 
2(Age group: younger or older) X 3(Severity: no interaction, mild interaction, severe interaction) 
X 3(Test) mixed-factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. There was no main 
effect of age on accuracy, F(1,50) = 1.66, p = .20, h2= .03. There was a significant main effect of 
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severity, F(2,100) = 4.27,  p = .02, h2 = .08. Follow up t-tests using Bonferroni corrections 
indicated that associative recognition of severe interactions (M = 0.53, SD = 0.17) was more 
accurate than that of mild interactions (M = 0.46, SD = 0.15), t(51) = 3.56, p = .03, and no 
interactions (M = 0.44, SD = 0.17), t(51) = 3.14, p < .01, but there were no differences between 
recognition of no interactions and mild interactions, t(51) = .65, p = 1.00. Unlike in Experiment 
1, there was no significant interaction between age and severity, F(2, 100) = 2.30, p = .11, h2 = 
.04. There was a significant main effect of test, F(2, 100) = 12.83, p < .001, h2 = .20. Follow up 
t-tests using Bonferroni corrections indicated that performance on Test 2 (M = 0.49, SD = 0.13) 
was more accurate than performance on Test 1, (M = 0.41, SD = 0.14), t(51) = 4.05, p < .001 and 
Test 3 (M = 0.52, SD = 0.17), was more accurate than Test 1, t(51) = 4.74, p < .001, but there 
were no differences on Tests 2 and 3, t(51) = 1.28, p = .61. No other effects were significant, ps 
> .22. As in Experiment 1, a 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed no differences in recognition accuracy for 
real and fictitious medications, F(1, 50) = 0.20, p = .66, h2 < .01, this did not interact with age, 
F(1, 50) = 3.19, p = .08, h2 = .06. 
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Figure 3.3. Performance on a series of three cued-recall tests in Experiment 2 by younger adults 
and older adults. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 As in Experiment 1, we sought to rule out the explanation that older adults were biased 
toward choosing “severe.” We again compared the amount of “severe” responses by each age 
group to 15, as there were 15 total “severe” interactions presented throughout the task. In 
Experiment 2, younger adults chose “severe” an average of 15.62 times (SD = 3.07), and older 
adults chose “severe” an average of 16.85 times (SD = 4.45). A one-sample t-test revealed that 
older adults chose “severe” marginally more than 15 times in Experiment 2, t(25) = 2.12, p = 
.045. There were no differences in the amount of severe responses given by younger and older 
adults, t(50) = 1.16, p = .25.  
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 utilized a task that required multiple items to be bound together, depending 
on the interaction presented. If older adults had been detrimentally harmed by the size of the 
“fan” (i.e., the fact that one medication was linked with five others in different ways), this might 
have led to age-related differences, at least for the associative recognition accuracy of lower-
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value information, as older adults are often still able to remember information that is important. 
Older adults can be detrimentally affected by interference to a greater extent than younger adults, 
but interestingly, findings from the current study suggest that there are instances in which older 
adults are not significantly less accurate in remembering interfering medication information. The 
“fan” of interfering items does not differentially affect older adults in this case. When medication 
interactions are presented consecutively in a simplified format (that is, with only the name of the 
medication on the bottle) as they are in the current study, both age groups remember them 
equivalently well. 
 Unlike in Experiment 1, both age groups were similarly affected by severity, such that 
both remembered items associated with a severe health outcome more accurately than those 
associated with a mild health outcome or no significant health outcome. Though Figure 3.3 
suggests that older adults differentially remembered severe outcomes more accurately than other 
outcomes, there was no interaction between age and severity, and the power to detect such 
differences was adequate (if using an effect size of 0.35, which is between moderate and high, 
the power to detect an effect given this design and sample size is 0.86). It is possible that the task 
in Experiment 2 was more difficult than in Experiment 1, causing even younger adults to 
struggle to encode and match every outcome with relatively high accuracy; that is, the 
introduction of the fan design made a value-based strategy more viable, rather than attempting to 
remember every item. Older adults chose “severe” slightly more often than it was presented, 
perhaps related to the difficulty of the task: if one cannot remember everything, it is perhaps 
beneficial to be cautious and assume that more items are dangerous. The lack of difference 
between memory for mild and no interaction items is interesting: perhaps severe items, because 
they are life-threatening, are considered important, whereas the other two categories are grouped 
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together into a category deemed “less important.” This pattern of results is similar to that of older 
adults in Experiment 1, providing further evidence for a possible division of stimuli into two 
categories by the participants when the task is considered challenging.   
General Discussion 
 The current study examined how younger and older adults remember information about 
medication pairs that varied with respect to the level of danger associated with their interaction 
— severe, mild, or no interaction. In Experiment 1, each pair of items was unique and memory 
for the interaction between the two was tested. Though it was possible that participants 
remembered one item of the pair and the result (e.g., “Namenda is associated with a mild 
interaction”), this was still a test of the association between at least those two items. Younger and 
older adults performed equally well in Experiment 1, and only older adults’ memory accuracy 
was affected by severity, suggesting sensitivity to the value-based structure in this study (or 
perhaps that the severe interactions were most distinct to the older adults, thereby leading to their 
more accurate recall).  
 In both experiments, the associative recognition accuracy of both groups increased given 
task experience. This is similar to prior work suggesting that older adults benefit from prior 
successful task performance (Geraci & Miller, 2013; Hargis & Castel, 2017; Kilb & Naveh-
Benjamin, 2011), and suggests that repeated study and retrieval of associative information 
regarding medication interactions can benefit overall recall of important pairs of items, even 
when there are interfering connections among medications. Additionally, the information was 
tested via associative recognition in which there were three answer choices. If the study had been 
conducted such that the individual medications were tested, older adults may have performed 
less accurately than in the current study, but in the present task remembering that a certain pair of 
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medications is dangerous to take together may be an effective value-based strategy. Experiment 
2 employed a paradigm that was thought to lead to stronger effects of interference on 
remembering medication interactions, in light of previous work investigating the fan effect. The 
task was considered to be more difficult in that it was no longer possible to bind only one item of 
the pair to its outcome, as each medication appeared multiple times; indeed, Figure 3.3 suggests 
that both age groups were less accurate overall in Experiment 2. In this study, testing effects 
(Meyer & Logan, 2013) and value-based encoding processes (Castel, Farb, & Craik, 2007) may 
have helped both younger and older adults to remember important medication interactions. 
Neither younger nor older adults’ amount of “severe” responses differed between experiment 
(older adults t(50) = 1.47, p = .15; younger adults t(50) = 1.33, p = .19), but the numerical shift 
seen toward choosing “severe” slightly more often in Experiment 2 may be related to the 
possible increase in task difficulty, as noted above. Perhaps when a task requires more cognitive 
effort or causes interference in memory, participants may be slightly more likely to be cautious 
and choose “severe” when in doubt of the answer or view the example outcomes (e.g., 
“dizziness”) as severe, though the differences were not statistically significant. 
 It is worth noting, however, that the associative paradigm used here may allow for a type 
of gist-based encoding of the health outcome that would occur if two substances were consumed 
together. That is, participants may rely on the general gist of the outcome (e.g., “very dangerous” 
versus “not so bad”) rather than the exact information presented during encoding. In aging, the 
ability to remember verbatim information can decline, but gist-based processing is often retained 
(e.g., Schacter, Koutstaal, Johnson, Gross & Angell, 1997; Titcomb & Reyna, 1995; Tun, 
Wingfield, Rosen & Blanchard, 1998). Previous work has suggested that memory for gist-based 
associative information can be as accurate in older as in younger adults, even if there are age-
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related deficits for verbatim associative information (Castel, 2005; Flores, Hargis, McGillivray, 
Friedman, & Castel, 2017). Further, since the test used in this paradigm is one of associative 
recognition, it is perhaps the case that some associative recognition tasks do not yield age-related 
associative deficits, while other value-based associative memory tasks using cued recall do 
indeed yield such differences (Ariel et al., 2015).  
 The present work suggests that the associative deficit often seen in older adulthood is not 
ubiquitous. While older adults typically suffer from impairments when interference is present 
(e.g., Jacoby, Debner, & Hay, 2001), there were no age differences in this study. This may have 
been because the test was simple (with three answer choices for each item), or perhaps older 
adults are actually able to overcome these deficits in interference when the to-be-learned 
information is valuable or meaningful (as opposed to a long list of word pairs). Future work may 
examine how this type of information is remembered in a more applied context, as the 
information in this study was presented on a computer screen (rather than as actual medication 
bottles, which may lead to more accurate recall), and may also directly assess the amount of 
experience participants have with taking multiple medications, further examining the impact of 
health on memory (Hess, 2005). It may also be of interest to pursue an explicit self-referencing 
manipulation (Gutchess et al., 2007), such that participants are asked to imagine that they are 
taking (or are actually prescribed) a subset of the medications they are asked to study. In 
summary, the present work shows that older adults may overcome deficits in binding to 
remember important medication interactions via value-based memory processes. 
Experiment 3 
  It can be difficult to remember — and easy to confuse — health-related information. 
When learning about a complicated new diagnosis or treatment regimen, we may feel 
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overwhelmed by the amount of information presented. It can be critical to remember, for 
example, important side effects of a medication, as the presence of certain side effects could 
indicate a serious condition for which the patient should seek additional treatment. However, 
patients forget up to 80% of medical information almost immediately upon encountering it 
(Kessels, 2003), and forgetting this type of information can have serious consequences, 
especially if one is unaware of their potential to forget. If the patient misremembers information 
about her own treatment plan, for example, or if a caregiver forgets information that is important 
to the loved one for whom she is providing care and cannot recall or relay that information later 
(see Nestojko, Bui, Kornell, & Bjork, 2014), medications can be omitted or taken incorrectly.  
Patients often struggle to adhere to their doctors’ recommendations; medication non-
adherence in particular is a common and costly problem (Gellad, Grenard, & Marcum, 2011; 
Hughes, 2004; Roebuck, Liberman, Gemmill-Toyama, & Brennan, 2011). Many older adults 
take several medications at the same time (Qato et al., 2008), and these complex regimens may 
lead to older patients or caregivers confusing or misremembering medication information 
(especially in light of associative memory deficits, Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). Older adults do 
struggle more to adhere to medical regimens than their younger counterparts (Brown & Park, 
2003; Morrell, Park, & Poon, 1990; Salzman, 1995). In the lab, schematic support can benefit 
older adults’ performance in memory tasks (e.g., Castel, 2005; Friedman, McGillivray, 
Murayama, & Castel, 2015; cf. Morrow, Menard, Stine-Morrow, Teller, & Bryant, 2001), but 
that benefit is not always found when the to-be-learned information is in the medical domain 
(Rice & Okun, 1994), so older participants may struggle particularly with binding associative 
medical information in memory.  
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Metacognitive factors are also of interest in the current study. More specifically, 
metamemory (that is, our perceptions about how memory works) may influence how we learn 
and share medical information. Knowing what we do and do not know can help us more 
efficiently allocate attention and resources appropriately (Metcalfe, 2009; Metcalfe & Finn, 
2008, Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault, 2003), and this type of monitoring may be especially 
important for older adults, as they often face cognitive declines (Rast & Zimprich, 2009).  When 
learning new information in a physician’s office or in a pharmacy, patients and caregivers may 
depend on their own abilities to remember information (such as a common side effect of their 
new medication) for later use. They may also consider, however, the memory abilities of the 
people with whom they will share that information. For example, a patient who has learned 
information during an appointment about a new diagnosis and wishes to share that information 
later with another person (perhaps a friend or spouse) would benefit from sharing the information 
in a way that is effective and clear, given the other person’s memory capacity and potential 
limitations.  
Family members often accompany patients, especially older adults, to medical 
appointments (Schilling et al., 2002). If a patient depends on another person who they brought to 
the appointment to remember information on their behalf, the helper’s memory abilities will, of 
course, influence the accuracy of information that will later be relayed to the patient. Relying on 
another person to remember information can often be effective for the patient – it may free up 
cognitive resources to ask important questions of the doctor, for example (Prohaska & Glasser, 
1996). However, the success of this process depends on the individual actually remembering the 
to-be-learned information; if the helper misremembers, that incorrect information may be passed 
along to the patient. Therefore, it would benefit the patient to have a general idea of how another 
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person’s memory works in a given situation and how much it should be trusted – that is, it would 
benefit the patient to have well-calibrated metamemory for themselves and others. As many 
older adults take several medications concurrently (Qato et al., 2008), knowledge of others’ 
memory abilities may be especially helpful when keeping track of new information. Not all 
patients and caregivers have similar cognitive characteristics, however. Many younger people 
relay medical information to older people (e.g., in a personal setting as a caregiver to a 
grandparent or in an occupation such as pharmacy technician), and many older people relay 
medical information to younger people (e.g., family members or young patients). Patients may 
rely also rely on people from across the lifespan to help them remember, as collaborative 
remembering can lead to benefits above and beyond individual remembering for older adults 
(Harris, Keil, Sutton, Barnier, & McIlwain, 2011; Johansson, Andersson, & Rönnberg, 2005). 
Extensive work has documented discrepancies between predicted performance and actual 
performance (e.g., Carroll, Nelson, & Kirwan, 1997; Castel, McCabe, & Roediger, 2007; Koriat 
& Bjork, 2005; Miller & Geraci, 2011a). Overconfidence in memory is fairly common; Schraw 
and Roedel (1994) suggest that overconfidence is largely due to participants not taking test 
difficulty into account when making judgments. There is evidence in the literature that older 
adults are as accurate in their metacognitive judgments as younger adults are (Halamish, 
McGillivray, & Castel, 2011; Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Rast & Zimprich, 2009), but other work 
suggests that older adults may be more overconfident in their judgments as compared to younger 
adults (Bruce, Coyne, & Botwinick, 1982; Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990). Often, if an 
individual misremembers a piece of advice or medication dosage instructions, they may not have 
a chance to remedy that misconception (doctor’s appointments are shorter than ever, Landau, 
Bachner, Elishkewitz, Goldstein, & Barneboim, 2007; and the amount of information available 
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on the internet is growing but not always trustworthy, Law, Mintzes, & Morgan, 2011). To allow 
for participants to learn about the fallible nature of memory, the current study compares 
perceptions about memory accuracy before and after a difficult learning task. In the current 
study, younger and older participants gave metacognitive judgments about their own and others’ 
memory performance before and after a challenging memory task, to allow for an examination of 
how these judgments change with task experience via repeated study-test cycles. 
Metacognition is often assessed by comparing item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs) 
given by participants with accuracy across a task. In tasks with multiple study-test trials, 
participants’ local judgments often reflect an underconfidence with practice (UWP) effect; their 
JOLs decrease across trials but their performance accuracy increases, which leads to a mismatch 
(England & Serra, 2012; Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002; see Rast & Zimprich, 2009 for an 
examination of UWP in older adults). Even with task experience, participants’ metacognitive 
judgments may not accurately reflect their performance (Miller & Geraci, 2011b; Mueller, 
Dunlosky, & Tauber, 2015). 
There have been several proposed accounts to explain the UWP effect, including that 
participants may rely on their memory for past tests to make current metacognitive judgments, 
leading them to be underconfident with task experience (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008; Tauber & 
Rhodes, 2012). Another account suggests that participants consistently anchor their judgments 
on the midpoint or lower on the confidence scale (e.g., between 30-50% on a scale from 0-100%; 
England & Serra, 2012; Scheck & Nelson, 2005). Using an anchor can be especially prevalent 
when the participant does not know much about the information they are being asked to judge 
(Scheck, Meeter, & Nelson, 2004). Younger and older adults may both use an anchoring 
heuristic, and the difference between estimated performance and actual performance can differ 
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based on the difficulty of the memory task (e.g., Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997; see Price, 
Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2008; Touron & Hertzog, 2004). The current task uses global 
metacognitive judgments; these types of judgments have been shown to be lower in magnitude 
(and can reflect less overconfidence) than single item-by-item judgments (Griffin & Tversky, 
1992; Liberman, 2004; Treadwell & Nelson, 1996). Connor et al. (1997) demonstrated that 
younger and older adults become more accurate in their global predictions of performance after 
the memory task, and that they use the midpoint of the scale as an anchor under some 
circumstances.  
It can be helpful to have accurate expectations about our own abilities and others’, but 
these perceptions are often incorrect (Nickerson, 1999). Western participants often perceive 
themselves as better than average on certain tasks (e.g., Krueger & Dunning, 1999; Krueger & 
Mueller, 2002; Odean, 1998; Svenson, 1981; see Chapter 2, Study 3 of this Dissertation). 
However, the better-than-average (BTA) effect may depend on task difficulty: when making 
judgments about an easy task, people think they will perform better than average, but when faced 
with a difficult task, people think they will perform below the average (Kruger, 1999; see 
Johansson & Allwood, 2007 for an investigation of the below-average effect when rating others’ 
knowledge). In the current experiments, though participants do not directly compare themselves 
to an average person, the cued recall task is designed to be challenging – if participants are 
sensitive to the difficulty of the task, they are expected to rate others as more accurate on the task 
than they themselves would be. 
  Memory often changes with age, and people across the lifespan believe that memory for 
information such as proper names is less accurate in older adulthood (Lineweaver & Hertzog, 
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1998; Ryan, 1992). Whether this belief informs expectations in the domain of memory for 
medication information has not been extensively studied.  
The current study 
  We expect participants to be overconfident before realizing how challenging the learning 
task is, particularly when there is the potential for interference in memory (i.e., in Experiment 3). 
Participants often fail to appreciate how much interference can detrimentally affect performance 
(Diaz & Benjamin, 2011), but interference often occurs in real-world medical situations (e.g., 
when a new medication can cause headaches as a side effect, while a previous medication was 
associated with dizziness). Because participants do not have much information upon which to 
base their judgments before the task, we expect that pre-task global judgments will be primarily 
based on their overall beliefs about their cognitive abilities (Koriat, 2002). Further, if participants 
rely on a metacognitive anchor between 30-50% (Scheck & Nelson, 2005), we expect pre-task 
metacognitive judgments to be in this range.  
  In the current study, we ask participants to make judgments not only about their own 
performance, but also to estimate how they expect other people to perform. Learning in the 
medical domain often includes communicating information to others and relying on others to 
remember information for us. For example, an older adult patient may consider their own 
memory accuracy, but also the memory accuracy of their spouse in the same age group, as they 
may depend on their spouse to ask important questions during the appointment or help them with 
adhering to the medication regimen outside the doctor’s office. Another older adult may consider 
their own memory for medical information to be poor (perhaps if they do not have much 
experience taking medications), but a peer may have more interest or experience (or both) and 
therefore have a more accurate memory for this type of information. Younger and older adults’ 
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judgments about early-career medical students may be particularly interesting: first-year medical 
students are often younger adults (e.g., in Dhalla et al., 2002), but they may be rated qualitatively 
differently than younger adults in general due to their potentially superior memorization abilities, 
their additional medical expertise, and/or their interest in the material. The current study 
investigated how younger and older adults perceived their own (and others’) memory abilities, as 
well as their cued recall memory accuracy across four study-test cycles.  
  Experiment 3 examines how a difficult task might differentially impact younger and older 
adults’ metacognitive judgment about multiple types of people. Overall, we expect that both age 
groups’ pre-task estimates of performance will be inflated, particularly when rating medical 
students’ performance, and when rating younger adults as individuals and groups (i.e., the “self” 
and “peer” categories for younger adult participants, and the “other age group” category for older 
adults). Participants of all ages may view younger adults and medical students as having superior 
memorization skills, interest in the material, and/or large capacities of cognitive resources that 
they could bring to bear in this task. Compared to ratings of younger adults and medical students, 
we expect overall that participants’ predictions will be relatively lower when they rate the 
abilities of older adults as individuals and groups (i.e., the “self” and “peer” categories for older 
adult participants, and the “other age group” category for younger adults). We expect that 
participants in both age groups will be overconfident in their own performance before the task, as 
they will not take the difficulty of the task into account when making judgments, and we expect 
older adults’ ratings of their own performance to be lower than their ratings of younger adults’ 
performance.  
  We constructed the memory task to be difficult so that participants would have the 
opportunity to learn about their memory abilities and adjust their metacognitive ratings 
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accordingly. Therefore, we expect cued recall performance to be relatively low on this task, and 
we expect older adults to perform worse than younger adults due to the associative nature of the 
task (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000) and the potential for memory interference (May, Hasher, & Kane, 
1999). After the task, we expect a similar pattern of metacognitive judgments as were given 
before the task but lowered to be more reflective of participants’ experiences.  
Method 
 Participants 
  Younger adults (n = 24) were undergraduate students at University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA) and were recruited through the Psychology Department subject pool (Mage = 
20.38, SD = 1.56), 22 were female, one other. Older adults (n = 26) were recruited from the Los 
Angeles community (Mage = 71.42, SD = 6.36), ten were female. This research was approved by 
the UCLA Institutional Review Board.  
Materials and Procedure  
  Participants were asked to imagine that they were learning information about 
medications, some of which had been on the market for a substantial amount of time, and others 
that were new to the market. (In reality, half of the medications were fictitious, and half were real 
medications.) Participants told that they would learn and be tested on 18 pairs of medications and 
the side effects that may occur when consuming them (e.g., “headache”). Critically, they were 
told that they would then see new pairs on the following study list before they were tested again, 
and this would repeat for a total of four study-test cycles.  
 After reading the instructions, participants were asked to estimate, with the instructions in 
mind, “How do you think you will perform on this task?” and filled in the following blank: “I 
will remember ___% of the items presented in this task.” On the same computer screen, 
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participants were also asked to predict the performance (as a percentage) of the following people: 
an undergraduate student at UCLA, a first-year medical student, and a person between the ages 
of 60 and 85. Depending on the participants’ age group, either the younger adult question or the 
older adult question was phrased as making a prediction about a “peer.” 
 After making the pre-task judgments, participants began the memory task, in which they 
viewed each of 18 medication-side effect pairs (e.g., “Calamor : itching”) for 5s. The pairs were 
presented in random order for each participant. Then participants were cued with each 
medication, one at a time, in random order, and asked to recall the side effect that was associated 
with that medication. This was repeated for a total of four study-test cycles, with new 
medications paired with the same set of side effects on each list to create interference (e.g., if 
“Calamor : itching” appeared on list one, list two could include “Zelnorm : itching”).  
 All medication stimuli and side effects were taken from a previously normed database. 
Medications were rated to be similarly familiar (M = 3.21, SD = 0.74 on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 
being “not familiar at all” and 5 being “very familiar”). Half were chosen to be fictitious to 
reduce the possible advantage (or possible interference) that might occur if certain participants 
were particularly knowledgeable about medications (see Hargis & Castel, 2018). Side effects 
were chosen from categories established by participants’ ratings of how concerning they would 
find the experience of that side effect to be: six were rated by participants as mildly concerning 
(M = 2.22, SD = 0.22 on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being “not concerning at all” and 5 being “very 
concerning”), six as moderately concerning (M = 2.73, SD = 0.14 on a scale from 1 to 5), and six 
as highly concerning (M = 3.51, SD = 0.25 on a scale from 1 to 5). These categories were not 
made explicit to the participants and were not a main variable of interest. The distinction 
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between the categories, especially between “mild” and “moderate” side effects, was relatively 
small. 
 After completing the four study-test cycles, participants were reminded of the task 
instructions and asked to make post-task metacognitive judgments. These judgments were 
similar to the pre-task ratings, except that participants were asked “How do you think you 
performed on this task?” and filled in the following blank: “I remembered __% of the items 
presented in this task.” Judgments were made for each category: oneself, a peer of the same age 
group, a first-year medical student, and a member of the opposite age group. 
Results 
Metacognitive judgments 
 Younger and older adults’ metacognitive judgments are displayed in Figure 3.4. The 
metacognitive judgments were first submitted to a 2 (age group) x 2 (time of judgment: pre-task 
vs post-task) 4 (type of judgment: self, peer, medical student, other age group) mixed-factorial 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). This test revealed no three-way interaction, F(3, 144) = 1.90, p = 
.13, h2 = .002. There were, however, three significant two-way interactions. There was a 
significant interaction between time of judgment and type of judgment, F(3, 144) = 10.84, p 
<.001, h2  = .009. There was also a significant interaction between type of judgment and age 
group, F(3, 144) = 35.37, p < .001, h2  = .06, and a significant interaction between time of 
judgment and age group, F(1, 48) = 12.63, p <.001, h2 = .019. 
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Figure 3.4. Metacognitive judgments given in Experiment 3 before (top panel) and after (bottom 
panel) the memory task. Participants estimated what percentage of items the following groups 
would recall: themselves, a peer of the same age group, a first-year medical student, and a 
member of the other age group. Error bars represent standard error. 
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 To decompose the interaction between time of judgment (pre-task vs post-task) and type 
of judgment (self, peer, medical student, other age group), we conducted a one-way ANOVA to 
assess the effect of type of judgment on the pre-task estimates. This test revealed a main effect of 
type of judgment, F(3, 147) = 42.60, p < .001, h2 = .22. Post-hoc t-tests (with Bonferroni 
corrections) revealed that in the pre-task judgments, participants did not rate themselves (M = 
53.50, SD = 18.42) differently than they rated their peers (M = 52.86, SD = 17.22), t(49) = .41, p 
= .69, Cohen’s d = .06. They did, however, expect medical students (M = 77. 03, SD = 15.24) to 
be more accurate on the test than they themselves would be, t(49) = 10.10, p < .001, d = 1.43 and 
more accurate than their peers would be, t(49) = 11.06, p < .001, d = 1.56. Participants on 
average also predicted that medical students would be more accurate than the opposite age group 
(M = 56.26, SD = 24.73), t(49) = 8.53, p <. 001, d = 1.21. All other post-hoc tests did not reach 
significance, ps > .18.  We also conducted a one-way ANOVA to assess the effect of type of 
judgment on the post-task estimates, and found a main effect of type of judgment, F(3, 147) = 
75.60, p < .001, h2  = .41. Post-hoc t-tests followed similar patterns to the tests conducted on the 
pre-test estimates: participants rated that medical students (M = 52.86, SD = 21.21) would get a 
higher percentage of correct responses than they (M = 14.78, SD = 15.51) would, t(49) = 12.22, p 
< .001, d = 1.73, and that their peer (M = 21.40, SD = 16.78) would, t(49) = 11.35, p < .001, d =  
1.61. Participants also gave higher post-task estimates for medical students than they did for 
members of the opposite age group (M = 25.30, SD = 16.79), t(49) = 9.42, p < .001, d = 1.33. 
There was not a significant difference in participants’ ratings of themselves and a person of the 
opposite age group, t(49) = 1.39, p = .17, d = .20. 
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 To investigate the interaction between type of judgment and participants’ age group, we 
conducted a one-way ANOVA to assess the effect of type of judgment on younger adults’ 
estimates, which revealed a main effect of type of judgment, F(3, 69) = 48.10, p < .001, h2  = 
.45. Post-hoc t-tests indicated that younger adults did not rate themselves (M = 36.02, SD = 
14.05) differently from their peers (M = 41.10, SD = 13.68) on this task,  t(23) = 2.25, p = .03, d 
= .46 (significance did not survive Bonferroni correction). Younger adults rated themselves and 
their peers as less accurate overall than a medical student would be (M = 60.83, SD = 14.97), 
t(23) = 6.91, p <.001, d = 1.41 and t(23) = 7.34, p <.001, d = 1.50, respectively. Medical students 
were rated as more accurate than were older adults (M = 27.69, SD = 11.97), t(23) = 10.36, p <.-
01, d = 2.12. Younger participants rated themselves as more accurate than older adults, t(23) = 
2.93, p < .01, d = .61, and they rated their peers as more accurate than older adults, t(23) = 5.40, 
p <.001, d = 1.10. 
 A one-way ANOVA assessing the effect of type of judgment on older adults’ estimates 
also revealed a main effect of type of judgment, F(3, 75) = 141.00, p <.001, h2  = .53. Post-hoc t-
tests revealed that older adults’ estimates were similar to younger adults’ estimates (ps < .001), 
with one primary difference: while younger adults rated themselves as more accurate than older 
adults in this task, older adults rated themselves (M = 32.40, SD = 12.53) as less accurate than 
younger adults (M = 52.87, SD = 14.25), t(25) = 10.30, p <.001, d = 2.02, as was expected. 
Similarly to younger adults, older adults did not rate themselves differently from their peers (M = 
33.46, SD = 14.50), t(25) = 0.68, p = .50, d = .134. Older adults also estimated that medical 
students (M = 68.74, SD = 15.84) would do better on this task than they would, t(25) = 14.98, p 
< .001, d = 2.94.   
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 Finally, we investigated the interaction between time of judgment and age group by 
conducting independent samples t-tests. We compared younger adults’ pre-task judgments to 
older adults’ pre-task judgments and found that overall, younger adults’ ratings  (M = 53.26 , SD 
= 12.02) were lower than older adults’ ratings (M = 66.05, SD = 16.36) before the task, t(48) = 
3.13, p  < .01, d = .89, likely driven by the differences between younger adults’ ratings of older 
adults and vice versa. We then compared younger adults’ post-task judgments to older adults’ 
post-task judgments and found no difference between younger (M = 29.56, SD = 14.78) and 
older adults’ ratings (M = 27.68, SD = 11.77) after the task, t(48) = 0.50, p = .62, d = .14. 
Accuracy 
 Younger and older adults’ memory accuracy across the task is displayed in Figure 3.5. To 
investigate how younger and older adults’ cued recall performance changed across the task, we 
conducted a 2(age group) x 4 (test) ANOVA, which revealed a non-significant interaction 
between age and test, F(3, 144) = 2.10, p = .102, h2 = .008 (see Figure 3.5). There was a 
significant main effect of age, F(1, 48) = 15.50, p < .001, h2 = .193, such that younger adults (M 
= 29.63, SD = 23.38) recalled a higher percentage of the items than older adults did (M = 12.45, 
SD = 9.75) across the task.  
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Figure 3.5. The percentage of side effects accurately recalled when presented with the associated 
medication in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 There was also, somewhat unexpectedly, a main effect of test, F(3, 144) = 2.96, p = .035, 
h2  = .0012, such that participants’ performance increased across the task. More specifically, 
participants’ performance increased between Tests 1 (M = 18.00, SD = 17.01) and 2 (M = 22.33, 
SD = 18.42), t(49) = 2.23, p = .03, d = .32, but not significantly between Tests 2 and 3 (M = 
19.44, SD = 17.72), t(49) = 1.66, p = .10, d = .24, or between Tests 3 and 4 (M = 23.00, SD = 
24.51), t(49) = 1.66, p = .10, d = .23. Accuracy was higher on the final test than on the initial test, 
t(49) = 2.20, p = .03, d = .31, suggesting that some learning did take place across the task. This 
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each learning phase, paired with a different medication) and were better able to learn the 
associations after being repeatedly exposed to the side effects. However, if a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons is applied, none of the above differences reach significance 
(corrected alpha = .0125). 
Accuracy of metacognitive judgments 
 To compare metacognitive judgments with actual performance, we conducted a 2 (age 
group) x 3 (pre-task judgment of one’s own performance, actual performance, post-task 
judgment of one’s own performance) mixed ANOVA. This test revealed a significant main effect 
of age group, F(1, 48) = 5.65, p = .02, h2  = .03 and a significant main effect of pre-task 
judgment, actual performance, and post-task judgments, F(2, 96) = 123.34, p < .001, h2  = .50; 
there was also a significant two-way interaction, F(2, 96) = 8.99, p <.001, h2  = .04. Figures 3.4 
and 3.5 suggest larger differences between older adults’ judgments and performance than 
younger adults’. To decompose the interaction, we conducted a one-way ANOVA for each age 
group. The ANOVA for younger adults revealed a significant difference between pre-task 
judgments, actual performance, and post-task judgments, F(2, 46) = 30.40, p < .001, h2  = .33, as 
did the ANOVA for older adults’, F(2, 50) = 114.00, p <. 001, h2  = .72. Post-hoc paired-samples 
t-tests revealed that younger adults’ pre-task judgments about themselves were higher than their 
actual performance, t(23) = 4.37, p < .001, d = .89 and higher than their post-task performance 
t(23) = 6.92, p < .001, d = 1.41. Younger participants’ post-task judgments were significantly 
lower than their actual performance, t(23) = 4.08, p < .001, d = .83. Taken together, these results 
reveal younger participants’ overconfidence before the task and underconfidence after the task. 
Similar tests were conducted to examine older adults’ judgments and accuracy, revealing that 
older adults’ pre-task ratings of their own performance were higher than their actual 
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performance, t(25) = 9.72, p < .001, d = 1.91 and were also higher than their post-task ratings, 
t(25) = 13.32, p <.001, d = 2.61. There was not a significant difference between older adults’ 
actual performance and their post-task rating of that performance, t(25) = 1.72, p = .10, d = .34, 
suggesting that older adults give appropriate metacognitive judgments after the task. 
Additional analyses 
 Though it was not a main variable of interest and the differences among categories were 
minimal, we also sought to determine whether the severity of the side effect influenced younger 
or older adults’ performance (see Experiments 1 and 2 in the current Chapter for an example of 
severity affecting older adults’, but not younger adults’ performance). To do this, we conducted a 
2(age group) x 3(severity) ANOVA, which revealed a marginally significant interaction between 
age and severity, F(2, 96) = 3.17, p = .05, h2  < .01. Though this interaction was marginally 
statistically significant, we decomposed it to explore the potential interactive effect of age and 
severity. We conducted a one-way ANOVA on younger adults’ memory performance and found a 
significant effect of severity, F(2, 46) = 4.33, p = .02, h2  = .02. Post-hoc t-tests revealed younger 
adults recalled moderate side effects (M = 32.64, SD = 23.97) more accurately than they recalled 
mild side effects (M = 25.87, SD = 20.89), t(23) = 2.87, p < .01, d = .59, all other differences 
were non-significant, ps > .06. Older adults’ performance, however, was not affected by the 
severity of the side effect, F(2, 50) = 1.33, p = .27, h2  = .02.  
 As half of the medications were real medications that could be found on the market and 
half were fictitious (but realistic) medications, we sought to determine whether recall differed 
based on whether the medication was real or not. We did not expect that younger and older adults 
would differ in their recall of real versus fictitious medications. We conducted a 2 (age group) x 
2(realness of medication) mixed ANOVA, and found no interaction between age and realness of 
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medications, F(1, 48) = 0.51, p = .48, h2 < .01.We did find, however, a main effect of realness of 
medications, F(1,48) = 23.62, p < .001, h2 = .03, such that the side effects of real medications (M 
= 23.83, SD = 18.23) were recalled more accurately than the side effects of fictitious medications 
(M = 17.56, SD = 18.02). (As reported above, younger adults did outperform older adults on this 
task, F(1, 48) = 15.50, p < .001, h2 = .22.). 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 3, younger and older adults studied pairs of medications and their side 
effects during four study-test trials. This task was designed to be difficult for both age groups, to 
examine the extent to which a challenging memory task could affect metacognitive ratings of 
oneself and others. After reading the instructions but before studying any words, both younger 
and older participants estimated that they and their peer would remember approximately 50% of 
the items presented (similarly to previous work investigating metacognitive anchoring near the 
midpoint of the scale; Scheck & Nelson, 2005). Pre-task ratings of the opposite age group (i.e., 
younger adults estimating older adults’ performance and vice versa) were in line with previous 
work about how memory is expected to change across the lifespan (Ryan, 1992). Both age 
groups estimated that medical students would perform fairly accurately on this task. 
 Though some work suggests that global metacognitive judgments often reflect 
underconfidence (Liberman, 2004; Treadwell & Nelson, 1996), actual cued recall performance 
was lower than the predicted 50% accuracy, and older adults in particular struggled to remember 
the pairs accurately. Age-related deficits for associative information have been found in many 
domains (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000), and the potential for memory interference present in the 
current design (due to the same side effects being paired with new medications on each list) 
likely served to further lower older participants’ performance. There was a significant main effect 
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of test on accuracy, and though the interaction between test and age did not reach statistical 
significance, Figure 3.5 illustrates a pattern than younger adults improved slightly across the task 
whereas older adults’ performance was fairly consistent (and consistently low; see Geraci & 
Miller, 2013). 
 After the memory task, participants completed the same metacognitive judgments as 
before about themselves and others, and all judgments were significantly lowered. The pre-task 
bias towards overconfidence was no longer present; indeed, younger adults’ post-task judgments 
were significantly lower than their actual performance, while older participants’ post-task ratings 
were not different from their actual performance. This finding is in line with previous work 
suggesting that older adults’ JOLs do not reflect an underconfidence-with-practice effect (Rast & 
Zimprich, 2009) and that older adults’ metacognitive judgments are often fairly accurate 
(Halamish et al., 2011; Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). Perhaps younger adults’ underconfidence in 
their own performance could be adaptive in this setting: expecting to remember less medical 
information than one actually would recall may lead that person to devote extra resources and 
attention toward learning it (Metcalfe, 2009; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008, Thiede, Anderson, & 
Therriault, 2003). Interestingly, both age groups still estimated medical students would perform 
fairly accurately compared to oneself, perhaps because they believe that medical students are 
particularly adept at memorizing and learning new information about their specialty, or perhaps 
they assumed that medical students would be more interested in the content and would therefore 
devote more effort toward learning the pairs (see Kruger, 1999; Johansson & Allwood, 2007). 
 Additional analyses suggest that younger adults did remember mildly concerning side 
effects (e.g., flushing) more accurately than moderately concerning side effects (e.g., nausea). 
Since those categories were not explicitly delineated, we did not expect that participants would 
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remember them differently; previous work that found effects of severity on performance used 
paradigms that emphasized the severity of the outcome (e.g., Friedman et al., 2015; Hargis & 
Castel, 2018; Middlebrooks et al., 2015). Medications that are actually on the market were 
recalled more accurately than fictitious medications, which may indicate that participants were 
able to use some schematic support for the real medication stimuli (see also Morrow, Menard, 
Stine-Morrow, Teller, & Bryant, 2001; Rice & Okun, 1994).  
 Participants in Experiment 3 were not given the opportunity to re-study (and thereby 
strengthen the memory trace of) pairs of medications and their side effects after they were tested 
on the pairs. Older participants in particular performed poorly in the memory task in Experiment 
3, so we sought in Experiment 4 to ensure that performance would not be near the floor 
(similarly to Experiments 1 and 2 in Connor et al., 1997). Experiment 4 allows for re-study and 
better reflects real-life learning situations in which repeated exposure to material could occur.   
Experiment 4 
 As discussed in Experiment 3, highly confident memory errors can have consequences. In 
the medical domain, patients may think they will remember what the physician is relaying (and 
therefore do not take effective notes, or do not take notes at all), only to find that, once they leave 
the doctor’s office, much of the information is now forgotten (Kessels, 2003). Experiment 4 
examined how younger and older people assess their performance on a challenging associative 
memory task, and how those estimates may change with task experience.  
 Instead of side effects that are randomly paired with new medications on each list (as in 
Experiment 1), Experiment 4 holds constant the medication : side effect pairings throughout the 
task, such that each pair is studied and tested a total of four times. Prior work suggests older 
adults benefit from successful prior task performance (Geraci & Miller, 2013); in the current 
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Experiment, participants have the opportunity to learn across several lists (Kilb & Naveh-
Benjamin, 2011). Even though direct comparisons cannot be made between Experiments 3 and 4, 
it is interesting to examine whether a separate group of participants’ predictions will in fact be 
different based solely on a change to the instructions that reflects the consistent pairing of 
medications with their side effects (see also Experiments 1 and 2 in Connor et al., 1997).  
 If younger and older adults are able to learn from task experience as in prior work 
examining associative memory for medical information (e.g., Hargis & Castel, 2018), we predict 
that younger and older adults’ cued recall performance will increase in accuracy across the task. 
Previous work suggests that older adults face deficits in associating information in memory if 
that information is unrelated (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). Therefore, as in Experiment 3, we 
predict that younger adults will outperform older adults, as the task at hand is still quite difficult.  
If participants use an anchoring heuristic (Scheck & Nelson, 2005), they may estimate that they 
will remember “about half” of the items, regardless of the specific task requirements. We expect 
that potential overconfidence will be at least somewhat remedied after the memory task is 
complete, such that ratings will be adjusted downward to be closer to actual performance (that is, 
performance estimates will be more accurate after participants finish the memory task).  
Method 
Participants 
 Younger adults (n = 26) were undergraduate students at UCLA and were recruited 
through the Psychology Department subject pool (Mage = 20.31, SD = 2.00), 19 were female. 
Older adults (n = 26) were recruited from the Los Angeles community (Mage = 75.35, SD = 6.75), 
11 were female. None had participated in Experiment 3. This research was approved by the 
UCLA Institutional Review Board.  
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Materials and Procedure 
 The materials and procedure of this study were the same as Experiment 3, except that 
participants studied the same 18 pairs of medications and side effects on each list, and this same 
list repeated for a total of four study-test cycles. Participants were told this information before 
they answered the pre-task metacognitive questions, which were the same as in Experiment 3, as 
were the post-task metacognitive questions.  
Results 
Metacognitive judgments 
 Younger and older adults’ metacognitive judgments are displayed in Figure 3.6. Similarly 
to Experiment 3, to analyze metacognitive judgments we conducted a 2 (age group) x 2 (time of 
judgment: pre-task vs post-task) x 4 (type of judgment: self, peer, medical student, other age 
group) ANOVA. This test revealed a significant three-way interaction, F(3, 150) = 5.61, p < 
.001, h2  = .003. To decompose this interaction, we conducted a 2(time of judgment) x 2(type of 
judgment) within-subjects ANOVA for younger adults, which revealed a non-significant two-
way interaction, F(3, 75) = 1.31, p = .28, h2  = .02. There was a significant main effect of time of 
judgment, F(1, 25) = 14.36, p < .001, h2  = .23, such that ratings given before the task (M = 
52.51, SD = 19.91) were lower than ratings given after the task (M = 70.17, SD = 29.03). This 
test also revealed a significant main effect of type of judgment, F(3, 75) = 59.76, p < .001, h2  = 
.19. We further investigated this main effect using a series of paired-samples t-tests with 
Bonferroni corrections. The only comparison that failed to achieve significance after the 
correction was between younger adults’ ratings of themselves (M = 62.56, SD = 27.56) and their 
peers (M = 60.65, SD = 24.45), t(23) = 2.25, p = .03, d = .46. Younger adults rated themselves as 
less accurate than medical students (M = 77.25, SD = 19.96), t(23) = 6.91, p < .001, d = 1.41 and 
  
 
119 
 
more accurate than older adults (M = 44.90 , SD = 23.01), t(23) = 2.97, p = .007, d = 
.61.Younger adults rated their peers to be less accurate than a medical student would be, t(23) = 
7.34, p < .001, d = 1.50, but more accurate than older adults, t(23) = 5.40, p < .001, d = 1.10. 
They also estimated that medical students would be more accurate than older adults, t(23) = 
10.36, p < .001, d = 2.12.  
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Figure 3.6. Metacognitive judgments given in Experiment 4 before (top panel) and after (bottom 
panel) the memory task. Participants estimated what percentage of items the following groups 
would recall: themselves, a peer of the same age group, a first-year medical student, and a 
member of the other age group. Error bars represent standard error. 
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 To further decompose the significant three-way interaction, we conducted (at the older 
adult participant level) a 2(time of judgment) x 4 (type of judgment) within-subjects ANOVA, 
which, unlike in younger adults, did reveal a significant two-way interaction F(3, 75) = 5.89, p = 
.001, h2 = .007. There was a main effect of type of judgment, F(3, 75) = 71.85, p < .001, h2 = 
.34, and a main effect of time of judgment, F(1, 25) = 75.89, p < . 001, h2 = .23. To decompose 
the interaction, we compared pre-task and post-task judgments at each level of the type of 
judgment variable (self, peer, medical student, and other age group). Older adults gave 
significantly higher estimates of their own performance pre-task (M = 51.23, SD = 17.04) than 
post-task (M = 18.69, SD = 15.59), t(25) = 9.16, p < .001, d = 1.80. They also gave significantly 
higher estimates of their peers’ performance pre-task (M = 72.15, SD = 16.64) than post-task (M 
= 47.31, SD = 19.56), t(25) = 7.20, p < .001, d = 1.41, and higher estimates of medical students’ 
performance pre-task (M = 82.77, SD = 15.41) than post-task (M = 62.65, SD = 23.64), t(25) = 
6.41, p < .001, d = 1.26. Older adults also gave higher ratings of the opposite age group’s 
performance (i.e., younger adults’ performance) pre-task (M = 51.27, SD = 15.59) than post-task 
(M = 25.85, SD = 15.40), t(25) = 6.82, p < .001, d =  1.34.  
Accuracy 
 Younger and older adults’ memory accuracy across the task is displayed in Figure 3.7.  To 
investigate how younger and older adults’ memory performance changed across the task, we 
conducted a 2(age group) x 4 (test) ANOVA. This test revealed a main effect of age, F(1, 50) = 
79.30, p < .001, h2 = .40, such that younger adults (M = 63.14, SD = 20.14) outperformed older 
adults overall (M = 19.76 , SD = 14.53).  
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Figure 3.7. The percentage of side effects accurately recalled when presented with the associated 
medication in Experiment 4. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 The test also revealed a significant interaction between age and test, F(3, 150) = 27.80, p 
< .001, h2  = .23. We then conducted a one-way within-subjects ANOVA to assess how younger 
adults’ accuracy changed across the task, which revealed a main effect of test, F(3, 75) = 150.00, 
p < .001, h2 = .53. Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests were conducted with Bonferroni correction; 
the corrected alpha was .0167 for three comparisons. These tests revealed that performance on 
Test 2 (M = 59.61, SD = 25.61) was better than on Test 1 (M = 26.71, SD = 20.01), t(25) = 10.47, 
p < .001, d = 2.05, and performance on Test 3 (M = 79.49, SD = 24.43) was better than on Test 2, 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f i
te
m
s 
co
rre
ct
ly
 re
ca
lle
d Younger Adults
Older Adults
  
 
123 
 
t(25) = 8.45, p < .001, d = 1.66. Performance on Test 4 (M = 86.75, SD = 18.53) was better than 
on Test 3, t(25) = 2.34, p < .01, d = .69. 
 To assess how older adults’ memory accuracy changed across the task, we conducted a 
one-way within-subjects ANOVA, which revealed a main effect of test, F(3, 75) = 29.00, p < 
.001, h2 = .26. Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests were conducted with Bonferroni correction; 
similarly to above, the corrected alpha was .0167. Older adults’ performance on Test 1 (M = 
6.84, SD = 5.28) was significantly lower than performance on Test 2 (M = 14.10, SD = 13.90), 
t(25) = 3.13, p < .01, d = .61, and performance on Test 3 (M = 25.21, SD = 20.04) was 
significantly better than performance on Test 2, t(25) = 6.09, p <.001, d = 1.20. Performance on 
Test 4 (M = 32.91, SD = 23.77) was also significantly better than performance on Test 3, t(75) = 
2.53, p < .01, d = .63.  
Accuracy of metacognitive judgments 
 As in Experiment 3, we conducted a 2 (age group) x 3 (pre-task judgments of one’s own 
performance, actual performance, post-task judgments of one’s own performance) mixed 
ANOVA to assess participants’ relative overconfidence and/or underconfidence. Similarly to 
Experiment 3, there was a significant main effect of age, F(1, 50) = 55.80, p < .001, h2  = .32, 
and a significant main effect of pre-task judgment, actual performance, and post-task judgment, 
F(2, 100) = 3.49, p = .03, h2  = .02. There was also a significant two-way interaction, F(2, 100) = 
37.25, p < .001, h2 = .16. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 suggest that both age groups’ initial judgments 
were anchored approximately at the midpoint of the 0-100% scale, and that younger adults’ 
judgments about their own performance increased after the task, whereas older adults’ 
judgements decreased. We conducted a one-way ANOVA on younger adults’ judgments and 
accuracy which revealed a significant main effect, F(2, 50) = 9.83, p <.001, h2 = .12. Post-hoc 
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paired-samples t-tests revealed that younger adults’ pre-task ratings were significantly higher 
than their actual performance, t(25) = 14.92, p < .001, d = 2.93, and their post-task ratings were 
also significantly higher than their actual performance , t(25) = 11.71, p <.001, d = 2.30. Younger 
adults’ post-task ratings were significantly higher than their pre-task ratings, t(25) = 3.53, p < 
.01, d = .69. The one-way ANOVA on older adults’ accuracy and judgments revealed a 
significant main effect, F(2, 50) = 33.30, p <.001, h2 = .46. Older adults’ pre-task ratings were 
higher than their actual performance, t(25) = 15.23, p <.001, d = 2.99, and their post-task ratings 
were also higher than their actual performance, t(25) = 6.03, p < .001, d = 1.18. Unlike younger 
adults, however, older adults’ post-task ratings were significantly lower than their pre-task 
ratings, t(25) = 9.16, p <.001, d = 1.80. 
Additional analyses 
 As in Experiment 3, we tested whether the severity of the side effect influenced younger 
or older adults’ performance using a 2(age group) x 3(severity) mixed-subjects ANOVA. This 
test revealed a non-significant two-way interaction, F(2, 100) = 0.11, p = .90, h2  < .01. There 
was no main effect of severity, F(2, 100) = 0.88, p = .42, h2  < .01. (As explored above, there 
was a main effect of age group on accuracy, F(1, 50) = 79.30, p <.001, h2  = .56, such that 
younger adults outperformed older adults across the task).  
 We also conducted a 2(age) x 2(real vs fictitious) mixed ANOVA to determine whether 
fictitious and real medications were remembered differently. This test revealed a significant two-
way interaction, F(1, 50) = 6.85, p = .01, h2  = .01. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that younger 
adults did not remember real (M = 61.55, SD = 21.70) and fictitious (M = 62.93, SD = 19.59) 
medications differently, t(25) = 0.56, p = .58, d = 0.11, but older adults remembered the side 
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effects of real medications (M = 26.28, SD = 17.61) more accurately than of fictitious 
medications (M = 18.80, SD = 14.21), t(25) = 3.06, p = .01, d = 0.60.  
Discussion 
 Experiment 4 was similar to Experiment 3, except that it allowed for more learning to 
occur across the task as participants learned the pairing between a medication and its side effect 
during four study-test cycles. If participants were to take the task requirements into account, we 
expected that pre-task ratings would be higher in Experiment 4 than in Experiment 3, since the 
memory task is objectively easier. Alternatively, we expected that if participants were to base 
their pre-task judgments on a metacognitive anchor (Scheck & Nelson, 2005) rather than the 
specific task demands, then participants’ pre-task judgments would not be different from 
Experiment 3. Before the task, younger and older adults estimated that they would remember 
approximately 50% of the items correctly. The similarities in pre-task judgments from 
Experiments 3 and 4 may represent a general metacognitive anchor in that regardless of the 
specifics of the task, people expect to remember about half of the information presented 
(England & Serra, 2012; Scheck et al., 2004; Scheck & Nelson, 2005). Participants also rated 
medical students as more accurate than themselves and their peers. Each of the older adults’ 
metacognitive judgments were higher pre-task than post-task, but Figure 3.6 suggests that there 
is more of a discrepancy between pre-task and post-task ratings of their own performance 
compared to others’. That is, though all of older adults’ judgments decreased after the memory 
task, judgments about their own performance decreased to what appears to be a greater extent 
than judgment about others’ performance (which is supported by the effect size of this difference 
compared to the other differences).  
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 We predicted a main effect of age on memory performance such that younger adults 
outperform older adults, perhaps due to the difficulty of the associative component of this task 
(Naveh-Benjamin, 2000) and the interference that can be caused by the side effects, which can 
differentially affect older adults’ performance (May et al., 1999). Younger adults did outperform 
older adults overall, and Figure 3.7 indicates that younger adults improved more quickly than 
older adults did. Younger adults improved rapidly at first, but later in the task they did not 
improve as rapidly as they approached 80% accuracy on Test 3. However, older adults may need 
to experience a test or two before they start making large gains in accuracy, and thus they did not 
completely catch up to younger adults’ performance.  
 Pre-task ratings reflected overconfidence, as participants may not have fully understood 
the difficulty of remembering 18 pairs of items until they actually experienced the task. Perhaps 
the level difficulty was made clear while studying the first list, or once taking the first test. Post-
task ratings were more in line with task performance; the overconfident pre-task ratings were at 
least affected by the task. Older adults in particular, though still overconfident after the task, did 
decrease their post-task ratings from their pre-task ratings. By the time the post-task judgment 
occurred, participants had just completed their fourth cued recall test, on which they scored 
relatively high after learning throughout the task. Having completed a test on which they scored 
fairly well might have led to a sense of fluency about the entire memory task (cf. Geraci & 
Miller, 2013), thus inflating their overall performance judgment to reflect overconfidence rather 
than estimating how they did on the task overall.  
General Discussion 
Taken together, the current experiments suggest that a difficult task affects younger and 
older adults’ metacognitive judgments about their and others’ abilities to remember medical 
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information. Many patients take several medications simultaneously (Qato et al., 2008), and 
remembering the side effects of those medications can be important, especially if the presence of 
a side effect may indicate the presence of a dangerous reaction. However, remembering side 
effects from multiple medications requires those items to be bound together in memory, which 
can be difficult for older adults (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000), and could potentially cause memory 
interference. Highly confident memory errors could lead to harmful consequences, especially 
when relying on other people to help us remember important information. The current study also 
allows for a novel investigation of metacognitive judgments about oneself and others. 
 Our results demonstrate that participants become more accurate in their predictions of 
performance after the memory task (see Miller & Geraci, 2014), and that both younger and older 
adults tend to use the midpoint of the scale when rating their performance (Connor et al., 1997). 
Younger and older adults did not fully account for task difficulty when giving pre-task estimates 
of performance. The instructions and task construction were different in Experiments 3 and 4, 
but participants in both experiments estimated that they would correctly recall approximately 
half of the items before they saw the memory task, perhaps relying on a metacognitive anchor. 
When one is unsure about task difficulty, it might be reasonable to estimate 50% performance; 
indeed, anchoring is prevalent when a participant does not know much about the task (Scheck et 
al., 2004). Overall, younger and older adults’ metacognitive judgments were similarly accurate 
across the task (Halamish et al., 2011; Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Rast & Zimprich, 2009), and 
older adults’ post-task ratings in Experiment 3 were in line with performance. 
 An interesting pattern appears in Experiment 4 when considering the difference among 
older adults’ post-task ratings. While older adults estimated that younger adults would recall 
about 26% of the items, they expected that a peer of theirs – another adult between the age of 60 
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and 85 – would remember approximately 47% of the items, a pattern similar previous work on 
the below-average effect (Kruger, 1999). In Experiment 3, older adults estimated that younger 
adults would remember more items than another older adult would. Perhaps in Experiment 3, the 
task was difficult enough that older adults considered it to be a route memorization task, 
dependent largely upon one’s cognitive resources and memory capacity. Perhaps older adult 
participants in Experiment 4 considered that interest in learning the information could be a 
driving factor in learning: younger adults would remember more items than the older adult 
personally would remember because younger adults have larger capacities, but an older adult’s 
peer could remember even more information if that person was sufficiently motivated or 
interested.  
 In Experiment 3, both age groups remembered real medications more accurately than 
fictitious medications; in Experiment 4, only older adults showed this pattern. It may be that the 
difficulty of the memory task in Experiment 3 led participants to rely more on familiarity with 
the medications or schematic support (cf. Rice & Okun, 1994), while younger adults in 
Experiment 4 were able to remember side effects associated with both types of medications. 
Similarly, there were marginal differences in cued recall based on the level of concern associated 
with the side effect in Experiment 3, but not in Experiment 4, perhaps also related to the 
difficulty of the task (Hargis & Castel, 2018). 
  Younger and older adults updated their knowledge about their memory abilities after task 
experience (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000; Touron & Hertzog, 2004; cf. Matvey, Dunlosky, Shaw, 
Parks, & Hertzog, 2002). In post-task judgments, older participants rated themselves as 
performing lower than a peer or a medical student. While people often rate themselves as better 
than average in tasks that are perceived to be easy, the difficulty of the current task likely led in 
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some cases to a below-average effect (note that participants were not asked explicitly to judge 
“average” performance on this task across all people, but rather individuals from different 
categories; Kruger, 1999). Future work may ask participants to directly estimate whether they 
will perform more or less accurately than the average person, and may also incorporate item-by-
item JOLs about oneself and others for further investigation of the UWP effect (Finn & Metcalfe, 
2008; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012). Additional work may investigate the role of older adults’ 
stereotype threat and anxiety (e.g., Geraci & Miller, 2013) on memory for medical information, 
and whether these effects may be mediated by metacognition.  
 In addition to theoretical implications for aging, memory, and metacognition, the current 
work also has practical implications for the medical field, both in patient care and medical 
student instruction. Individuals learning medication information may benefit greatly from a quick 
check of their memory: they can learn the content they do not know and learn that their 
expectations about their memory and others’ is often overly optimistic. A short task influenced 
overconfidence in the current study, but it has yet to be determined what steps can lead to more 
accurate metacognition about medical information across time and in different learning 
situations. In summary, the present works suggests that younger and older adults’ overconfidence 
in their cued recall memory for medication information can be adjusted after a difficult learning 
task, a finding which has implications for metacognition and memory for health-related 
information across the adult lifespan.  
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Chapter 3 Conclusions 
 
 While social goals are undoubtedly important for older adults, and knowledge-based 
goals for younger adults, the evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggests that the pursuit of 
knowledge can be important to both groups – especially when this knowledge is practically 
valuable. Learning information without an explicit social component is important for both age 
groups in domains in which health is relevant: Experiments 1 and 2 illustrate that older adults are 
as accurate as younger adults in their associative recognition of medication interaction outcomes, 
even when the task was modified to be more difficult by creating interference in memory. There 
is an even more difficult medication-related task in Experiments 3 and 4, which allows for the 
examination of high-confidence metacognitive errors: both age groups were largely 
overconfident in their ability to remember the set of medications and their side effects in 
Experiment 3, but this overconfidence was affected by a short task that illustrated how difficult 
learning this information can be. Participants in Experiment 4 also predicted that they would 
remember approximately 50% of the items presented, as in Experiment 3, which provides 
interesting evidence for participants’ potential reliance on an anchor when making judgments 
about their memory. Future research can more directly assess whether, how, and why people rely 
on the midpoint of the scale as an anchor when making global (and/or local) metacognitive 
judgments.   
 Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 assess memory and metacognition for medical information, 
which is an important domain across the lifespan as people often (intentionally or 
unintentionally) do not use medications as prescribed. Overall, evidence presented in Chapter 4 
suggests that with repeated study-test cycles, younger and older adults tend to improve their 
performance with the opportunity to learn from their mistakes if the same information is 
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presented in each trial. However, if that information is confusable – which medication 
information often is – the picture is not as clear, as participants in both age groups may struggle 
in particularly difficult tasks.  Chapter 4 will investigate how information importance may affect 
learners’ decisions during study, as well as their accuracy at test.  
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CHAPTER 4: EFFECT OF IMPORTANCE ON OFFLOADING AND REMEMBERING 
 When we are not able to remember everything, we often depend on external sources to 
remember information for us (e.g., Cherkaoui & Gilbert, 2017; Risko & Dunn, 2015; Storm & 
Stone, 2015). Many of us trust calendar alerts, online to-do lists, and polite emails from 
colleagues to remind us to go to meetings, finish papers, or meet deadlines. Offloading, or the 
transfer of the requirements of a task (e.g., remembering a certain piece of information) to an 
external device rather than one’s own cognitive system, is thought to be influenced by our 
metacognition. More specifically, the decision to offload can be driven by our willingness to 
exert effort to remember certain information, our perception of our ability to use appropriate 
strategies, and/or our trust in the system handling the load we give it (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). 
We may exert effort to remember some information because it is easier or more important to 
remember than other information; for example, we may not feel as if we need to offload the date 
of our partner’s birthday, as it is a distinctive day that we know we should remember. We may 
know that our ability to use memory strategies can be compromised if we have too much to 
remember: for example, we may offload a list of 15 items to purchase at the grocery store but not 
a list of five items. Also, we may offload more content to a system that is likely to be there when 
we need it: to extend the grocery store example, we may choose an application on our 
omnipresent phones to record our grocery list rather than using a paper list that we run the risk of 
leaving at home. 
 With the advent of digital offloading mechanisms, we can supplement our paper-and-
pencil offloading – or replace it completely – with smartphone applications and cloud-based 
software. Those who once used a written to-do list may now opt for an omnipresent, ultra-
convenient electronic to-do list (which is also perhaps less susceptible to poor legibility from 
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rushed handwriting). Hamilton and Benjamin (2019) discuss how we use technology as an 
external memory source by arguing that the relationship between human memory and 
technological memory can be thought of as an “extended organism” that can do more than the 
sum of its parts. That is, the limitations of human memory and of technology by themselves are 
in some ways improved upon when those two work together (e.g., a human may be limited by an 
imperfect memory, while a technological device such as the internet may be limited by lack of 
creativity to combine multiple related areas of knowledge). In the current study, our primary goal 
is to assess how individuals choose to offload, and whether those decisions affect memory. 
However, we do use a paradigm that, due to it being a computer program, may be more similar 
to offloading to a smartphone app than to a paper-and-pencil system.  
 Saving some information, or at least setting it aside, gives us the opportunity to reallocate 
cognitive resources toward other information. Prior work suggests that instructing participants 
that an initial list of items can be forgotten can enhance memory for other, to-be-learned items 
(Bjork & Woodward, 1973). Other work provides evidence for a preserved recency effect for 
words that participants were instructed to forget (Lee, 2013). Similar dynamics could be at play 
in the current study as the saving mechanism may serve as a type of self-directed forgetting, such 
that participants may try to forget saved information in favor of remembering that which has not 
been saved.  
 While offloading can include writing information on paper, many of us use technology as 
a memory aid by using to-do list applications, digital calendars, or email reminders. The way we 
interact with technology is of interest in the current study, particularly how we may need to make 
judgments about our reliance on technology using a sort of extended metacognition. Much of the 
metacognitive literature asks participants how they feel about their own memory abilities in the 
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moment (e.g., item-by-item judgments of learning; Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 
2003; Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002) and over time (e.g., the stability of memory; Kornell 
and Bjork, 2009), or sometimes how we feel about another person’s memory abilities (e.g., 
Nickerson, 1999; see also Chapter 3, Experiments 3 and 4). 
 However, we often need to make metacognitive judgments about technology: how much 
am I relying on this technological tool to help me remember? What would my memory 
performance be like without this tool? For example, using a car’s GPS to get to a new location 
may seem like a fluent experience, but people may not be aware of how much they rely on this 
external device – if they try to return home without the GPS, people may overestimate the 
strength of their memory trace for the directions and find it difficult to return without an external 
aid. When a student studies using notes that they will not be able to use during the exam, they 
also may not have an accurate representation of their own memory abilities. This inaccurate 
representation may cause them to study less effectively than they otherwise would if they did not 
have help from an external source. That is, we may not take into account the ubiquity and 
helpfulness of memory aids, particularly as they are available via technology, when assessing our 
own memory abilities.  
 Previous work suggests that technology does influence our thinking during a memory 
task. Sparrow, Liu, and Wegner (2011) found that difficult memory questions made participants 
think more about computers, perhaps because they may often use computers to answer questions 
they cannot answer themselves (e.g., “Google, what are the primary side effects of Namenda?”). 
The use of computers to find and save information can allow us the opportunity to use those 
cognitive resources on other tasks, but it may not be without cost, as saving valuable information 
to an untrustworthy or unreliable source, for example, could have uncomfortable consequences. 
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If my doctor advised me to remember important medication dosage information, and I saved that 
information to a digital source only to find later that it had not properly been stored, I would 
likely regret using that opportunity to offload and wish that I had either committed to exerting 
effort to use an appropriate memory strategy or that I had offloaded onto a more trustworthy 
source (e.g., a notebook). 
 There is, in fact, a benefit to memory for saved information, but only when the 
information is saved to a reliable source. Storm and Stone (2015) presented participants with lists 
of words in PDF files. The first of the PDF files that participants studied was either saved or not 
saved to the computer, but whether the first studied file would be saved was not made clear to 
the participant until after the study session for that file was complete. When participants were 
able to save the first studied file, their recall accuracy for the words presented in the second file 
was higher than if they had not been able to save the first file, thus illustrating what Storm and 
Stone (2015) argue to be a saving-enhanced memory effect. If the saved source was unreliable, 
this effect was extinguished. This prior work provides evidence that saving a set of information 
can benefit the learning of new information, in line with the directed forgetting literature 
described above (Bjork & Woodward, 1973). 
 In contrast with Storm and Stone (2015), the current experiments allow participants to 
make their own saving decisions. We examine how these saving decisions may affect later 
memory, as measured by both recall tests and a surprise recognition test. In Experiment 1, 
participants studied words only; in Experiment 2, participants were presented with an adapted 
value-directed remembering paradigm (Castel, 2008), in which they studied words that varied 
with respect to their value. 
  
 
136 
 
 When participants are able to save words to the computer, the first question of interest is 
whether they trust the saving mechanism enough to do so. Secondarily, does the act of choosing 
words to offload thus make them more distinctive to the participant? Previous work (Hunt & 
Worthen, 2006) suggests that memory is improved for items made distinct, in a perceptual sense 
or in a semantic sense. If the offloaded words are particularly salient to the participants since 
they were chosen for saving, they might later intrude in the participants’ recall, and a participant 
may be unsure whether the remembered word was already saved. The surprise recognition test 
will also assess whether offloaded words remain in memory. If offloading acts as an effective 
instruction to forget, participants are not expected to recognize offloaded words at a high rate 
during a surprise final test. If, however, the offloaded words are still available, participants 
should recognize them during the final test.  
Experiment 1 
 The purpose of Experiment 1 was to assess whether and how participants used the 
offloading system, whether they recalled offloaded words, and whether they recognized words 
they had offloaded and/or recalled during a surprise final test. Participants were given multiple 
opportunities to learn how the offloading mechanism works and what strategies were effective, 
as they studied eight lists of words, each followed by a recall test. Participants were not told 
about the final recognition test until after the eighth recall test.  
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 28 undergraduate students at the University of California, Los Angeles 
participated in this study for partial course credit. Participants ranged in age from 18-26 (M = 
20.61, SD = 1.97); 24 were female, three were male, and one other.  
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Materials and Procedure 
 A total of 240 unique nouns were presented to each participant. To reduce the likelihood 
of specific item effects, these words were randomly drawn from a bank of 400 nouns that ranged 
from four to six letters in length. The words in the bank averaged 8.73 (SD = 1.81) on the log-
transformed Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) frequency scale (Balota et al., 2007). 
Participants were told that they would be completing a memory task in which they would be 
presented with 30 words. After studying all 30 words simultaneously, participants would 
complete a free recall test in which they were asked to recall as many words from the preceding 
list as they could. There were a total of eight study-test cycles, each with unique words, and there 
was a feedback portion after each free recall test in which participants were told how many 
words they and the computer recalled correctly (e.g., “You recalled (and the computer saved) 18 
of 30 words”).  
 Critically, participants were also told that during the study sessions, which were to last 
90s each, they would be able to save six words to the computer by clicking on them (see Figures 
4.1a and 4.1b for example study screens). When participants clicked on the word they wished to 
save, it appeared in a box below the study area and was underlined within the study area so that 
participants could keep track of which word(s) they had saved. If participants attempted to save 
more than six words, the computer alerted them that this was not possible, and they were able to 
“un-save” words by clicking them again to remove them from the “saved words” box at the 
bottom of the screen (see Figure 4.1b). There was also a timer on the screen that counted down 
the remaining seconds that participants had to study the words. Participants repeated this study 
test-trial for a total of eight cycles. After the final recall test, participants were presented with a 
recognition test. They were presented with the full list of 400 words and asked to check a box 
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next to each word they remembered seeing on the task (each participant saw a total of 240 of the 
words, but the amount of words they could check during this test was not limited). 
 
 
Figure 4.1a. An example study trial in Experiment 1. A timer counts down from 90s, 30 words 
are displayed, and there is a box in which saved words will appear after participants click on 
them.  
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Figure 4.1b. An example study trial in Experiment 1 with words saved. This figure presents the 
same study trial as in Figure 4.1a, but with six words saved (saved words are underlined in the 
study box and are also included in the box below).  
 
Results 
Offloading and recall 
 To determine whether participants began the task by offloading fewer words — perhaps 
due to a lack of trust in the computer, or a reflection of overconfidence in which one would not 
need to rely on the computer — we conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The 
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amount of words offloaded did not change significantly across the task, F(7, 315) = 1.86, p = .08, 
as many participants offloaded the maximum six words on every trial (M = 5.80, SD = 0.81).  
 To determine whether participants’ performance on the task (as measured by the amount 
of words they correctly recalled) increased with task experience (perhaps due to a better 
understanding of how the offloading system worked), a one-way ANOVA was conducted. In line 
with prior work, the amount of words recalled also did not change across the task — that is, there 
was no difference in the number of words participants correctly recalled across the eight test 
trials, F(7, 189) = 1.53, p = .16, h2 = .05, see Figure 4.2. Participants were presented with new 
words on each list, so the potential for accumulated learning was not present, and the potential 
for interference and confusability from prior trials was possible.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. The number of words recalled across the task in Experiment 1 (not including 
offloaded words). Error bars represent standard error. 
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Recognition 
  Figure 4.3 suggests that the best-recognized words were those that had been recalled on 
previous lists, but also that words that were offloaded were not completely forgotten. A one-way 
ANOVA revealed that there were differences in recognition accuracy among words that were 
recalled, were not recalled, and were offloaded, F(2, 54) = 27.00, p < .001, h2 = .50. Words that 
had been recalled were recognized more accurately than those that were offloaded, t(27) = 7.11, 
p < .001,  and more accurately than those that were not recalled, t(27) = 6.43, p < .001. There 
was no difference in recognition accuracy among words that were offloaded and words that were 
not recalled, t(27) =1.47, p = .15. On average, participants falsely recognized 10.43 words (SD = 
11.48). 
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Figure 4.3. The percentage of words correctly recognized in Experiment 1. The percentage of 
words correctly recognized in Experiment 1 differed based on whether those words were recalled 
during the task, not recalled during the task, or offloaded during study as compared to overall 
performance on the recognition test. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 To further investigate how recalling a word during the task was related to its likelihood of 
later being recognized, we conducted a one-way ANOVA (see Figure 4.4). This test allows us to 
examine how a word that was recalled early on in the task may be less likely to be recognized 
than a word that was recalled later in the task. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of list, F(7, 
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189) = 2.14, p = .03, h2 = .07, such that there were changes in how many of the words recalled 
on each test were later recognized. We conducted post-hoc t-tests to assess where the differences 
lie, but no tests reached significance following the Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons (the comparison that was closest to reaching statistical significance was between 
Test 4 (M = 5.79, SD = 4.63) and Test 8 (M = 8.14, SD = 5.14), t(27) = 3.03, p = .006, all other 
ps > .05. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. The number of words on each list that were recalled during Experiment 1 that were 
also correctly recognized at the very end of the task during the surprise recognition test. 
Participants studied 30 words on each list. Error bars represent standard error. 
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 At the end of the task, participants rated their trust that the computer would remember their 
saved words: M = 88.32, SD = 23.65 (on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning not at all and 100 
meaning completely). 
Discussion 
 In the current study, participants were faced with two decisions: how much information 
should I save to the computer (if any), and, if I do choose to save information, what kind of 
information should that be? For the most part, participants chose to save, or offload, the 
maximum amount of words to the computer (participants were told that the computer’s storage 
capacity was six words). That is, people took full advantage of the saving mechanism. 
Participants recalled approximately 10 words per list on the free-recall tests, which did not 
change significantly across the task.   
 Participants recognized the words they recalled at a fairly high rate during the final 
surprise recognition test. While participants recognized words that they offloaded slightly less 
accurately than they recognized words they recalled (and equally as accurately as words they did 
not recall), they did not completely forget offloaded words. Words that were offloaded were 
recognized at a higher rate (M = 16.64 words per list, SD = 8.93) than false-alarm recognitions of 
words that did not appear during study (M = 10.43 words per list, SD = 11.48), t(27) = 2.59, p = . 
02 (see Bjork & Woodward, 1973; Davis & Okada, 1971). The final recognition test included 
480 words, 240 of which participants had seen before (they were “old” words), so the false alarm 
rate was relatively low. That is, on average, participants incorrectly said 4.35% of “new” words 
were words they had seen before. 
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Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 1, participants’ goal was to remember as many words as possible. They 
did not have specific direction about which words to prioritize, or even indirect suggestions 
about which words to offload. In Experiment 2, participants’ goal was no longer simply to 
remember as many words as possible, but to maximize their score, which was calculated by 
summing the points associated with the words participants offloaded and recalled on each list. 
The introduction of value into an experiment assessing offloading decisions and memory 
performance allows us to examine how those processes are affected when some information 
becomes more important than other information (which can reflect real-life situations, such as 
when offloading and remembering critical ingredients for a recipe or important concepts for an 
exam).  
 If participants trust the saving mechanism to remember the words for them more than 
they trust their own memory abilities, they should offload the maximum amount of words, while 
making sure that those words are of the highest value. If the participants do not feel the need to 
take advantage of the option to save words to the computer, they may rely on their own memory 
instead to recall the highest-value items. Overall, we predict that value will affect both recall and 
offloading decisions, as well as performance on the surprise final recognition test.  
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 28 undergraduate students at the University of California, Los Angeles 
participated in this study for course credit, ranging in age from 18-25 (M = 20.68, SD = 1.83); 26 
were female. None had participated in Experiment 1.  
Materials and Procedure 
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 The materials were identical to Experiment 1. The procedure was similar, except for the 
added value component: each word was randomly paired with a point value ranging from 1 to 
30. In the initial task instructions, participants were told that their goal was to maximize their 
score (their score was calculated by adding up the points associated with the words they recalled 
– they did not have to recall the point values, only the words). Participants were able to save up 
to six words to the computer. The computer noted a running calculation of the total point value 
of the words saved inside the box (e.g., “current value: 165”), so participants were aware of how 
many points they would receive at test when the computer recalled these words on their behalf 
(see Figures 4.5a and 4.5b for example study screens). As in Experiment 1, there were eight 
study-test trials with new words on each list. When participants moved on to the free recall test 
immediately after the 90s study session, they were also told the number of points they occurred 
due to the computer saving the words they selected (e.g., “Points from words saved by the 
computer: 165”). Feedback was given after each test in the form of points earned by the 
participant and by the computer (i.e., how many points participants earned from the offloaded 
words).  
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Figure 4.5a. A study trial from Experiment 2. A timer counts down from 90s, 30 words are 
displayed with corresponding point values, and there is a box in which saved words will appear 
after participants click on them.  
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Figure 4.5b. A study trial from Experiment 2 with words saved. This figure presents the same 
study trial as in Figure 4.5a, but with six high-value words saved (saved words are underlined in 
the study box and are also included in the box below).  
 
Results 
Offloading and recall 
 As in Experiment 1, the amount of words recalled did not change across the task, F(7, 
203) = 0.68, p = .69, h2 = .02, see Figure 4.6.  
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Figure 4.6. The number of words recalled across the task in Experiment 2 (not including 
offloaded words). Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 Also similarly to Experiment 1, out of six possible words that participants were able to 
offload, participants very commonly chose to offload all six words (across eight lists, M = 5.97, 
SD = 0.41). There was no difference across list of the amount of words participants chose to 
recall, F(7, 189) = 1.34, p = .23, h2 = .05. If participants were to offload the six most valuable 
words on a given list (30 + 29 + 28 + 27 + 26 + 25), their average offloaded value for that list 
would be 27.5. Most participants offloaded the most valuable words throughout the task. 
 Selectivity index (SI) was calculated for both the offloaded words and the recalled words 
to determine to what extent participants were selective in their offloading and in their recall (see 
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Figure 4.7). There was a main effect of list on the selectivity index of the offloaded words, F(7, 
189) = 3.42, p < .01, h2 = .11, as participants became more selective with the words they 
offloaded across the task. We conducted post-hoc t-tests to assess where the differences lie, but 
no tests reached significance following the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (the 
comparison that was closest to reaching statistical significance was between List 1 (M = 0.52, SD 
= 0.35) and List 7 (M = 0.71, SD = 0.25), t(27) = 3.32, p = .003, all other ps > .05. 
 In contrast, a one-way ANOVA revealed no main effect of list on the selectivity index of 
words that were recalled, F(7, 189) = 1.25, p = .28, h2 = .04, such that participants’ recall 
selectivity (as measured by SI) did not increase across the task. 
 
Figure 4.7. The extent to which participants prioritized high-value words (as measured by 
selectivity index) across Experiment 2, both in their offloading decisions (black line) and recall 
performance (gray line). Error bars represent standard error.  
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 Further, we sought to examine whether the offloaded words were of higher value than the 
recalled words (see Figure 4.8), and whether such a pattern may have changed across the task. 
To do this, we conducted a 2(words: offloaded, recalled) x 8(list) within-subjects ANOVA. 
There was no two-way interaction between whether a word was offloaded or recalled and list, 
F(7, 196) = 0.70, p = .68, h2 = .02, nor was there a significant main effect of list, F(7,196) = 
1.88, p = .07, h2 = .06. There was, however, a significant main effect when comparing the value 
of words that were offloaded and words that were recalled, F(1, 28) = 235.17, p < .001, h2 = .89, 
such that offloaded words were of a significantly higher value than words that were recalled (M 
= 25.99, SD = 3.21, and M = 16.92, SD = 3.11, respectively). 
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Figure 4.8. The average point value of words that were offloaded (black line) and recalled (gray 
line) across the task in Experiment 2. The dashed line at 27.5 points represents the average of the 
top six most valuable words (i.e., the average value of words with 30, 29, 28, 27, 26, and 25 
points). Error bars represent standard error.  
 
 Across the task, few words were both offloaded and recalled. On average, participants 
offloaded and recalled fewer than one word per list (M = 0.62, SD = 1.60), or an average of 4.96 
words across the task (SD = 12.14; mode = 0). Though offloading and recalling the same word 
was uncommon, of the words that were offloaded and recalled, the average point value was 
24.08 points (SD = 4.91).  
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Recognition 
 As in Experiment 1, Figure 4.9 suggests that the best-recognized words were those that 
had been recalled on previous lists. It also suggests that offloaded words were not completely 
forgotten. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there were differences in recognition accuracy 
among words that were recalled, were not recalled, and were offloaded, F(2, 54) = 94.60, p < 
.001, h2 = .78. Words that had been recalled were recognized more accurately than those that 
were offloaded, t(27) = 9.09, p <.001,  and more accurately than those that were not recalled, 
t(27) = 12.53, p < .001. There was no difference in recognition accuracy among words that were 
offloaded and words that were not recalled, t(27) = 0.70, p = .49. On average, participants falsely 
recognized 12.75 words (SD = 15.92) on the final test. Because the final recognition test included 
480 words, 240 of which participants had seen before, this reflects a relatively low false alarm 
rate (that is, on average, participants incorrectly said 5.31% of “new” words were words they had 
seen before).  
 Figure 4.10 illustrates how many words on each list were both recalled during the task 
and recognized correctly at the end of the task. Unlike in Experiment 1, there was no main effect 
of list, F(7, 189) = 1.21, p = .30, h2 = .04. Also unlike Experiment 1, words that were offloaded 
were not recognized at a higher rate than false-alarm recognitions of words that did not appear 
during study, t(27) = 1.29, p = . 21. When asked at the end of the task how much they trusted the 
computer on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning not at all and 100 meaning completely, 
participants gave an average rating of 92.00 (SD = 21.38). 
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Figure 4.9. The percentage of words correctly recognized in Experiment 2. The percentage of 
words correctly recognized in Experiment 2 differed based on whether those words were recalled 
during the task, not recalled during the task, or offloaded during study as compared to overall 
performance on the recognition test. Error bars represent standard error. 
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Figure 4.10. The number of words on each list that were recalled during Experiment 2 that were 
also correctly recognized at the very end of the task during the surprise recognition test. 
Participants studied 30 words on each list. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 We also sought to determine whether value was related to performance on the final 
recognition test. Figure 4.11 illustrates the proportion of words of each point value that were 
offloaded during study, as well as the proportion of words of each point value that were correctly 
recognized on the final test. The gray line representing offloading is low and relatively stable 
until words of approximately 20 points, and reflects a substantial increase between the values of 
24 and 25, supporting the notion that participants offloaded the highest value items. In contrast, 
the black line indicating recognition accuracy slopes upward (i.e., higher-value items are 
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remembered more accurately) until the six highest-value items, which are recognized at a rate 
comparable to the lowest-value items.  
   
  
 Figure 4.11. The proportion of words of each point value in Experiment 2 that were offloaded 
during study (gray line) and correctly recognized on the final test (black line). To the right of the 
dashed line is the offloading proportion and recognition accuracy for the six highest-value items. 
Error bars represent standard error. 
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 We also assessed the point values of the words that were correctly recognized and 
compared them to the point values of words that participants studied but were not correctly 
recognized. We conducted a paired-samples t-test to assess whether the average point values 
differed, which did reveal a significant difference, t(27) = 2.44, p = .02, such that words that 
were correctly recognized on the final recognition test were of higher value than those that were 
not correctly recognized (M = 16.46, SD = 1.79, and M = 15.32, SD = 0.83, respectively).  
Discussion 
 Across the task, the selectivity index of the offloaded words increased, suggesting that 
participants were using those six “save” slots more wisely with task experience by directing the 
computer to remember the most valuable words. This could reflect an increase in trust in the 
computer to reliably recall the saved words across the task. The increase in selectivity index of 
the offloaded words across the task could also reflect an increasing awareness of one’s limited 
memory capacity (e.g., it is difficult to remember these valuable words, and the computer is 
more dependable than my memory capacity is). There was no difference in the amount of words 
recalled across the list, which is consistent with Experiment 1 and with prior work (e.g., Castel, 
2008).  
 It is possible that an increase in high-value offloaded words while there was no increase 
in the selectivity index of words recalled is due to offloading more high value words while also 
remembering more lower-value words (in a sense, replacing the high-value words that would 
have taken up memory capacity with low value words, because there is perceived “room” to do 
so). A tendency to recall the same amount of words overall across the task, but with an 
increasing proportion of low-value words, would be captured by a decrease in selectivity index 
across the task. In fact, analyses revealed no significant difference in selectivity index of recalled 
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words across the eight test trials, suggesting that participants were equally selective in their recall 
across the task (though they were more selective in their offloading across the task, as discussed 
above). It is perhaps an optimal strategy to offload words with lower value at first, while one 
acclimates to the task, before depending on the computer to remember the highest-value words. 
Once the computer is determined to be trustworthy and participants understand more about their 
capacity limitations, more valuable words are offloaded. As in Experiment 1, participants 
commonly saved the maximum of six words per trial. In Experiment 2, participants also 
commonly offloaded high-value words. In sum, participants in both Experiments took advantage 
of the saving mechanism to its fullest extent. 
 In contrast with Experiment 1, words that were offloaded in Experiment 2 were 
recognized equally as often as false-alarm recognitions of words that did not appear during 
study, which does not provide evidence that offloaded words were learned during study. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.11, recognition accuracy is sensitive to value: higher-value items are 
remembered more accurately than lower-value items except for the six highest-value items, 
which are recognized at a rate comparable to the items on the lowest end of the value spectrum. 
This finding is of particular interest: the decision to offload high-value items was effective 
during the free recall portion of the experiment. However, it seems that especially in Experiment 
2, the offloading of high-value information did act as an effective cue to forget that information. 
General Discussion 
 The current study utilized a novel paradigm to examine how, when presented with more 
words than they can hope to remember, participants saved valuable information to the computer. 
We sought to examine how offloading words might affect recall and recognition, and whether 
value influenced decisions and performance. In both Experiemnts, participants relied on the 
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offloading mechanism that can be considered as an “extended organism” (Hamilton & Benjamin, 
2019, p. 40) to remember words for them, and the effects of this saving on memory differed 
between the two Experiments. The number of words recalled did not differ across the task in 
either experiment, and few participants offloaded and recalled the same words, but recognition 
accuracy was affected by the value of the to-be-learned information.  
 Directed forgetting (Bjork & Woodward, 1973) involves the designation of some 
information as to-be-forgotten, and some information as to-be-remembered. In the current study, 
participants may have used the “saving” option during study as a type of self-directed forgetting: 
they decided what should be remembered and what should be effectively forgotten (as only a few 
participants recalled offloaded words on only a handful of trials throughout the entire task). 
There may be a benefit to memory for saved information (Storm & Stone, 2015), but participants 
do not often spontaneously recall saved information — the current study allowed participants to 
recall those words but did not explicitly ask them to do so. The findings of the current study 
mirror the real-life situation of participants saving items to a virtual to-do list; once the 
information is saved to the to do-list, it is not spontaneously recalled again (as long as the 
program tasked with doing the remembering can be trusted to remember than information).  
 In Experiment 1, the results of the final recognition tests suggest that the offloaded words 
are not completely forgotten; that is, if there is a self-directed forgetting cue for the offloaded 
words, it does not completely erase them from memory. In contrast, in Experiment 2, the 
offloaded words do appear to be effectively forgotten (i.e., the recognition rates of offloaded 
words did not differ from false alarms to lures that were not studied; Bjork & Woodward, 1973). 
This argument is supported by data illustrated in Figure 4.11, which displays recognition 
performance by point value. Participants usually offloaded the six highest-value words (see 
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Figure 4.8, which compares the values of offloaded and recalled words across Experiment 2), 
and those words were often forgotten by the recognition test (in which recognition accuracy was 
similar to that of the lowest-value items). The self-directed forgetting of the high-value 
information was particularly potent.  
 This difference between Experiments 1 and 2 may be due to participants’ having an 
explicit strategy or goal in their offloading in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 1. That is, in 
Experiment 1, there is no surface-level information (e.g., point value) to guide participants when 
they are making their offloading: they may consider several words to offload, think about their 
likelihood of remembering those later, and then choose to offload them or not. In contrast, in 
Experiment 2, it is obvious what participants should do, given that they trust the offloading 
mechanism: they should offload the words associated with the highest point values. If 
participants use that strategy, they do not need to consider any characteristic of the word beyond 
its value; indeed, participants need not even look at the actual word they are offloading, only use 
its point value to guide their decision. Then, once those top-value words are offloaded, 
participants devote more time to remembering higher-value items, which is reflected in their 
recall performance as well as in their final recognition performance (i.e., the value curve on 
Figure 4.18 from points 1 to 24).  
 Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 differ in their performance accuracy on the recall and 
recognition tests, as illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 4.6 (recall) and Figures 4.3 and 4.9 
(recognition). When comparing accuracy on the recall tests across lists and between experiments, 
there is a main effect of experiment, F(1, 54) = 5.82, p = .02, h2 = .10, such that participants in 
Experiment 1 (M = 9.95 words per list, SD = 4.21) performed better than participants in 
Experiment 2 (M = 8.19 words per list, SD = 2.45) did. (In this analysis, there was no main effect 
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of list, F(7, 378) = 0.45, p = .87, h2 = .01, nor was there an interaction between list and 
experiment, F(7, 378) = 0.61, p = .75, h2 = .01.) On the recognition test, there was a two-way 
interaction between experiment and how a word was treated in the study-recall phase of the task 
(offloaded, recalled, or not recalled), F(2, 108) = 5.55, p = .01, h2 = .04. Post-hoc independent-
samples t-tests revealed that participants in Experiment 1 performed more accurately in 
recognizing the words they had offloaded than those in Experiment 2, t(54) = 3.65, p < .001 
(with accuracy proportions of M = 0.36, SD = 0.19 and M = 0.20, SD = 0.14, respectively), and 
participants in Experiment 1 recognized words that were not recalled during the task more 
accurately than those in Experiment 2, t(54) = 4.77, p < .001 (M = 0.44, SD = .24 and M = 0.19, 
SD = 0.13, respectively). There was not a statistically significant difference in how accurately 
participants in Experiments 1 and 2 recognized the words they recalled during the task, t(54) = 
1.27, p = .21. 
 One candidate explanation for these between-experiment differences in accuracy is the time 
participants spent on the memory tests. Participants were able to spend as much time as they 
wished on these tests and advance to the next phase of the experiment whenever they chose. 
Time spent on these tests, especially the recognition test, could be considered a proxy for effort 
on the tests – though, of course, this is an imperfect comparison. Nevertheless, we compared 
how much time participants in Experiments 1 and 2 spent on the recall tests (Figure 4.12) and the 
recognition test (Figure 4.13). Figure 4.12 suggests that overall, participants in Experiment 1 did 
spend slightly more time on the recall tests compared to those in Experiment 2; this difference 
was not statistically significant, F(1, 54) = 3.27, p = .09, h2 = .06. (There was also no interaction 
between experiment and list, F(7, 378) = 1.00, p = .43, h2 = .02. There was a main effect of list, 
F(7, 378) = 12.92, p < .001, h2 = .19, and follow-up t-tests revealed this was driven by time 
  
 
162 
 
spent on Test 1 being longer than time spent on all other tests, ps < .05). The differences in time 
spent on the recognition task are also interesting: participants spent 15 fewer seconds, on 
average, in Experiment 2, though this difference also failed to reach statistical significance, t(54) 
= 0.52, p = .61. 
 
Figure 4.12. The average time in seconds participants spent on each recall test during 
Experiments 1 and 2. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 Test 7 Test 8
Ti
m
e 
sp
en
t o
n 
re
ca
ll 
te
st
s 
(s
)
Experiment 1 (no value)
Experiment 2 (value)
  
 
163 
 
 
Figure 4.13. The average time in seconds (240 s = 4 min, 360 s = 6 min) participants spent on 
the final recognition test during Experiments 1 and 2.  Error bars represent standard error. 
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Chapter 4 Conclusions 
 In Chapter 4, I sought to assess how offloading may affect recall and recognition, and 
how value may affect how people choose what to save and remember. We often offload 
important information to external sources, such as to-do lists, grocery lists, and flash cards or 
study guides. The findings reported in Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that when participants are 
able to save information to a trustworthy source, they take full advantage of that ability, 
maximizing the amount (Experiments 1 and 2) and value (Experiment 2) of the saved words, 
rather than relying on their own abilities to remember important information. In Experiment 1, 
participants did not completely forget offloaded words; in Experiment 2, the self-directed 
forgetting was powerful enough that offloaded words were recognized at a rate equivalent to 
lures that had not been presented during study. 
 Differences between Experiments 1 and 2 are not likely to be fully attributable to 
differences in how much time participants spent on each test. We propose that one or more other 
factors contribute to between-experiment differences: for example, participants in Experiment 2 
had a more complex goal than those in Experiment 1, which might have required more cognitive 
resources during study to pursue (thus leaving them with less cognitive capacity to study the 
words). More specifically, those in Experiment 2 were not only trying to offload words and study 
words, but were also paying attention to another variable (the words’ point values) and how that 
variable could help them achieve their goal of maximizing their score. In Experiment 1, 
participants did not need to exert extra attention to any value structure, which may explain why 
they remembered more information on the recall tests.  
 More broadly speaking, the amount of deliberation involved in the offloading decision 
process affected later incidental memory performance. When there was a substantial amount of 
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deliberation, or thoughtfulness, about whether to offload a given item, those items were encoded 
more strongly and were therefore later recognized. Because participants did not expect a 
recognition test, this recognition memory for offloaded items can be considered incidental rather 
than explicitly purposeful. In contrast, when there was not much deliberation about whether to 
offload a given item (e.g., for the high value items in Experiment 2), that item was not later 
recognized.  
 Participants in the Experiments 1 and 2 trusted the offloading mechanism to work in their 
favor. Future work in which the computer’s reliability is manipulated by telling participants after 
the test that the computer made an “error” that resulted in their saved words being lost would 
allow for examination of whether participants still decided to offload valuable information, even 
if the source was unreliable (cf. Storm & Stone, 2015), and whether they also recall the 
information that they offloaded just in case the computer fails. Additionally, future work can 
investigate how other characteristics of the words besides value (e.g., concreteness, frequency) 
may influence offloading decisions to assess whether the difficulty of learning a word influences 
its likelihood of being offloaded.  
 In sum, Chapter 4 provides a novel investigation of extended cognition and 
metacognition (e.g., see Hamilton & Benjamin, 2019), offloading and self-directed forgetting, 
and how important information in particular is susceptible to forgetting if we feel that we have 
stored it somewhere reliable. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Overview of findings 
 Prior work suggests that older adults are largely driven by the urge to connect to others 
socially, while younger adults’ strongest motivating factor is the desire to acquire knowledge. 
However, there are meaningful instances in which older adults seek to learn, either to achieve an 
external goal (e.g., Bye et al., 2007), or for the sake of learning (Wolfgang & Dowling, 1981), or 
perhaps both. Younger and older adults often have different goals, but instances in which they 
overlap are worth examining, particularly in the domain of memory. If a subset of information is 
important to the participant, he or she is likely more motivated to remember it than unimportant 
information, and therefore age-related memory deficits for important information can be reduced 
(or absent). Motivation to learn can thus have a powerful impact on memory across the adult 
lifespan. The notion that being motivated to remember information improves performance is 
tested in the current Dissertation using novel stimuli, including social information, foreign 
language word pairs, and medication interactions, while considering the predictions of prior 
work such as socioemotional selectivity theory (Charles & Carstensen, 2010; Carstensen & 
Charles, 1998; Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2008; Fredrickson & 
Carstensen, 1990; Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999). 
 The research reported in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 addresses questions regarding younger and 
older adults’ motivation to remember in relatively practical contexts: when learning information 
about other people, when learning information to use when communicating with other people, 
and when learning health-related information. Through the lens of socioemotional selectivity 
theory (Carstensen et al., 1999), I examined how older age might affect memory for information 
about social partners or for information that may be relayed to another person. I then widened the 
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scope of goal pursuit in learning to include how older adults remember medication interactions 
and side effects in light of possible age-related deficits in memory for associative information 
(Naveh-Benjamin, 2000) before investigating how offloading and value can affect younger 
learners’ performance on recall and recognition tests.  
Younger and older adults’ memory for important social information 
  In Chapter 2, participants learned associative social information of varying value. 
Overall, older adults can struggle in these associative tasks, as binding pairs of unrelated 
information (e.g., a person’s face and their arbitrarily-assigned name) can be difficult in healthy 
aging. Additionally, peoples’ names are often more difficult to learn than other biographical 
information about them, such as their hobbies or occupations, and remembering people’s names 
is a common memory complaint among older adults in particular. 
 In Experiment 1, participants studied triads of social information: a person’s face, their 
name, and their occupation. These triads varied with respect to the likelihood that the participant 
would need to use that information in the future. Recall was sensitive to likelihood of future use; 
younger and older adults recalled important associative social information (name-occupation 
pairs) equally accurately. As is a pattern throughout this Dissertation, participants’ performance 
improved across study-test trials as they had an opportunity to learn more information with task 
experience. Experiment 1 provides evidence for the benefit of repeated testing and restudy 
opportunities for both age groups (though younger adults did consistently outperform older 
adults in recalling information that was less important, which is consistent with prior work). In 
Experiment 2, younger participants were allowed only 1s to study each item (compared with 3s 
each in Experiment 1) in order to reduce the processing resources younger adults could bring to 
bear during the encoding phase. In this task, both age groups prioritized information that was 
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most important throughout the task; although younger adults had less time to encode than older 
adults did, they were able to selectively remember the information that had a high likelihood of 
future use. Additionally, older adults (and, to some extent, younger adults) remembered people’s 
occupations more accurately than they remembered names, which is in line with prior work 
suggesting that biographical information that is not name information is easier to learn than 
names are. Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that younger and older adults 
can use effective memory strategies to remember important associative information about others.  
 Study 3 (in Chapter 2) builds upon the notion that names are more difficult to remember 
than other types of biographical information. Given that older people often comment that their 
memory for names is “not what it used to be,” and even younger adults may lament that they are 
“bad with names,” Study 3 examines whether metacognitive judgments are in line with this 
awareness that remembering names is difficult. Evidence in support of such awareness includes a 
potential spotlight effect: it can be embarrassing when we forget others’ names, and this 
embarrassment may make our failure come to mind more easily when we are asked to make 
judgments about our abilities. Further, participants across the adult lifespan, but especially older 
adults, may experience tip-of-the-tongue states when trying to recall names, further increasing 
the salience of prior mistakes. Even so, substantial prior work has established than we often rate 
ourselves as better than the average person in many domains, including social qualities like 
leadership ability. There is thus some conflict between two hypotheses: do we see ourselves as 
better than average at remembering all types of information, or are we sensitive to our struggle to 
remember names? Study 3 supports the latter point: both younger and older participants rate 
themselves as no different from the average person their age in their ability to remember others’ 
names. Participants in both age groups did rate themselves as better than average in other 
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domains such as honesty, capacity for hard work, and leadership ability, as well as their overall 
memory accuracy, suggesting that people are unrealistic in their perception of some of their 
memory abilities. Perhaps there is something special about learning social information, such that 
when learning people’s names, younger and older adults’ metacognition is more accurate than 
when learning other types of information.  
 Overall, Experiments 1 and 2 and in Study 3, focused on participants’ memory for 
information about other people. In Experiments 4 and 5, the focus shifted to examining how 
people remember information that they could use when communicating with other people. Using 
a paired associate learning paradigm with English-Swahili word pairs, two Experiments assessed 
how younger and older adults remembered foreign language vocabulary that varied in its 
importance. Participants were told to imagine going on a trip to Kenya, which certainly 
supported the use of Swahili-English pairs as opposed to another language, but Swahili words 
were primarily chosen because they are not likely to be familiar to most participants in America 
(compared to, for example, French or Spanish words) and, perhaps even more importantly, 
because they do not easily lend themselves to common encoding strategies (e.g., imagery). 
Because the words are difficult to learn, we predicted participants would use a different type of 
strategy to guide their learning: value. That is, participants would remember the words that were 
most important for them to learn on their trip. Overall, younger adults remembered more pairs 
than older adults did, which is in line with previous work on age-related associative deficits. 
Both age groups learned with task experience as the words were repeated on a second study-test 
trial, but pre-task ratings suggest that all words were considered relatively important, without 
much variance among the categories.  
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 Experiment 5 sought to create a larger contrast in importance: some categories of words 
were selected from Experiment 4, to which were added words that were less important to learn 
for a trip (e.g., common objects such as “pen”). Though pre-task ratings were again not sensitive 
to value, younger and older adults’ paired associate learning accuracy did differ between these 
two types of words, such that higher-value words (e.g., “doctor”) were remembered more 
accurately than lower-value words (e.g., “desk”). The results suggest that participants were not 
aware that they should prioritize information until they actually attempted to study and/or recall 
the items, after which they realized that prioritization was necessary to remember the information 
that was actually more important to learn for their trip. Participants benefited from the 
opportunity to learn from their mistakes and adjust their learning strategies on a subsequent 
study-test trial. 
 Overall, Chapter 2 illustrates that under certain circumstances, younger and older people 
can prioritize important associative social information, and that they are generally aware than 
remembering some types of social information (e.g., people’s names) can be difficult. 
Participants often benefited from repeated study-test trials, and while value-directed strategies 
were not always present from the beginning of the task, many participants learned to prioritize 
with task experience: when they recognized that they were not able to remember everything, 
participants directed their resources toward information that was most important to know.  
Younger and older adults’ memory for important health-related information 
 While Chapter 2 focused primarily on socio-emotional goal pursuit in learning, Chapter 3 
focused on knowledge-based goal pursuit, specifically in learning health-related information. 
Health-related information can be important to remember, but easily confusable: many people, 
especially older adults, take multiple medications and/or supplements at the same time. Due to 
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the commonality of complex medication regimens, participants may benefit by knowing which 
medications should or should not be taken concurrently (Experiments 1 and 2), and which side 
effects are associated with which medications (Experiments 3 and 4). 
 In Experiment 1, participants were presented with pairs of medications or a medication 
and a substance (e.g., grapefruit), as well as the severity of the interaction that would occur 
should those two items be consumed together. In some of the pairs, there was said to be no 
interaction between the two, in others, there was said to be an interaction that was mild in 
severity (e.g., headache), and in others, there was said to be a severe interaction (e.g., stroke) 
should the two items be consumed together. Participants were presented with these pairs during 
repeated study-test cycles and were tested using an associative recognition memory paradigm in 
which they were shown the pairs of medications and asked to recall what would happen should 
those two be taken together (i.e., severe, mild, or no interaction). Only older adults’ recognition 
accuracy was affected by the severity of the health outcome in Experiment 1. There were no 
significant age-related differences in memory performance, which was somewhat surprising, 
given that older adults often struggle with age-related associative deficits in memory (e.g., see 
Chapter 2, Experiments 4 and 5).  
 Perhaps younger adults felt that the learning task in Experiment 1 was easy enough that 
they did not need to prioritize the severe items, thus leading to no effect of severity on memory 
performance. In Experiment 2, the task was modified such that it was relatively more difficult 
than in Experiment 1: Instead of studying unique, non-repeating pairs of medications, 
participants in Experiment 2 completed a task that involved interference in memory. Based on 
prior work investigating the “fan effect” in learning, Experiment 2 paired one medication with 
five others to create a task in which participants were required to learn both items in the pair and 
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match them to the severity of the health outcome in order to know the correct response. Older 
adults are thought to be differentially (negatively) impacted by interfering information in 
memory, but again, surprisingly, younger and older adults’ memory performance did not differ 
(perhaps at least partially due to the simplicity of the recognition test). The results were different 
from Experiment 1, however, in that both age groups’ recognition accuracy was affected by 
severity, such that the outcomes associated with the most severe health consequences were 
recognized with the highest accuracy. Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that younger 
and older people can remember associative information about medication interactions that vary 
in severity. Participants in both Experiments learned with task experience, and an age-related 
associative deficit was not established – though it certainly would be in Experiments 3 and 4.  
 We often share information about medical diagnoses and treatment plans with loved 
ones, friends, and/or spouses. When we share this information – such as what medications the 
doctor has prescribed to us, or when we should begin our new medication regimen – it is helpful 
for us to have an accurate perception of our own memory’s fallibility, as well as others’. 
However, overconfidence in memory is fairly common, and it could have negative consequences 
in the health domain if we commit memory errors without realizing we have the propensity to do 
so. Experiments 3 and 4 were constructed to assess whether younger and older people were 
overconfident in their ability to remember associative health-related information, and, if so, 
whether a short but challenging task could affect that overconfidence. 
 In Experiment 3, younger and older participants read a short description the learning task 
and then made judgments about how well they and other people (a same-aged peer, a first-year 
medical student, and a member of the other age group) would remember a set of pairs of 
medications and their side effects. Critically, new pairs were presented on each list, and 
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participants were told of this design before they made their metacognitive judgments. After these 
estimations, participants completed a series of study-cued recall test cycles before making 
judgments about themselves and others (the same people as in the pre-task judgments) after the 
final test. The task was designed to be difficult without appearing so on its face, to assess 
whether participant’s likely overconfidence would change after they were faced with the 
fallibility of their memory. Participants were not just told that memory is fallible – they 
experienced it firsthand. While participants estimated pre-task that they and a same-aged peer 
would remember approximately 50% of the information presented (perhaps relying on a 
metacognitive anchor by picking the midpoint of the 0-100% scale), they performed significantly 
worse than they estimated, and their post-task estimations were adjusted downward. 
Interestingly, both groups continued to rate medical students as being able to remember a fairly 
high number of items, suggesting they did not view the task simply as impossible, but surely 
difficult for those who do not have much familiarity with the information and/or are not 
interested in learning it.   
 In Experiment 4, participants were able to learn with task experience: the pairs of 
medications and side effects were held constant across the task, rather than changing on each list. 
Participants still tended to estimate that they would remember about 50% of the items presented, 
providing more evidence for the use of a metacognitive anchor near the midpoint of the scale. 
For older adults in particular, judgments were higher pre-task than post-task, especially when 
making judgments about their own memory accuracy. 
 Younger adults outperformed older adults in memory accuracy, but both age groups were 
largely overconfident before learning in Experiments 3 and 4. Overall, Experiments 3 and 4 
suggest that a short but difficult task can affect overconfidence in learning associative health-
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related information. The learning illustrated in Experiments 3 and 4 can provide two benefits: in 
a relatively short but difficult memory task, participants can learn the content they do not know 
(which may be important in a clinical and/or pharmaceutical setting), while also learning that 
because memory is fallible, they should not rely solely on their own capacity to remember a 
large amount of information, but rather use strategies such as taking notes to aid their recall. 
Effect of importance on offloading and remembering 
 We often use external sources to help us remember information. We take notes during 
important lectures and review those notes while studying for exams, we use calendars and to-do 
lists to help organize our daily lives, and we bring a list to the grocery store to ensure we 
purchase the necessary ingredients for a new recipe. We may offload this information because 
we realize that our memory capacity is neither infinite nor perfectly accurate, and we need help 
remembering information that we will want to revisit later. The purpose of Chapter 4 was to 
investigate whether and how participants used a computer-based offloading system in a memory 
task in which they were asked to remember a set of words (though there were, by design, more 
words present than participants could hope to remember).  
 In Experiment 1, participants offloaded the maximum amount of words they were able to, 
and rarely recalled those words on future free recall tests. Participants trusted that the offloading 
mechanism would work, that is, that it would “remember” the information they saved to it. On a 
surprise final recognition test, participants recognized words they offloaded less accurately than 
words they recalled, but they did recognize offloaded words more accurately than they 
committed false alarms (by saying they had seen lures that were not presented during study). 
That is, the words offloaded during study in Experiment 1 were not completely forgotten. 
  
 
175 
 
 Experiment 2 incorporated a value structure to determine how information importance 
affects offloading decisions, and how those decisions in turn may affect recall and recognition 
performance. When we offload information to a to-do list, we may write down the most 
important information (e.g., “attend an important meeting on Wednesday at 10:00am”), but not 
information we consider as less critical to remember – or, put another way, information we 
consider unlikely to be forgotten (e.g., “walk the dog this evening”). In Experiment 2, words 
were randomly paired with point values, and participants were told that their goal was to 
maximize their score, which would be calculated by summing the points associated with the 
words they offloaded and recalled on each list. Again, participants used the offloading 
mechanism to its fullest extent: they overwhelmingly chose to offload six words on each list, and 
those words were often the six words associated with the six highest point values.  
 Unlike in Experiment 1, however, offloaded words were not very accurately recognized: 
they were recognized at the same rate as words that were not presented during study were 
inaccurately chosen as having appeared (i.e., false alarms to lures that were not presented during 
study). In Experiment 2, the self-directed forgetting of offloaded, high-value words was 
substantial, perhaps because their offloading goal was obvious compared to participants in 
Experiment 1: if you trust the offloading mechanism, you should find and save the six highest 
value words and then devote the remaining time to studying the other words. In Experiment 1, 
the offloading goal was not so obvious, perhaps leading to deeper encoding of the offloaded 
words as offloading decisions were made, which led to stronger memory traces of those items, 
and thus more accurate recognition of those words later.  
Incidental memory for items that were not delibrated about during the offloading decision 
was at least partially preserved. In contrast, when there was not much deliberation about whether 
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to offload a given item (e.g., for the high value items in Experiment 2), that item was not later 
recognized. To further assess this proposed explanation, we can manipulate the amount of 
deliberation involved in the offloading process. While directly instructing participants to 
deliberate or not about their decisions might be the most straightforward way to test our 
assumption that more deliberation during offloading leads to more accurate incidental memory, 
perhaps more sophisticated manipulations are of interest. These potential avenues of interest are 
discussed in the next section.  
 Overall, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 in Chapter 4 suggest that people are willing to 
use offloading mechanisms to save information that is important to their goals, and that saved 
information is, under certain circumstances, not completely forgotten.  
Future directions 
Younger and older adults’ memory for important social information 
 To build upon Experiments 1 and 2, future work can manipulate actual future use of 
social information. In the studies reported above, participants were asked to imagine that they 
were more likely to use a subset of information than they were to use other information in the 
future. If participants were studying some information they would actually use in the future and 
some information they would not use, the need probability manipulation may influence both 
younger and older adults’ performance. For example, meeting a group of people (digitally or in 
real life) and having to tell another participant (or confederate) about the people they met would 
likely create an even stronger value manipulation than was used in Experiments 1 and 2.   
 In addition, future work could assess the role of impression formation on memory for 
important social partners. Impression favorability could be manipulated as a competing variable 
with value, such that people with a lower need probability make a better impression on 
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participants. If this manipulation occurred, which variable would have a stronger effect on 
recall?  
 Study 3 can be modified into an experimental design: perhaps with a spotlight-inducing 
manipulation, participants would be more accurate in their memory for names that would 
actually be tested (rather than only surveyed). For example, some participants could be asked to 
retrieve specific examples of forgetting other peoples’ names (as compared to forgetting 
locations, facts, or even more common activities such as where they placed their keys) before 
completing a memory and metacognition task. This type of retrieval would bring their memory 
failures to mind, and perhaps making examples of forgetting highly available could decrease the 
better-than-average bias for several types of memory.   
 In Experiments 4 and 5, older participants were not particularly accurate in learning 
Swahili-English word pairs. Future work could investigate how to improve this type of memory, 
as travelling throughout the lifespan may require learning some important words. For example, if 
older adults are explicitly told to use a certain memory strategy such as value-directed 
remembering when learning these PAL stimuli, will their performance improve compared to 
when they are not given such instructions? Further, technological advances in language-learning 
smartphone applications may make memorizing foreign language vocabulary easier (or perhaps 
not even necessary, if the content is available during one’s travels). Incorporating study 
techniques from apps like Duolingo or Memrise may reflect a more accurate representation of 
how people actually learn this type of information. Participants could be allowed a sort of “cheat 
sheet” in which they are encouraged to write down the information that they would like to know 
for their trip, and performance in this condition could be compared to using an app to learn. In 
this line of work, another study could allow participants to choose the categories they find most 
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important (e.g., the food-related category and the health-related category) and study those, in 
addition to some other words considered less important. The participant pool itself could also be 
adjusted: seeking out older adults who will be going on an international trip (perhaps through an 
older-adult-focused travel organization such as Road Scholar or Elder Treks) and asking them to 
rate and learn the information in Experiment 5 could capture an audience that is likely to be 
interested in and/or experienced in learning new information about foreign countries. This 
technique could shed light on age-related differences in which types of words are considered 
most important, which the pre-task ratings in Experiments 4 and 5 did not clearly explain. 
Younger and older adults’ memory for important health-related information 
 Experiments 1-4 used highly-controlled, randomly paired medication stimuli from a 
normed database. While these stimuli are helpful for internal validity, the external validity of the 
studies could be increased by assessing participants’ own medication regimens and presenting 
them with information that is more directly relevant to their health. Future work may also 
examine how this type of associative health-related information is remembered in a more applied 
context, as the information in this study was presented on a computer screen (rather than as 
actual medication bottles, which may lead to more accurate recall).  
 Based on findings from Experiments 3 and 4, future work may add local (item-by-item) 
judgments of learning for a deeper investigation of the underconfidence with practice (UWP) 
effect and whether this type of metacognition changes with age. Additional work may investigate 
the role of older adults’ stereotype threat and/or anxiety on performance (e.g., Geraci & Miller, 
2013), as stereotype threat can certainly have a negative impact on memory accuracy, but 
perhaps can also have a beneficial impact on metacognition (making memory estimates about 
oneself lower and, as a result, more in line with actual performance).  
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 Experiments 3 and 4 revealed interesting metacognitive judgments about first-year 
medical students. Do participants believe that expertise with medications improves memory for 
them? If so, are there memory differences among new and experienced medical students, 
physicians, and pharmacists? Alternatively, are participants’ metacognitive ratings driven by 
perceived interest in the material? If that is the case, are medical professionals truly more 
interested than others in learning new medication information, and does that affect recall? Future 
research can also assess how younger and older patients follow their doctors’ advice and the 
effectiveness of their strategies.  
 If future work seeks to improve peoples’ memory for health-related information, studies 
may assess how patients take notes while learning about new medications or diagnoses – not just 
what they write down, but also how manipulations of speed of information presentation and/or 
material organization may affect what is offloaded and what is remembered. Further, context 
may be important in learning information about new medications: does telling people the 
purpose of a medication (e.g., to decrease plaque buildup in arteries) help them remember it 
better than other contextual information (e.g., its size, color, and shape)? Does one’s optimal 
time of day affect when they choose to visit the doctor or pharmacist, and how much they 
remember during those visits? In addition to extensions relevant to patients, the Experiments in 
Chapter 4 have practical implications for healthcare practitioners: for example, how students in 
medicine, pharmacy, and nursing learn about new medications, as well as what they know about 
how their patients learn.  
Effect of importance on offloading and remembering 
  When we offload important information, we trust our devices to remember what tasks we 
need to accomplish, what groceries we need to purchase, or which dates are important to 
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celebrate. Many of us have also had the misfortune of learning that the information we thought 
we had saved has been lost — possibly due to a computer error in recording our to-do list, or 
perhaps because we left our grocery list at home. These instances may require us to try to recall 
important information that we thought we could save and have access to later, but in fact is no 
longer available to us. A sense of uncertainty can arise when there is not complete trust in the 
device doing the saving. If we are aware that the device onto which we offload information is 
fallible, there is more risk involved in relying on it to save important information than if the 
device was completely trustworthy.  
 Future work could examine two circumstances in which there is a risk of forgetting: of 
course, the participant himself could be at risk to forget the items he studies, but there could also 
be a manipulated level of risk that the computer itself will “forget” (i.e., not accurately record) 
the words the participant wishes to save. Risk of the computer forgetting will likely cause 
uncertainty in the learner, which is expected to affect encoding strategies and retrieval 
performance. The less trust the participants have in the offloading system, the more they are 
expected to rely on their own memory for the highest-value items. These items may be 
offloaded, but may also possibly be recalled at test, as participants may want to make sure that 
they earn points associated with the offloaded words, in case the computer commits an error. The 
uncertainty could also affect overall recall performance, as participants who can fairly reliably 
predict what the computer will do are expected to have more cognitive resources to devote to 
encoding and therefore recall more words at test (without considering the offloaded words). 
Thus, if future work incorporates risk and uncertainty, participants in higher-uncertainty 
conditions (i.e., when the computer will save the words 25%, 50%, or 75% of the time) could be 
expected to face more cognitive load at encoding as they seek to remember valuable items just in 
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case the computer fails, while participants in the lower-uncertainty conditions (i.e., when the 
computer will save the words 100% or 0% of the time) would not face the cognitive load of 
anticipating what the computer will do and should study and learn accordingly.  
The potential metacognitive extensions of this paradigm are also interesting. Are 
participants aware of how much they rely on the offloading system? If they were to lose access 
to their saved words, would they accurately assess how well they learned those words? Or would 
they assume that they would remember saved words better than other types of words just because 
they made decisions about those words? Metacognitive judgments about the relationship 
between (and comparative accuracy of) oneself and the external offloading mechanism may 
reflect an accurate representation of how we work with technology (after all, many of us use 
computers as remembering devices quite frequently; Hamilton & Benjamin, 2019), or perhaps a 
misunderstanding or underestimation of how much the external system really helps us remember.  
 Additional future work based on Chapter 4 could manipulate the memorability of the 
studied and offloaded words by varying the frequency and/or concreteness of those words (e.g., 
Tullis & Benjamin, 2012). This manipulation could uncover how word-based characteristics 
(compared to, or in contrast with, value) may affect offloading decisions and/or memory 
accuracy. If more deliberation for each item during offloading leads to better incidental memory, 
we expect that words that are associated with easy decisions to offload should be less accurately 
recognized. If participants are sensitive to how word-based characteristics such as frequency and 
concreteness may affect their memory, they should offload the words on those dimensions that 
would lead to least accurate remembering. Regardless of how exactly it is instantiated, we expect 
that increasing the deliberation involved in judgments about offloading will benefit later 
incidental memory.  
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Conclusions 
  The primary goals of this Dissertation were to assess how healthy aging and information 
importance may affect memory and motivation to learn, with potential applications to social 
(Chapter 2), health (Chapter 3), and educational (Chapter 4) domains. Substantial prior work 
supports a general shift in priorities with aging, from younger adults pursuing knowledge-based 
goals to older adults pursuing socio-emotional goals. While this framework is certainly helpful 
and is supported by evidence in many cases, it is also of interest to consider situations in which 
these goals may overlap (as in Experiments 4 and 5 in Chapter 2), or when learners may pursue 
new knowledge to achieve an experimenter-designated goal (e.g., learning health-related 
information in Chapter 3, or achieving a high score in Chapter 4).  
  In Chapter 2, younger and older adults remembered important associative information 
that was in line with socioemotional goal pursuit under some circumstances. Experiments 1 and 
2 and Study 3 assessed how younger and older people remembered information about other 
people, as well as their awareness of their ability to do so. Experiments 4 and 5 assessed how 
younger and older people remembered information they could use with communicating with 
other people, and while younger adults did outperform older adults overall, both groups did 
remember important information given a structure that lent itself to value-directed remembering. 
In Chapter 3, Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 investigated how knowledge-based learning goals about 
medical information may affect memory and metacognition in younger adults. Experiments 1 
and 2 suggest that older adults (and, when they are challenged, younger adults) prioritize 
important health-related information across several study-test trials, and Experiments 3 and 4 
illustrate how a difficult task can affect overconfidence in one’s own (and others’) abilities to 
remember health-related information. Finally, Experiments 1 and 2 in Chapter 4 illustrate how 
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the decision to save certain information to an external source can affect memory as measured by 
both recall and recognition, which has implications for how learners study information of 
varying importance and how they use technology while learning. 
 Overall, the results presented in this Dissertation suggest that older adults are often able 
to overcome, or are not always harmed by, established deficits in binding multiple unrelated 
items together in memory. Participants across the adult lifespan can benefit from being given 
multiple study-test cycles and indications of what information is important to learn. Though age-
related associative deficits are found in certain circumstances discussed in the current 
Dissertation (e.g., in Chapter 2, Experiments 2, 4 and 5, and in Chapter 3, Experiments 3 and 4), 
older adults perform as well as their younger counterparts in other associative domains (e.g., 
when the information is highly important; see Chapter 2, Experiment 1, and Chapter 3, 
Experiments 1 and 2). Chapter 4 suggests that learners can use saving mechanisms effectively, 
both in the amount of information they save and in the importance of the information they save, 
but that saving information can negatively impact incidental (recognition) memory if that saving 
does not require much or any deliberation.  
Goal pursuit, learning, and value 
 Substantial prior research supports the shift in goals from knowledge-based to socio-
emotional across the adult lifespan. The theoretical contributions of the current work include the 
notion that value – in an objective and/or subjective sense – can supersede this general pattern. 
That is, if learners consider a set of information important to know to achieve their goals, they 
are often able to direct their attention and cognitive resources accordingly, regardless of whether 
it is socio-emotional in nature. In some sense, the predictions of age-related shifts from 
knowledge-based to socio-emotional goal pursuit are overly limiting, given the findings of the 
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current work and other work outside the realm of this dissertation (e.g., see Hargis, Siegel, & 
Castel, 2019, for a further discussion). The assumption that knowledge-based goals are not 
important in older adulthood certainly reflects the relatively small percentage of older people 
enrolled in university classes or engaged in formal educational programs, but it largely overlooks 
the everyday pursuit of knowledge-based goals in aging. 
 How, then, should we understand shifts in learning new information that are associated 
with cognitive aging? Of course, these shifts are well-established, and the idea that learning goals 
change with age is not argued here. Rather, to fully understand changes in motivation across the 
adult lifespan, we should consider not just that older adults seek to build relationships and 
regulate emotions above all else, but that a more general notion of value or importance could be 
in fact the primary mechanism driving goal pursuit in older adulthood.  
 Benjamin (2010) provides convincing evidence via computational modelling that rather 
than specific deficits (e.g., source and context memory, or associative information), older adults 
face a global degradation of memory accuracy. That is, aging does not affect particular modules 
of memory, but the entire memory system. Established deficits in source memory and associative 
memory, for example, may not be caused by particular difficulties with those types of learning, 
but because that information is represented with lower fidelity – what Benjamin (2010) refers to 
as “sparse” representation in the memory system (p. 1063).  
 On its face, it may seem like a value-based mechanism such as the one discussed here 
does not fit well with a theory of global deficits. If older adults are overall less accurate than 
younger at remembering associative information because of global loss of fidelity and sparsity of 
representation, how would the results of age-equivalence in learning some types of associative 
information in, for example, Experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter 2 be compatible with such a theory? 
  
 
185 
 
The same could be said of age equivalences in another associative memory task presented in 
Chapter 3, Experiments 1 and 2. However, I suggest that a broader value-based mechanism is not 
only compatible with a theory of global deficits, but can be supported by such a theory. If age-
related deficits in memory are due to certain types of information (e.g., associations and sources) 
being represented more sparsely than other information, it serves to reason that other types of 
information, when represented more densely, would be remembered more accurately. That is, 
higher value leads to denser representations, a claim which is agnostic to the specific format of 
the to-be-learned information (e.g., whether it is associative or not). While Benjamin (2010) 
explains age-related losses in memory, understanding the effect of value or importance on 
learning can help shed light on older adults’ preserved abilities that were illustrated in the 
Experiments mentioned above and elsewhere.  
 The difference between subjective and objective value is an important one to discuss, as 
what is important to one person may not be important to another. In several of the studies in this 
Dissertation, value was manipulated by the experimenter, but it is also worth considering how 
subjective importance that is driven by the participants’ interests and/or knowledge affects 
motivation. The older adult who enjoys birdwatching devotes time and energy to learning 
migratory patterns and eating habits – not because the goal will necessarily help him build 
relationships with loved ones (though, of course, he could join a birdwatching group), but 
because learning new information is his priority. The information has high subjective value (see 
McGillivray & Castel, 2017; McGillivray et al., 2015; and Middlebrooks et al., 2016). New 
information about his hobby can also be viewed as fitting within that individual’s schemas for 
learning. In contrast, when an experimenter randomly assigns some medication pairs to be 
associated with a severe health outcome, for example, the value of that information is being 
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manipulated more objectively (in fact, randomly). Objective value may be simplest to illustrate 
and manipulate in a lab-based task, but we also often encounter information that others view as 
important in the real world: our professor tells us that we should study certain information for an 
upcoming exam, our pharmacist tells us that we must take exactly 10mg of the currently-
prescribed medication, and our partner tells us that we really need to pick up chocolate milk from 
the supermarket.  
 When these two types of value – what we think is important and what others think is 
important – align, memory should be represented more densely than when those two are not 
aligned or, worse, when they are in conflict. The densest representation, to use Benjamin’s 
(2010) terms, should be for information in which subjective and objective value overlap – for 
example, if we see it as important to get our dosage exactly correct and the pharmacist mentions 
that they do too, that information is represented densely. A sparser representation would occur 
for information that is either one type of value or the other – for example, our partner thinks 
chocolate milk is important to buy at the store, and we think bread is important to buy. These two 
items still have value, but perhaps are less likely to be learned than if the idea of what is most 
important was aligned.  
 Finally, the sparsest representation of the three types would be for information about 
which the two types of value conflict – for example, I believe that learning the names of famous 
experimenters and the years in which they published major studies is important for my 
Psychology exam, but another student in the course tells me that those items will not be tested. 
(Alternatively, perhaps value conflict makes certain information distinct, and thus more 
memorable – certainly an empirical question.) In this case, I think something is important to 
know while another person thinks it’s unimportant. I may adjust my perception of subjective 
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value and/or my learning strategies based on this conflict. The extent to which I change my 
opinion of value depends, of course, on the person with whom my perception of importance in 
conflict: if I think something is important but a fellow student does not, I’m probably less likely 
to change my interpretation of value than if the professor tells me that what I thought was 
important to know actually is not. That is, the level of authority from which the “objective” value 
is projected affects my subjective value judgments.   
 I have not included one type of information in these examples: information that has 
neither objective nor subjective value. It would be interesting to compare whether conflict 
between subjective and objective value is learned more or less accurately than information that is 
not valuable at all, but according to the current framework, information with low value would 
have very sparse representation in memory (in a sense, if it is not important to anyone, why 
should the learner bother learning it?) and would thus be learned least accurately. 
 The subjective/objective value difference explored above is not the only way to 
conceptualize differences in value, however. Perhaps it is more generalizable to think of a two-
tiered value system: the first threshold is the motivation to actually begin a task (e.g., to show up 
to a memory study). For younger adults who participated in the Experiments in this Dissertation, 
the value earned was credit for their college courses (though many may also have been curious 
about the tasks at hand). For older adult participants, their motivation to attend was often to learn 
more about their memory, to “exercise” their mind, and, for some, to earn money as 
compensation for participating. If we consider this value “alpha” – the initial motivating force 
that leads people to begin a task – we can also consider “beta” value, or the in-task motivation to 
learn certain things (often at the expense of others), as well as how performance may improve 
with task experience.  
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 Consider a student in a college course. The alpha value for this student to go to lecture 
may be increased by thoughts of how much money it costs to attend college, how excited he is to 
learn the material, and/or how important the course is to his major or career goals, among others. 
These factors get him into the room. Then, once he is in class, the beta motivation to learn comes 
into play: how does he take notes to determine what is important to him to know? Does he 
simply transcribe the lecturer’s words, or does he exert some kind of learning strategy to pay 
attention to the most difficult or important content? The difference between alpha and beta here 
is not only the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, though those terms are 
certainly helpful, and the constructs do contribute to each value factor. Instead, this notion 
includes more of a first-order and second-order conceptualization of value, importance, and 
motivation which can be extended to learning and non-learning domains and can be adapted for 
individuals throughout the adult lifespan.   
 In conclusion, as is argued throughout this dissertation, the instances in which older 
adults seek to learn new information are not merely superficial exceptions to the overall pursuit 
of socioemotional goals, but are worth incorporating into theory. A focus on value as the driving 
force behind goal pursuit is both more general and more personalizable than other frameworks: 
rather than being pigeonholed into socio-emotional goal pursuit, we can consider a broad value 
mechanism that drives older adults’ decisions while also allowing for the fact that an individual’s 
perceptions about what is important can be highly personal. (Helpfully, those perceptions can 
also be affected by the experimenter’s instructions about what is important.) The current work 
sheds further light on the potentially contrasting theories of socio-emotional goal pursuit and a 
broader, more general value-based goal mechanism in older adulthood.  
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 Goal pursuit changes across the lifespan, as does the motivation to learn. The current 
research suggests that even in light of some deficits in memory that are associated with healthy 
cognitive aging, older adults can remember important associative information given the 
opportunity to learn with task experience. When we are presented with more information than we 
can hope to remember, we are often able to prioritize that which is most important to achieving 
our goal – whether that goal is to remember information about a social partner, information about 
a new medication regimen, or information that helps us achieve a high score on a test. Continued 
research can further investigate how motivation and value affect learning across the adult 
lifespan, but the current work suggests that, especially when given the opportunity to learn from 
their mistakes, people young and old can learn information that will help them achieve their 
goals. 
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Appendix 
Chapter 2, Study 3 
Items Used to Assess the Better-Than-Average Effect, Rated on a Scale from 1-9 
How would you say you compare to others your age in terms of leadership ability?  
How would you say you compare to others your age in terms of ability to get along with others?  
How would you say you compare to others your age in terms of honesty?  
How would you say you compare to others your age in terms of capacity for hard work?  
How would you say your memory compares with that of others your age?  
How would you say your memory for historical figures (e.g., Napoleon) compares with that of 
others your age?  
How would you say your memory for scientific terms (e.g., photosynthesis) compares with that 
of others your age?  
How would you say your memory for locations compares with that of others your age?  
How would you say your memory for people's names compares with that of others your age? 
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